Edward Huggins Johnstone

This case involved a claim for disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits by a claimant in her mid-thirties who alleged disability due to a work-related back injury and related physical and mental limitations. The ALJ denied benefits at step five of the sequential evaluation process after finding the claimant could perform a range of light work, relying on a vocational expert's testimony identifying jobs such as copy machine operator that she could still do. The court decided to remand the case to the Commissioner for a new decision and new vocational hypotheticals and testimony. The core reasoning was that the controlling hypothetical posed to the vocational expert failed to incorporate all of the claimant's vocationally significant limitations, including moderate limitations in maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods as assessed by state agency psychologists, and there were discrepancies between the RFC findings, medical opinions, and the hypothetical questions.

healthcareprocedurefederal power

This case involved a claim for Social Security disability insurance benefits in which the plaintiff alleged onset of disability on September 15, 1998, due to diffuse body pain, elevated liver enzymes, and related mental impairments, before her date last insured of December 31, 2001. The ALJ denied benefits, finding no severe physical impairments and rejecting the alleged onset date based on insufficient corroboration and other factors. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, determining that the claimant's testimony, lay witness statements, and medical expert opinions provided substantial evidence supporting disability as of the alleged onset date under SSR 83-20, and that the ALJ's credibility assessment was inadequate. The case was remanded to the Commissioner for calculation and payment of past-due Title II benefits.

federal powerhealthcareprocedure

This case concerns Carrie Gentry's federal habeas corpus petition after her state conviction for second-degree manslaughter and driving under the influence, which stemmed from a fatal car accident. Gentry had challenged the conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds because five prosecution witnesses testified via two-way closed-circuit television rather than in person. The district court previously issued a conditional writ of habeas corpus requiring the Commonwealth to retry her within ninety days or face an absolute writ vacating the conviction. Because the state neither retried Gentry nor pursued its appeal, the court now converts the writ to absolute and orders the state judgment of conviction vacated to eliminate ongoing collateral consequences such as loss of driving privileges and felony status. The decision rests on precedents recognizing federal habeas courts' authority to fashion relief that removes such burdens even after a sentence has been fully served.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition by Gentry challenging her state convictions for second-degree manslaughter and driving under the influence arising from a fatal traffic accident. The court had previously found that admission of expert witness testimony via two-way closed-circuit television violated Gentry's confrontation rights under Maryland v. Craig but deemed the error harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson because the testimony likely would not have changed if given in person. On a motion to alter or amend the judgment, the court reexamined the harmless-error analysis in light of Sixth Circuit precedent in Brumley v. Wingard and Stoner v. Sowders, which require evaluating whether the remaining evidence without the improperly admitted testimony would support the verdict. The court concluded that the expert testimony on blood alcohol, DNA, fiber identification, and occupant roles was essential to the prosecution's case, and without it the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. Accordingly, the court vacated its prior judgment, denied summary judgment for the respondent, and conditionally granted habeas relief requiring retrial within ninety days.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This habeas corpus case involves petitioner Carrie Gentry's challenge to her Kentucky state convictions for second-degree manslaughter and DUI, arising from a fatal car accident. Gentry argued that allowing five prosecution expert witnesses to testify via two-way live video conferencing, rather than in person, violated her Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights because the state offered no compelling interest or necessity finding to justify the remote testimony, contrary to Maryland v. Craig. The district court agreed that the Kentucky courts had unreasonably applied Craig and that the procedure infringed her confrontation rights, but concluded the error was harmless because it did not substantially affect the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the court granted the state's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the habeas petition.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a former employee's claims that her employer, HealthSouth, discriminated against her based on sex by not promoting her to Area Controller, retaliated against her for complaining about sex discrimination in a subordinate's pay, and constructively discharged her by creating intolerable working conditions, in violation of Kentucky law (KRS 344.040). The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact. The court reasoned that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie discrimination or retaliation case because she was offered an interview for the position but declined it, effectively withdrawing her application, and that the single disputed incident and other circumstances were not severe or pervasive enough to constitute an objectively intolerable work environment supporting a constructive discharge claim.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved Ralcorp Holdings, which administered an ERISA-governed health plan for employees of its subsidiary and paid $111,505.44 in medical expenses for plan beneficiary Warren Fricke after he was injured in a car accident. Fricke reached a structured settlement with the third-party tortfeasor that included annuity payments but made no provision for reimbursing the plan. Ralcorp filed suit seeking reimbursement and moved for summary judgment, arguing it was entitled to equitable relief in the form of a constructive trust over the settlement proceeds. The court granted the motion, holding that Ralcorp's claim for reimbursement from funds traceable to the tort recovery qualified as equitable relief permitted under ERISA and that allowing Fricke to retain the payments would frustrate the plan's reimbursement provisions.

healthcareprocedurepropertytorts & liability

The case involved David Sacharnoski, a former truck driver for Bunzl Distribution, who sued the company for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Kentucky law. He alleged that Bunzl forced him to falsify employment records and then used those records as grounds to terminate him. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that the alleged conduct could not reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. The reasoning applied precedents such as Humana of Kentucky v. Seitz and Bevins v. Dollar General, which require conduct that deviates from all reasonable bounds of decency and is utterly intolerable in a civilized community, and found that this employment dispute fell short of that standard.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case arose after a 14-year-old student killed three classmates and wounded others at Heath High School in Kentucky in 1997, with plaintiffs (the victims' parents) alleging that the shooter was influenced by violent movies, video games, and internet materials. The complaint asserted negligence, strict products liability, and RICO claims against the producers and distributors of The Basketball Diaries, various video games, and websites containing adult content. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss all claims. It held that the defendants owed no duty of care because the shooter's criminal acts were unforeseeable, that his actions constituted a superseding cause breaking any causal chain, that expressive content like ideas in films and games does not qualify as a "product" under strict liability, and that the RICO claims failed to meet essential statutory elements.

torts & liabilitycriminal lawfree speech

The case involved a healthcare provider who sued a health maintenance organization for additional payments for chiropractic services provided to plan participants, bringing claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, violations of Kentucky statutes, and ERISA. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by ERISA and that she lacked standing to assert claims under ERISA. The core reasoning was that ERISA broadly preempts state laws with a connection to employee benefit plans, the plaintiff did not qualify as a beneficiary under ERISA's definition, and the relevant Kentucky statute did not fall within ERISA's savings clause for laws regulating insurance.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved Millennium Petrochemicals suing various Lloyd's of London Names and Equitas for breach of 1984 insurance policies that provided reimbursement for directors' litigation expenses, along with related bad-faith claims under Kentucky law; the plaintiff invoked a service-of-suit clause in the policies to establish jurisdiction. Equitas, created in 1996 to reinsure pre-1993 policies, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion, holding that Equitas lacked sufficient contacts with the forum and was not bound by the Names' jurisdiction-consent clause because the reinsurance agreement was an indemnification arrangement that preserved the Names' direct liability to policyholders without creating third-party beneficiary rights or successor liability for Equitas. As a result, Equitas was dismissed from the action.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case was a negligence lawsuit brought by the family of Gloria Ross, who was murdered at her job in a massage parlor, against the building owner Louise Seawright for allegedly failing to maintain safe premises or evict the tenants despite rumors of illegal activity. Default judgment had already been entered against the parlor owners. The court granted Seawright's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claims. Under Kentucky law, a landlord generally owes no duty to protect tenants or their employees from third-party crimes unless the acts are reasonably foreseeable based on prior incidents or specific knowledge; here, the record showed no prior violence, threats, or other facts that would have put Seawright on notice of the risk.

torts & liabilityproperty

In Walker v. MDM Services Corp., plaintiff Lisa Walker sued her former employer MDM Services Corporation and supervisors for sexual harassment under Title VII and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, along with pendent state claims for retaliatory discharge, breach of contract, defamation, and emotional distress, plus an assault claim against one supervisor. The court dismissed the Title VII and state civil rights claims against the individual supervisors because they could not be held personally liable. It granted the motions to compel arbitration of all remaining claims, holding that the signed arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, controlled over any conflicting company manual provisions, and was not unconscionable due to conditions of employment or potential cost-sharing.

labor & employmentcivil rights

Patricia Effinger sued Philip Morris and two supervisors under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act for sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation, and also asserted a state-law tort of outrage claim. The district court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants Leach and Collins, holding that they were not employers under the statute and that the alleged conduct did not support an outrage claim. The court denied Effinger's motion to remand, ruling that the removal based on diversity jurisdiction was timely because the plaintiff's deposition constituted "other paper" revealing fraudulent joinder of the non-diverse defendants.

civil rightslabor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved franchisees John St. Martin and Saints Express Corporation suing KFC Corporation over disputes arising from their existing KFC restaurant franchises and attempts to open new Express Units at convenience stores in Las Vegas. The plaintiffs alleged antitrust violations, FTC disclosure rule breaches, breach of contract including Section 19 rights to apply for new outlets, promissory estoppel, breach of good faith duties, fraud based on assurances about profitability and equipment buybacks, and sought punitive damages. On KFC's motion to dismiss, the court granted dismissal of the antitrust and FTC counts, finding insufficient allegations to state a claim under the Sherman Act or a private right of action under the cited FTC rules. The court denied dismissal of the tortious breach of good faith, fraud, and punitive damages counts, determining that the complaint sufficiently pleaded those claims at this stage and allowing time to amend. The ruling turned on application of pleading standards under Rule 12 and analysis of the franchise agreement terms and representations made by KFC representatives.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involves plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claim against Boeing Helicopters and Breeze-Eastern regarding dangers in using the tandem cargo hook system on CH-47D military helicopters. On remand from the Sixth Circuit, which vacated prior summary judgment and clarified the government contractor defense test for warning claims, the district court assumed Kentucky tort law would impose liability and applied the three-prong Boyle test adapted for failure to warn. The court determined that the United States had exercised discretion to approve the warnings, the contractors' warnings conformed to those approvals, and the contractors had informed the Army of known dangers about which the government was unaware. It therefore granted the defendants' renewed motions for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' motion, finding no genuine issue of material fact on the defense.

torts & liabilityprocedurefederal power

This case involved a cross-claim by Dow Corning against Waste Management of Kentucky, successor to Tri-City Industrial Services, seeking contractual indemnification for a $321,000 CERCLA settlement payment to the United States plus defense costs stemming from hazardous waste disposal at the Lee’s Lane Landfill. The court determined that the parties had entered into a binding contract in late 1963 and early 1964 that included an express indemnity provision covering all waste materials generated by Dow Corning’s Elizabethtown plant. Core reasoning rested on reconstruction of the contractual relationship through contemporaneous documents—the December 20, 1963 letter, the January 27, 1964 indemnity agreement, and purchase order 150-N—along with testimony establishing the parties’ intent to allocate liability for any harm arising from the waste disposal activities.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a motion by Waste Management to alter or vacate a prior court ruling that found an express indemnity agreement between Dow Corning and Tri-City Industrial Services covering waste disposal services. The court had previously held that the agreement, including a January 27, 1964 document, encompassed both liquid and solid waste, continued until April 1968, and extended to CERCLA liability at a Kentucky landfill, allowing Dow Corning to recover $321,000 plus costs, fees, and interest from Waste Management. Waste Management argued the indemnity document was unenforceable as it modified a fully integrated contract without consideration and did not cover CERCLA claims. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the initial documents formed only a partially integrated agreement under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 216, making the indemnity a consistent additional term admissible without new consideration, and that the parties intended it to apply to the CERCLA liability with fees recoverable under Kentucky indemnity law.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

This case is a prisoner civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, in which plaintiff Ronald Phipps sought a preliminary injunction against prison officials at Kentucky State Penitentiary. Phipps requested orders compelling outdoor exercise for inmates in three cellhouse, limiting exercise to protective custody inmates only, and prohibiting the cutting of his earlocks based on his Orthodox Hasidic Jewish beliefs. The court denied the motions regarding exercise, finding that defendants were not deliberately indifferent to safety or health needs under the Eighth Amendment because they had begun constructing an outdoor facility and Phipps showed no actual harm from mixed-classification exercise. The court granted the motion regarding earlocks after applying the four-factor test from Mason County Medical Association v. Knebel, determining that Phipps showed a likelihood of success on his First Amendment and RFRA claims, irreparable injury from repeated haircuts, and that the injunction would not cause substantial harm if precautions were taken.

criminal lawcivil rightsreligious libertyprocedure

This citizen suit under RCRA and CERCLA was brought by environmental groups and a nearby resident against LWD, Inc., a hazardous waste facility operator in Kentucky, and the state environmental secretary, alleging ongoing permit violations, improper operation without a final permit, and failure to enforce federal requirements. The court addressed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, abstention doctrines, and related grounds. It held that jurisdiction exists over most claims because the state had not commenced a court action to require compliance, as administrative enforcement alone does not bar citizen suits under the statute's plain language. The court dismissed Count VIII under Burford abstention due to its entanglement with complex state regulatory issues but retained jurisdiction over the remaining federal claims to the extent they do not require deep state-law analysis.

environmentprocedurefederal power