Norma Holloway Johnson

John E. Moore sued President George W. Bush, Senator Bill Nelson, the NSA, the Department of Justice, a county sheriff's department, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the ACLU of Florida, and another entity, alleging that government agencies had implanted him with a microchip to control his brain data and that the advocacy groups had failed to respond to his letters. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the claims were so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be devoid of merit, consisting of fanciful conspiracy theories unsupported by any plausible basis. Some FOIA claims against the NSA and DOJ were left pending.

procedure

This case involved motions by a criminal defendant, his attorneys, and their law firm to quash grand jury subpoenas duces tecum seeking records of legal fees paid in connection with the defendant's representation on drug conspiracy charges. The court denied the motions to quash, to appoint independent counsel, and to intervene. It held that the subpoenas sought non-privileged fee information relevant to an ongoing grand jury investigation, that the government had not created a conflict of interest, and that the defendant had made no factual showing that the grand jury was being misused for trial discovery rather than legitimate further inquiry into unindicted persons or uncharged conduct.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Pollard, the defendant, who had pled guilty in 1986 to conspiracy to commit espionage and received a life sentence, filed a second motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in 2000 seeking resentencing on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and failure to file a notice of appeal. The court held that the motion constituted a second or successive petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), requiring certification by a panel of the court of appeals before it could be considered, and that the defendant did not meet the pre-AEDPA McCleskey cause-and-prejudice standard to avoid this requirement. The court further concluded that the motion was untimely under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations and that equitable tolling did not apply due to insufficient evidence of extraordinary circumstances preventing timely filing. Accordingly, the court declined to consider the motion on the merits.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an inmate's Freedom of Information Act requests to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of California and the FBI for records related to his 1989 criminal conviction. The plaintiff sued the Central District after delays in receiving documents, leading to disputes over which DOJ components were proper defendants and whether referrals of records between agencies constituted improper withholding. The court initially addressed motions to substitute the Department of Justice as the sole defendant and to join the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys and FBI as parties, but later granted reconsideration to substitute DOJ alone. It then granted DOJ's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the agencies had provided all responsive documents permitted under FOIA exemptions and the Privacy Act, with no genuine issues of material fact remaining.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case concerns motions by an Independent Counsel to compel three White House officials to testify before a federal grand jury investigating matters involving President Clinton, including conversations with senior advisers Bruce Lindsey and Sidney Blumenthal. The court granted the motions to compel Lindsey and Blumenthal to answer questions, while denying the motion as to the third witness as moot. It held that the presidential communications privilege presumptively applies to the relevant conversations but is not absolute and can be overcome by the need for evidence in a criminal grand jury proceeding, drawing on precedents such as United States v. Nixon and In re Sealed Case. The court also considered but rejected Lindsey's additional claims of governmental attorney-client privilege and work product protection in this context.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a challenge by the American Society of Dermatology and two physicians to the Secretary of Health and Human Services' use of CPT codes from American Medical Association committees in administering the Medicare Part B physician fee schedule under the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale system. Plaintiffs claimed violations of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and improper delegation of statutory authority in how the codes and relative value units were developed and adopted. The district court granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment, denied plaintiffs' motion, and dismissed the case after allowing an amended complaint. The core reasoning was that the Medicare statute expressly bars judicial or administrative review of the Secretary's coding system and relative value determinations, and the APA does not confer jurisdiction over the claims.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

The City of Klamath Falls sued the Secretary of the Interior to challenge the designation of an eleven-mile section of the Klamath River as a National Scenic River under the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, which blocked the city's proposed hydroelectric project by preventing a FERC license. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants and upheld the designation after reviewing the administrative record. It found that the Secretary had authority to act on the Oregon governor's recommendation, properly determined the river's eligibility as a scenic river, and complied with NEPA by preparing an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact rather than a full EIS. The court also rejected claims that prior congressional studies or amendments had removed the Secretary's designation power under the statute.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

In Sherwood v. Washington Post, former Post reporter Thomas Sherwood sued his employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid overtime compensation covering the years 1983 through 1989, alleging he regularly worked more than forty hours per week without receiving overtime pay. After a bifurcated trial on liability, the district court held that the Post was not liable because Sherwood's primary duties as a reporter qualified for the FLSA's professional exemption. The court found that his work required invention, imagination, and talent, as he originated story ideas, cultivated sources, analyzed complex political events, and wrote engaging, analytical prose rather than performing routine fact-gathering under direct editorial instructions. The decision rested on evidence of Sherwood's autonomy in selecting and developing stories, his acknowledged talent, and the distinction between his role and that of nonexempt reporters at smaller publications or on routine beats.

labor & employment

This case involves plaintiffs suing the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of needy children and adults, alleging that the District's practices and procedures for Medicaid applications violate Title XIX of the Social Security Act, its regulations, the Due Process Clause, and D.C. Code provisions. The court ruled on defendants' motions to dismiss, addressing challenges to standing that turned on the existence of an enforceable private right under § 1983 for the Title XIX claims. Applying the test from Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn. and considering Suter v. Artist M., the court held that plaintiffs have a § 1983 remedy for all but one of the Title XIX violations, denied dismissal of the due process claim and official policy allegations, and granted the first motion to dismiss only in part.

healthcarecivil rights

This case was an ERISA action by the plaintiff to recover benefits under a group insurance plan after an initial judgment for the defendant was reversed on appeal, resulting in a $23,811.39 award to the plaintiff. The court addressed the plaintiff's petition for attorneys' fees and costs, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation to deny fees while awarding costs under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d). The decision applied the five-factor Hummell test rather than a presumption favoring fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs, as in civil rights cases under Hensley, because ERISA's policy considerations differ, the plaintiff sought only personal recovery without vindicating broader public interests, and the defendant had not acted in bad faith.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved the Fair Employment Council and two Black testers who applied to defendant BMC's employment agency for job referrals but were not referred, while white testers with similar qualifications were referred; the plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the D.C. Human Rights Act, and also sought to hold franchisor Snelling liable based on its agreement with BMC. The court addressed motions to dismiss, focusing primarily on whether the testers had standing despite not genuinely seeking jobs. It held that the testers had standing under Title VII because the statute's language, like the Fair Housing Act provision in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, creates an enforceable right to nondiscriminatory treatment whose violation constitutes injury for Article III purposes. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a but denied the defendants' other dismissal motions, finding genuine issues of material fact on the agency relationship and allowing the remaining claims to proceed while deferring the D.C. Human Rights Act statute of limitations issue.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The United States sued Virginia L. Ferrara, Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the New Mexico Supreme Court's Disciplinary Board, seeking to enjoin a state disciplinary proceeding against Assistant U.S. Attorney John Doe for communicating with a represented criminal defendant without counsel's consent during a D.C. prosecution. Doe, licensed in New Mexico, had faced charges under New Mexico and D.C. ethics rules after the D.C. court referred the matter. The defendant moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia. The court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding it lacked personal jurisdiction over Ferrara under the D.C. long-arm statute because she had not transacted business in the District. The opinion added that, had it reached the merits, the Supremacy Clause would not bar the proceeding, as Congress authorized state ethical regulation of DOJ attorneys through appropriations acts requiring them to be duly licensed.

federal powerprocedurecriminal law

The case concerned a Medicare provider's challenge to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board's (PRRB) ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the 1983 fiscal year cost report reimbursement. The provider filed its appeal almost three years after receiving the Notice of Program Reimbursement, missing the 180-day statutory deadline under 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a), and the PRRB found no good cause to waive the limit under the applicable regulation. The court held that it possessed jurisdiction to review the PRRB's denial of the waiver and upheld the validity of the good cause regulation, but concluded that the PRRB did not abuse its discretion in refusing to extend the filing period. The reasoning centered on the provider's failure to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for PRRB review, the inadequacy of a later position paper as timely notice, and the fact that counsel's neglect did not constitute good cause.

healthcareprocedurefederal power

This case involved plaintiffs from the timber industry in the Pacific Northwest and Southeast challenging two regulations under the Endangered Species Act (ESA): the Secretary of the Interior's definition of "harm" in the prohibition against "taking" endangered species, which includes significant habitat modification that actually kills or injures wildlife, and the extension of that prohibition to all threatened species. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, upholding both regulations as consistent with the ESA and finding the harm definition not void for vagueness. It reasoned under Chevron that the statute's broad language on "take" and the Secretary's discretion under section 4(d) to prohibit any acts for any threatened species supported the agency's permissible interpretations, with no requirement for species-by-species findings.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned the interpretation of the Pickle Amendment to the Medicaid Act in states that have elected the § 209(b) option, which allows them to use more restrictive eligibility criteria than federal SSI standards. Plaintiffs challenged a regulation issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services that permitted § 209(b) states to consider OASDI cost-of-living adjustments when determining Medicaid eligibility for individuals who would otherwise qualify for SSI but for those adjustments. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant Secretary and denied the plaintiffs' motion, finding no material facts in dispute. It held that the regulation was consistent with the statutory language and that the agency's interpretation was reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., even if the amendment's wording was ambiguous.

healthcarefederal power

This case involved a Freedom of Information Act request by the New York Times for a voice recording from the Challenger space shuttle that captured the astronauts' voices and background sounds before the 1986 disaster. NASA withheld the tape under FOIA Exemption 6, asserting it would invade the personal privacy of the astronauts' families. After remand from the Court of Appeals, which had determined that the tape qualified as a "similar file" under Exemption 6, the district court balanced the families' privacy interests against the public interest in disclosure. The court granted summary judgment to NASA, concluding that release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy because the families had a substantial interest in avoiding additional anguish from public exposure of the recordings, while any public interest was minimal or speculative given that an accurate transcript had already been provided.

free speech

The case involved a Freedom of Information Act request by the Times Journal Company for records from the Department of the Air Force concerning analyses and results of Computer Assisted Telephone Interview surveys conducted since 1985 on topics like pay and working conditions. The Air Force withheld approximately six thousand pages of documents under Exemption 5, claiming they fell within the deliberative process privilege. The court granted summary judgment to the Department, holding that the survey results were pre-decisional and deliberative because they consisted of opinions used by policymakers to formulate personnel policies, and their release could inhibit candid responses from participants and harm the decision-making process.

procedurefederal power

This case concerns the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's appointment of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation as conservator for two Texas savings and loan associations, Mercury and Milam, based on findings of insolvency, substantial dissipation of assets due to regulatory violations and unsafe practices, and an unsafe condition to transact business. The associations' owner and directors sued to remove the conservator, seeking judicial review under the Home Owner’s Loan Act. After consolidating cases transferred from Texas district courts and granting summary judgment on most claims, the court held a trial on the remaining issue and determined that the Bank Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record and were not arbitrary or capricious. The court concluded that the statutory grounds for the appointment were met and dismissed the action.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved plaintiff John Henry Hosford, Jr. suing the estate of Vincent A. Campbell for negligence, assault and battery, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff alleged that the decedent had misrepresented his sexual history, leading the plaintiff to enter a relationship that exposed him to the AIDS virus and caused mental distress, though the plaintiff tested negative. The defendants moved to dismiss, citing the District of Columbia's Dead Man's Statute among other defenses. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the statute barred the claims because they relied solely on the plaintiff's uncorroborated testimony about statements by the deceased, with no other evidence to support the alleged misrepresentations.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Ricardo Maldonado-Sanchez, who acquired dual U.S.-Venezuelan citizenship at birth and executed a formal renunciation of U.S. citizenship in 1967 at the U.S. Embassy in Venezuela, resulting in a Certificate of Loss of Nationality. In 1986, after being denied a U.S. passport, he sued the Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), claiming the renunciation was involuntary and unknowing due to alleged coercion and misinformation from his father. The court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the action because the 1986 passport denial constituted the relevant final administrative action triggering the five-year period. On the merits, however, the court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding no genuine issue of material fact that the renunciation was voluntary and intentional, as the plaintiff had executed the required oath after being advised by a consular official that it was permanent. The decision rested on the absence of evidence beyond the plaintiff's later self-serving declarations to show lack of voluntariness or intent.

immigrationprocedure