Ellen Segal Huvelle

In United States v. Baylor, the defendant, serving a 25-month federal prison sentence for a non-violent offense, filed a third emergency motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) due to her chronic kidney disease and hypertension, which heighten her risk of severe illness from COVID-19. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the motion, reducing her sentence to time served and adding a three-month period of home detention as a condition of supervised release. The court reasoned that the emergence of COVID-19 cases at her facility, combined with evidence of inadequate medical management by the Bureau of Prisons, established extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors supported the reduction given her time served, lack of danger to the community, and model inmate status.

criminal law

In United States v. Price, the defendant, convicted after a 2008 jury trial of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of PCP and sentenced to a mandatory life term plus supervised release based on prior drug convictions, filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the motion and reduced the sentence to time served, with an added three-month period of home detention as a condition of supervised release. The court found extraordinary and compelling reasons for the reduction, including the defendant's age and health factors heightening COVID-19 risks, the First Step Act's reduction of the applicable mandatory minimum to 15 years, the non-violent nature of the offense, the defendant's good prison record and rehabilitation efforts, and unwarranted sentencing disparities with more culpable co-defendants. The court also determined that the defendant was not a danger to the community and that further incarceration would not serve the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

criminal law

The case United States v. Suggs was a federal criminal matter on appeal. The court affirmed the district court's ruling by reference to prior decisions including United States v. Powell, United States v. Glover, United States v. Brown, United States v. Dunlap, and United States v. Croft. Its core reasoning rested on the application of established precedent to the facts and legal questions presented in the appeal.

criminal law

In United States v. Harrison, defendant Ronald Harrison, who had pleaded guilty in 2012 to unlawful distribution of cocaine and was serving a 180-month sentence, filed an emergency motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) due to a medical condition that increased his risk of severe complications from COVID-19. The court granted the motion, reducing his sentence to time served with a three-month period of home detention as a condition of supervised release. It found that Harrison had exhausted administrative remedies and that extraordinary and compelling reasons existed based on his health, as conceded by the government. After weighing the § 3553(a) factors, the court concluded a reduction was warranted because Harrison's offense and history involved no violence, he had completed educational programs and maintained good conduct in prison, and release would better allow him to manage COVID-19 risks while still serving the goals of sentencing.

criminal lawhealthcare

This case involves a lawsuit by Democracy Partners and related plaintiffs against Project Veritas Action Fund and others, stemming from undercover operations that produced videos leading to contract cancellations by groups like AFSCME. Defendants sought reconsideration of the court's partial denial of summary judgment on First Amendment and causation issues related to certain damages, arguing that the court had misinterpreted deposition testimony from AFSCME witness Scott Frey about reasons for canceling a contract with Strategic Consulting. The court reviewed the full context of Frey's statements, including his testimony that plaintiffs had allowed their offices to be infiltrated by a Project Veritas operative, and concluded that a plausible interpretation supported plaintiffs' view of causation. Even without the disputed excerpts, the court found sufficient evidence of a material factual dispute regarding whether defendants' non-expressive conduct was a substantial factor in the damages. The motion for reconsideration was therefore denied.

free speechprocedure

In Samma v. U.S. Department of Defense, noncitizen service members challenged a 2017 DOD policy that imposed minimum duration and type-of-service requirements before they could obtain a Certification of Honorable Service (Form N-426) required to pursue expedited naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1440. The plaintiffs brought claims under the Administrative Procedure Act alleging that the policy was arbitrary and capricious, not in accordance with law, in excess of statutory authority, and resulted in unlawfully withheld agency action. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and vacated the minimum service requirements. The court reasoned that the statute limits DOD to a ministerial role of certifying honorable service based solely on an individual's past service record and does not authorize additional preconditions for certification.

immigrationfederal power

The case involved defendant Ernest Glover's motion for compassionate release from his federal prison sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute phencyclidine, after he had served about 70% of a 240-month term reduced by clemency. The court granted the motion, reducing his sentence to time served. The decision was based on extraordinary and compelling reasons due to Glover's health conditions that heightened his risk of severe illness from COVID-19, combined with consideration of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the significant time already served and evidence of rehabilitation.

criminal law

In this case, petitioner Abdur R. Mahdi, convicted on multiple federal and D.C. counts including racketeering and murder, sought to reopen his denied 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), alleging that his appointed counsel on appeal had abandoned claims, failed to advise him about seeking Supreme Court review of the certificate of appealability denial, and omitted arguments based on a later Supreme Court decision. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction, concluding that the motion was in substance a second or successive § 2255 petition because the allegations attacked the substance of the prior resolution rather than a procedural defect in the habeas proceedings' integrity. Under AEDPA and Gonzalez v. Crosby, such claims require pre-filing certification from the court of appeals based on new evidence or a new retroactive constitutional rule; the court therefore transferred the motions there under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Associated Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (AMB), an FHA-approved lender, challenging a HUD Administrative Law Judge's order requiring AMB to indemnify HUD for losses on a defaulted mortgage loan (the Springer Loan) that HUD had included in its bulk note sales program. AMB argued that HUD's sales program, which involved accelerating insurance claims and selling defaulted mortgages without prior notice-and-comment rulemaking, was unlawful and that the indemnification agreement should not apply. The district court granted HUD's motion to dismiss the complaint in full. The court held that AMB's claims were time-barred under the statute of limitations because the final agency action occurred no later than 2010 when HUD resumed bulk note sales, and any procedural challenges to the program's validity should have been raised then rather than years later when an offset was enforced.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case involves noncitizen U.S. military service members who sued the Department of Defense under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging a 2017 DoD policy that imposed minimum service requirements and certification restrictions before issuing N-426 forms needed to apply for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1440. Plaintiffs moved for class certification and appointment of counsel, which defendants opposed in part. The court granted the motion in part after modifying the proposed class definition to address valid objections, certifying a main class of noncitizens subject to the policy who have not received certified N-426s (excluding certain MAVNIs), plus an Active Subclass and a Reservist Subclass based on component and minimum service rules. Certification was appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(2) because the modified class satisfies commonality, typicality, adequacy, and other requirements for injunctive relief and consistent adjudication. The court also appointed plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel after finding they met Rule 23(g) factors.

immigrationcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

In United States v. Dorsey, defendant Tommie Dorsey, who was serving a 300-month sentence after pleading guilty to drug and RICO conspiracy charges, moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) on the grounds that his type 2 diabetes, hypertension, and obesity placed him at heightened risk of severe illness from COVID-19 while incarcerated. The government opposed the motion. The court denied the motion without prejudice, concluding that although the medical conditions combined with the pandemic qualified as extraordinary and compelling reasons, the § 3553(a) factors—particularly the seriousness of the underlying offense that included murder—showed that Dorsey would remain a danger to the community if released. The court also found insufficient evidence that Dorsey's rehabilitation and support network outweighed these considerations.

criminal law

In United States v. Brown, defendant Kevin Brown, serving a 135-month sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to defraud the government, aiding false tax refund claims, and identity fraud, moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He cited his age, race, grief from his brother's death, adjustment disorder, depression, and heightened COVID-19 risks at FCI Butner Low as extraordinary and compelling reasons for reducing his sentence. The court denied the motion, finding that Brown had exhausted administrative remedies but failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. It further held that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against any reduction, as the original sentence appropriately reflected the offense's seriousness, promoted respect for the law, and provided just punishment, especially given Brown's leadership role and the scale of the fraud.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge by the Humane Society and individual plaintiffs to the USDA's 2017 withdrawal of a proposed rule that would have strengthened enforcement of the Horse Protection Act by limiting self-regulation by horse industry organizations and banning certain devices linked to horse soring. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, including improper withdrawal of the rule before publication, failure to provide notice and comment, and acting contrary to the HPA's mandate. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the 2017 rule never became final because it was withdrawn prior to public inspection and publication, that plaintiffs' claims regarding procedural irregularities failed under relevant precedents like Kennecott, and that the HPA claim amounted to an impermissible programmatic attack rather than a challenge to specific agency action. The decision rested on the conclusion that no effective repeal occurred and that broad challenges to existing regulations could not proceed through judicial review.

business & regulatoryfederal powerenvironment

The case involved a smokers' rights organization and individual public housing residents challenging a HUD regulation that banned smoking in public housing units, including inside residents' homes, on grounds including lack of statutory authority, Tenth Amendment anticommandeering, Commerce Clause, and Fourth Amendment concerns. After the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants upholding the rule, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration and amendment of the judgment under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)(1), as well as to amend their complaint. The court denied the motion for reconsideration, finding no clear error because the plaintiffs largely rehashed prior arguments or raised new ones that were waived, and it denied the motion to amend the complaint; however, it granted in part the motion to amend the judgment by correcting the order to deny summary judgment on the Commerce Clause counts as moot rather than on the merits. The core reasoning rested on the high bar for Rule 59(e) relief requiring a showing that the original decision was clearly erroneous, along with limits on using such motions to relitigate issues or introduce new theories.

federal powerbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In United States v. Mohammed, defendant Fetehi Mohammed, convicted after pleading guilty to interstate transportation of money taken by fraud and engaging in monetary transactions derived from bank fraud, moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to reduce his 33-month prison sentence, citing his non-violent first-offender status and medical conditions including valvular heart disease and atrial fibrillation that heightened his COVID-19 risks in prison. The government opposed the motion. The court denied the motion, concluding that Mohammed had not shown extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction because his conditions were managed with medication without evidence they substantially diminished his ability to care for himself, and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including that he had served only about 10% of his term, counseled against release.

criminal lawprocedure

In this medical negligence case, plaintiff Lisa Lovelace sued Washington Hospital Center Corporation (d/b/a MedStar Washington Hospital Center) after suffering total blindness allegedly due to improper eye treatment while hospitalized for Stevens-Johnson Syndrome in 2016; her claims included medical negligence, negligent hiring and supervision, and lack of informed consent. The defendant moved for a protective order to permit ex parte interviews with approximately 36 of the plaintiff's treating physicians and counselors, arguing that formal discovery would be inefficient and that such interviews are allowed under HIPAA and D.C. law. The court granted the motion in part, authorizing limited ex parte communications with specified physicians while requiring the defendant to notify plaintiff's counsel of any such contacts and imposing restrictions on the scope of disclosed information. The ruling relied on D.C. precedent from Street v. Hedgepath permitting ex parte interviews when a plaintiff's medical condition is at issue, combined with a finding of good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 given the large number of providers involved.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involves defendant Davon Wheeler's motion for compassionate release from his 34-month federal prison sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, citing his chronic asthma, other medical conditions, mental illness, and heightened COVID-19 risks while incarcerated. The government opposed the motion, and the court denied it after finding that Wheeler had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The court reasoned that Wheeler's conditions did not substantially diminish his ability to provide self-care in the prison setting, consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements. Even assuming such reasons existed, the court found that the § 3553(a) factors, including that Wheeler had served only about 25% of his sentence and his prior illegal activity while on supervised release, counseled against reducing the term of imprisonment.

criminal law

This case involves a group of hospitals challenging the Secretary of Health and Human Services' setting of fixed loss thresholds for calculating Medicare outlier payments under the Inpatient Prospective Payment System for federal fiscal years 2005 and 2006. The hospitals sought a declaration that the thresholds were arbitrary and capricious along with an order remanding the matter for recalculation of payments. After settling the 2004 claims, the court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss the remaining claims. The core reasoning was that the challenges were barred by claim and issue preclusion because the hospitals had previously litigated or could have litigated the same issues regarding the Secretary's methodology and refusal to adjust the thresholds in earlier cases.

healthcareprocedure

The case involves plaintiffs, descendants of a Jewish Hungarian art collector whose family collection was seized during the Holocaust, suing the Republic of Hungary and affiliated museums and entities to recover dozens of specific artworks they allege were wrongfully retained. Defendants moved to dismiss the action. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, determining that subject-matter jurisdiction existed under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's expropriation exception for certain listed pieces but not for others. The core reasoning focused on whether each artwork was taken in violation of international law, the identity of the original owner, and whether the claims met statutory requirements for jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

The Fort Sill Apache Tribe sued the National Indian Gaming Commission and other federal defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging the agency's determination that the Tribe could not conduct gaming on its Akela Flats lands in New Mexico under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants. It held that the lands, acquired in trust after the IGRA's 1988 effective date, did not qualify for the restored lands exception because the Tribe lacked a sufficient modern connection to the area, with its government offices located over 540 miles away and no members residing nearby, in contrast to other tribes whose cases had satisfied the relevant factors.

federal powerbusiness & regulatory