The case involved a creditor who obtained a judgment in 1840 and sought to enforce it through execution on the debtor's real property in Illinois. After the property was appraised under a 1841 state law requiring bids of at least two-thirds the appraised value for a sale to proceed, the marshal refused to sell when no such bid was made. The creditor moved for an order directing sale to the highest bidder without regard to the valuation law or related court rule. The Supreme Court held that the motion should be granted and the marshal directed to sell without the 2/3 valuation requirement or further appraisal. The core reasoning was that the Contract Clause of the Constitution prohibits state laws that, even if framed as regulating remedies, impair the obligation of contracts by denying or obstructing enforcement rights that existed when the contract and judgment were made, as established in prior precedent like Bronson v. Kinzie.
The case concerned a dispute over title to land in Wisconsin that had belonged to Peter Grignon, who died intestate in 1823; his heirs claimed ownership while defendants traced title to a 1826 sale of the property by the estate administrator under a county court order. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below upholding the defendants' title. The Court held that the County Court of Brown County had jurisdiction over the subject matter of authorizing the sale of a decedent's real estate to pay debts, that its proceedings could not be collaterally attacked, and that titles acquired through such judicial sales are protected under longstanding principles of common law. The confirmation of the land by act of Congress was treated as equivalent to a patent, giving the estate a legal interest that could be sold.
The case involved Phalen and Morris suing Catts to recover $12,500 he had received after falsely claiming a prize in a Virginia-authorized lottery they managed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment for the plaintiffs. The core reasoning was that Catts's deliberate fraud in inducing payment created an independent obligation to refund the money regardless of whether the lottery itself was illegal, and the jury instructions he requested improperly omitted the fraud element while his minority defense failed because the relevant receipt of funds occurred after he reached majority.
The case involved competing claims to Creek tribal lands in Alabama under the 1832 Treaty of Washington, with plaintiff Ladiga asserting title as a head of family who had selected her improved residence and defendant Roland claiming under later patents issued for orphan selections directed by the President. The Supreme Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court's judgment against the plaintiff. It held that the treaty created distinct categories of selections, with those by heads of families expressly reserved from sale for five years and protected from intrusion, while orphan lands were under separate presidential authority that could not override valid prior selections. The Court reasoned that the sale and patents for the orphans' benefit directly violated the treaty's terms, that Ladiga qualified as a head of family entitled to the protections, and that her continuous efforts preserved her rights under the treaty.
This case involved a lawsuit brought in the name of the Mississippi governor on a sheriff's official bond for the benefit of New York citizens against Mississippi defendants, after the lower federal court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction due to the nominal parties all appearing to be from Mississippi. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and held that the circuit court had diversity jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that the governor was merely a nominal trustee with no real interest or control, so jurisdiction depends on the citizenship of the actual parties in interest—the New York plaintiffs and Mississippi defendants—consistent with the Constitution and Judiciary Act, as well as prior precedent like Browne v. Strode.
This case is a follow-up to an earlier dispute between the same parties involving the estate of David Peter and debts owed to the Bank of the United States. The prior decision had established that the will charged the real estate with payment of the debts, created a surviving power in the executor to sell the property to satisfy them, and confirmed that the debts remained unpaid. The Court held that principles of res judicata barred relitigation of those facts and issues, that the statute of limitations did not apply to the unexecuted trust, and that the lower court's decree denying relief was therefore erroneous. It reversed and remanded with directions to order a sale of the property and to determine the priority of certain claims.