This case concerns whether several non-party journalists should be held in civil contempt for refusing to identify confidential sources during depositions in Wen Ho Lee's lawsuit against the Department of Justice. The court held each journalist in civil contempt of its prior October 9, 2003 order requiring them to answer questions about government sources who provided information on Wen Ho Lee, imposing a $500-per-day fine stayed pending appeal. The core reasoning was that the journalists' refusals to comply, based on assertions of reporter's privilege, claims of ignorance, or arguments that questions concerned unrelated matters, violated the clear terms of the discovery order and lacked credibility.
In Lee v. United States Department of Justice, Dr. Wen Ho Lee sued the Departments of Justice and Energy and the FBI under the Privacy Act, alleging that the agencies improperly disclosed personal information about him to the media during investigations into suspected espionage at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The plaintiff issued subpoenas to journalists who had published stories containing the allegedly leaked information, and the journalists moved to quash them based on a reporter's privilege. The court ruled that the District of Columbia Shield Law does not apply because evidentiary privileges in federal-question cases are governed exclusively by federal law under Fed. R. Evid. 501. Relying on Branzburg v. Hayes, the court reasoned that there is no absolute First Amendment privilege for journalists to withhold sources, and that lower courts must balance the interests of justice against the need to protect confidential sources on a case-by-case basis.
The case arose from a series of agreements between Gulf Resources, its subsidiary, Occidental, and the Republic of the Congo for the purchase and sale of Congo's royalty oil between 1993 and 1996, with Gulf alleging breach of contract, conversion, tortious interference, and related claims after Congo allegedly stopped deliveries, causing Gulf over $100 million in losses including a failed merger. Congo moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, asserting sovereign immunity. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, holding that the commercial-activity exception did not apply because Congo's conduct produced no direct effects in the United States and that Congo had not waived immunity by its conduct or agreements, which provided for arbitration in Paris under French law.
Barrick Goldstrike Mines sued the EPA under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging the agency's use of guidance documents, letters, and preambles to reinterpret EPCRA provisions on 'manufacture' and 'process' of toxic chemicals and to limit the de minimis exemption for mixtures. These changes expanded reporting obligations under the Toxic Release Inventory program for the company's gold mining operations without formal rulemaking. The court considered cross-motions for summary judgment, analyzing whether the EPA's interpretations warranted deference and complied with the statute's text and APA procedures. It concluded that the EPA's expansive reading of 'process' and related terms impermissibly disregarded statutory language requiring chemicals to be prepared after their manufacture, rendering the interpretations invalid.
The case involved Atlantic Tele-Network (ATN), an American company that built a telecommunications system in Guyana under a contract granting it an exclusive license and a guaranteed return, after which Guyana allegedly blocked rate increases and planned a competing system using funds from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). ATN sued IDB, U.S. federal officials overseeing IDB lending, and Guyana, seeking to enjoin the loan and compel enforcement of federal statutes like the Inter-American Development Bank Act and Foreign Assistance Act, plus a contract claim against Guyana. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that ATN lacked Article III standing against the federal defendants because any injury was not redressable, that the statutes provided no private right of action, that IDB enjoyed immunity, and that the contract claim against Guyana failed due to a forum-selection clause. The reasoning relied on precedents such as Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife for standing and analogous cases denying standing in similar foreign-aid disputes.
This case is a wrongful death action brought by the widow, children, and estates of Malcolm Kerr against Iran and its Ministry of Information and Security for his 1984 assassination in Beirut, Lebanon, by Hizbollah gunmen acting with Iranian support as an act of terrorism. The court entered a default judgment for the plaintiffs after the defendants failed to respond and evidence was presented ex parte showing Iran's sponsorship of the killing. Jurisdiction exists under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for claims involving extrajudicial killings by state sponsors of terrorism, even though Iran was designated after the murder, because the assassination contributed to that designation. The court found the killing deliberate, unsanctioned by any tribunal, and directly linked to Iranian agents based on U.S. intelligence and prior similar cases.
