J. Lawrence Irving

The case involved two defendants prosecuted for possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute after their vehicles were stopped at permanent U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints away from the Mexican border, where agents discovered methamphetamine and other items during questioning and searches. The court denied the defendants' motions to suppress the evidence and statements, finding that the initial stops, referrals to secondary inspection, and questioning comported with Fourth Amendment requirements under U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte for brief immigration inquiries without individualized suspicion. However, the court ruled that permanent checkpoints cannot be used to investigate narcotics offenses absent probable cause or consent, as such use deviates materially from the checkpoints' authorized immigration-enforcement purpose. The core reasoning emphasized that routine immigration stops at these locations are permissible, but extending them to drug investigations requires separate legal justification to avoid unconstitutional expansions of authority.

criminal lawimmigrationcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved defendants charged with money laundering and currency reporting violations who moved to suppress evidence obtained from a roving wiretap on defendant Petti under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11), arguing the statute was unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it lacked the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The court upheld the constitutionality of the roving wiretap provision. It reasoned that the statute still requires a judge to make probable cause findings as to the identified person and the offense, while the particularity requirement is satisfied by specifying the person whose communications are targeted and showing their intent to change facilities to evade interception, rather than fixed locations or phones.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a father suing a court-appointed guardian ad litem and her sponsoring nonprofit organization, alleging that the guardian acted outside her authority and violated his constitutional rights during an investigation and reports in his child's dependency and custody proceedings. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants. It reasoned that the guardian ad litem performed functions integral to the judicial process, similar to social workers and probation officers preparing reports, and was therefore entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity to protect independent fact-finding, with procedural safeguards like appeals available to address misconduct.

family lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved consolidated securities litigation in which plaintiffs asserted claims under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, plus pendent state claims, arising from the sale of Nucorp securities. Some defendants reached a $41 million settlement that required court approval of its good faith and the extinguishment of contribution and indemnification claims by non-settling defendants. The court upheld the magistrate's order, finding the settlement in good faith under California Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 and barring the claims under both federal and state law. The reasoning was that federal securities laws permit implied contribution rights (but not indemnification) that can be extinguished by a partial settlement representing the settling parties' fair share, evaluated through factors such as independent judicial oversight, settlement adequacy, and proportionality to culpability.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In United States v. Orozco, numerous defendants charged in a 270-count indictment with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine, extortion, and related offenses moved to suppress evidence derived from eleven court-authorized wiretap orders issued over a one-year period targeting phones and locations in California, Idaho, and Florida. The court considered challenges to the orders' legality, the sufficiency of the supporting applications, and the government's post-interception procedures, with particular focus on whether intercepted communications could be disclosed and used in grand jury proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 2517. The court ruled that grand jury testimony qualifies as testimony under oath within the meaning of § 2517(3) and that § 2517(5) applies to such proceedings, requiring judicial review for statutory compliance before use of interceptions for offenses not specified in the original authorization. Its reasoning drew on the sworn nature of grand jury testimony, the Fifth Amendment's grand jury requirement, precedents from multiple circuits, and the need to prevent potential subterfuge while protecting Fourth Amendment interests prior to indictment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned cross-motions for summary judgment challenging the constitutionality of California Labor Code § 1153(c), which permits union-shop agreements in agricultural employment but defines membership to require satisfaction of all reasonable terms set by the union, including good standing under its constitution and bylaws. Agricultural workers covered by such an agreement sued, arguing that the provision infringed their First Amendment rights to free speech and association by giving unions excessive control over continued employment. The court held the statute unconstitutional, finding it constituted state action that failed strict scrutiny because it did not advance a compelling interest through the least intrusive means; unlike the federal NLRA, which limits termination to nonpayment of dues, the California law allowed subjective union determinations that chilled protected rights without adequate safeguards.

labor & employmentfree speechcivil rights

This case involved multiple federal indictments charging numerous defendants with conspiracy to possess and distribute large quantities of marijuana (and in some instances cocaine), along with related narcotics, firearms, tax, and racketeering violations. After one co-defendant became a government informant following his own indictment, defense counsel filed motions to dismiss the indictments, alleging Sixth Amendment violations under Massiah from post-indictment contacts, improper interference with attorney-client relationships through a shared investigator, prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury, and requesting disclosure of grand jury transcripts. The court denied all motions, finding that defendants lacked standing or that the informant did not deliberately elicit incriminating statements in most instances, that any contacts did not amount to unconstitutional interference or misconduct, and that the Jencks Act already provided the appropriate mechanism for obtaining relevant materials without broader disclosure.

criminal lawprocedure

The SEC sued Richard L. Burns, chairman and CEO of Nucorp Energy, Inc., for alleged violations of federal securities laws, including Count V claiming he induced purchases of Nucorp stock during an ongoing distribution in violation of Rule 10b-6. Burns moved for summary judgment, arguing that Rule 10b-6 does not apply to individual officers or directors and that scienter must be alleged and proved. The court held that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires scienter for a Rule 10b-6 violation and that the original complaint failed to sufficiently allege it, but granted the SEC leave to amend because the rule applies to officers and directors of an issuer and amendment would not be futile. Accordingly, the court dismissed Count V without prejudice and permitted the SEC to file an amended complaint within ten days.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In United States v. Meyer, the defendant was charged in an indictment with multiple counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) for transporting material involving the sexual exploitation of children and under 18 U.S.C. § 545 for importing obscene merchandise, with each count tied to a single photograph from a binder seized at the border. The defendant moved to strike or consolidate counts on grounds that the indictment was multiplicitous, as all items were transported and imported simultaneously in one transaction. The court determined that the statutes were ambiguous as to the allowable unit of prosecution and applied the rule of lenity, granting the motion and ordering the government to elect one count from each set of charges, with the remaining counts to be dismissed.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Meyer, the defendant was indicted on multiple counts including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 for inducing minors to engage in sexually explicit conduct to produce visual depictions in March 1984 and June 1983, prior to the enactment of the Child Protection Act of 1984. The court granted the motion to dismiss counts one and two on ex post facto grounds. The 1984 amendments removed the prior requirement that production be for pecuniary gain and redefined a minor as a person under 18 (previously under 16), and the court determined that the criminal act of production was completed before the statute's effective date. The court reasoned that § 2251 criminalizes only the production itself, not later transportation of the depictions, which was separately charged under § 2252, and that the changes imposed punishment for acts not criminal at the time or increased the prescribed punishment.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved investors in J. David Entities suing multiple securities brokerage firms and individuals, alleging a conspiracy to issue and finance securities in violation of California law and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, along with related claims of RICO violations, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and securities fraud under Rule 10b-5. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants made false representations about the entities' financial condition, leading them to make or continue investments, and profited through fees and kickbacks. The court dismissed the RICO claims (1-3) without leave to amend, finding that the complaint failed to allege an enterprise or any injury beyond that from the predicate acts, and failed to specify which subsection of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 was violated. It also dismissed the fraud, negligent misrepresentation, fiduciary duty, and securities fraud claims (4-9, 13-14) with leave to amend because the allegations lacked the particularity required by Rule 9(b), such as identifying specific statements, actors, and securities transactions.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) suing Center City Motors, Inc., Center City Leasing, Inc., and the Swinks under ERISA for liability on a deficiency in an underfunded employee pension plan that terminated in 1975. PBGC claimed the defendants formed a commonly controlled group under 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b), making the Swinks' rental property proprietorship part of a single employer liable under § 1362. The Swinks moved for summary judgment, arguing their net lease of property to the corporation did not qualify as a "trade or business," so they were not part of such a group. The court denied the motion, holding that ERISA's goal of protecting retirement benefits requires a broad interpretation of "trade or business," that a net lease between commonly controlled entities does not exempt the arrangement, and that facts supported viewing the rental activity as integrated with the Swinks' overall business operations.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved plaintiffs who sued Aetna Life Insurance and unnamed DOE defendants in California state court, alleging breach of statutory duties under California Insurance Code § 790.03. Aetna removed the action to federal court based on diversity of citizenship and moved to dismiss the DOE defendants, while plaintiffs moved to remand the case. The court denied Aetna's motion to dismiss and granted remand, concluding that the statute applies to insurance company employees and agents based on implications from California Supreme Court precedent and other state court decisions. It further found that the DOE defendants were sufficiently identified as likely California residents whose presence would destroy complete diversity jurisdiction.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In United States v. Van Brandy, three defendants were arrested in August 1982 on suspicion of attempted bank robbery after a confidential informant alerted authorities; an original indictment charged conspiracy and attempted robbery, but a superseding indictment filed in December added four new counts for being ex-felons in possession of weapons and carrying a firearm during a felony. The defendants moved to dismiss the new counts under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), arguing they were not filed within thirty days of arrest despite the government having known the relevant facts and identities well in advance. The court severed the original counts, proceeded to trial on them (resulting in convictions for two defendants), and then addressed the remaining counts. It held that the thirty-day indictment deadline applied to the additional charges because the information was available earlier, rejected the government's reliance on precedent allowing superseding indictments at any time without prejudice, and dismissed counts 3 through 6 with prejudice after weighing the seriousness of the offenses, the circumstances of the delay, and the impact on the administration of justice and the Act itself. The core reasoning focused on the need for a sanction to deter unnecessary delays and ensure orderly prosecution when the government could have presented all evidence to the grand jury initially.

criminal lawprocedure