The case involved a habeas corpus petition by Wilhoit, who had been convicted and sentenced on three counts under the Mann Act (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 398, 399, 400) for transporting a woman for prostitution; he received concurrent sentences of five and seven-and-a-half years on two counts and a suspended five-year sentence with probation on the third. He challenged the convictions on grounds of double jeopardy from multiple sentences for the same offense, perjured testimony by a government witness, incompetent testimony by a co-defendant's wife, and lack of jurisdiction because the crimes were not committed in the Northern District of Tennessee. The court dismissed the petition and denied the writ, holding that habeas corpus does not lie to challenge concurrent sentences or evidentiary rulings from trial, that the Mann Act sections define distinct offenses so separate sentences are permissible, that the perjury and spousal testimony issues were either not shown to involve deliberate prosecutorial deception or were not constitutional violations reviewable in habeas, and that jurisdiction and evidence questions are not proper subjects for the writ.
The case involved a federal prisoner, Peter J. Innes, Jr., who had been sentenced by an Army court-martial and was serving his term in a U.S. penitentiary. He petitioned for an injunction, declaratory judgment, and related writ to require that his confinement be calculated solely under military law in effect at the time of sentencing and to bar application of the civil conditional release statute. The court dismissed the petition, holding that the Declaratory Judgments Act does not apply to suits against the United States, that the request for injunctive relief was an improper original mandamus action outside the district court's jurisdiction, and that any habeas claim was premature. The court further reasoned that the underlying issues had already been resolved in its prior decision in Fitch v. Hiatt, which held that military prisoners confined in federal penitentiaries receive only the good-time credits and parole eligibility provided by statutes governing civilian prisoners.
This case arose when an insured driver sued his auto insurer for breach of contract after the insurer refused to defend him in a state court damages action stemming from a car-train collision, leading to an unpaid judgment against him. The insurer then filed a third-party complaint against the driver's attorney, claiming the attorney negligently failed to move for a new trial after the verdict, which allegedly caused or increased the damages. The court granted the attorney's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the third-party complaint. It reasoned that the pleadings alleged negligence without any claim that the verdict was erroneous or would have been reversed on appeal, and that the insurer could not equitably shift blame for failing to defend the underlying suit itself.
This case involved a trademark dispute between G. F. Heublein & Bro., which had used the 'Old Raven' mark for whiskey prior to Prohibition and sought to resume sales after repeal, and Bushmill Wine & Products Co. (later Brookside and Breck entities), which began selling 'Raven Run' whiskey in Pennsylvania in 1935 and 'Old Raven' in 1937 through the state liquor control system. The plaintiff obtained federal registration of 'Old Raven' in 1939 but made no sales in Pennsylvania until after learning of the defendant's activities, at which point it opposed the defendant's federal registration efforts and sought an injunction and damages. The court found that the defendant had adopted and used the marks in Pennsylvania first, built substantial sales through state stores, and that the plaintiff had unreasonably delayed asserting its rights. Based on principles of laches and prior local use, the court denied the plaintiff's claims, protected the defendant's rights to the marks within Pennsylvania, and enjoined the plaintiff from using them in the state while awarding no damages to either side.
This case involved a lawsuit by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division seeking an injunction to prevent a rug and carpet manufacturing company from violating the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay minimum wages and overtime to home workers who prepared raw rags. The court found that the home workers were independent contractors rather than employees, based on the lack of employer control over their methods, hours, tools, or assistants, as outlined in their agreements and work practices. The opinion relied on definitions in the Act and precedents distinguishing independent contractors from employees, noting that the broad 'suffer or permit to work' language did not override traditional tests for employment status. The court also observed that any potential violations had been discontinued well before the suit, with no likelihood of repetition, leading it to refuse the requested injunction.
This case involves a bankruptcy trustee for Ridgway Corporation suing Pennsylvania tenants for unpaid rent on mortgaged property, claiming rights as a mortgagee in possession after default on a 1932 mortgage assigned in part to the bankrupt entity. The defendants moved to dismiss, citing lack of jurisdiction due to citizenship issues, failure to join necessary parties, insufficient consent from co-mortgagees, and inadequate allegations about title and the mortgage's priority over the leases. The court sustained the motion to dismiss, reasoning that Pennsylvania law distinguishes between leases predating or postdating the mortgage and whether the mortgage assigns rents, profits, and issues; without allegations specifying these facts, the trustee's right to collect rent directly from tenants could not be determined, though leave was granted to file an amended complaint.