John Bailey Jones

The case involves defendant Richard Red Elk, who was charged with the murder of a twenty-month-old child on the Cheyenne River Reservation in violation of federal law. Red Elk moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury, including improper comments on evidence, calling his ten-year-old son as a witness, intimidating witnesses, and pressuring the grand jury. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and denied the motion without prejudice to raising the issue after trial. The court reasoned that an indictment may be dismissed for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing of flagrant error that significantly infringes on the grand jury's ability to exercise independent judgment and actually prejudices the defendant, and no such showing was made here.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between two insurance companies over coverage for a wrongful termination lawsuit against their mutual insured, Tri-State Electric. Crum & Forster, which provided an umbrella policy and defended the suit after Pacific Employers denied coverage under its commercial general liability policy, sought reimbursement for the $66,267.14 it spent to settle the claim. The court granted summary judgment to Pacific, holding that it had no duty to defend because the underlying complaint alleged only wrongful termination, which did not fall within the policy's defined personal injury coverage for offenses such as false arrest, libel, or invasion of privacy. Although the complaint mentioned reputational injury, the court found it did not arguably trigger coverage and rejected speculation about potential claims that might have arisen in discovery.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Thompson v. Ellenbecker, plaintiffs with more than $1,000 in child support arrears challenged South Dakota statutes that barred issuance or renewal of driver's licenses and certain professional licenses to such individuals, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on grounds that the laws violated substantive and procedural due process as well as equal protection. The court first ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to contest the professional-license statute. It then upheld the driver's-license statute under rational-basis review, finding no fundamental right or suspect classification at issue and concluding that the restrictions were rationally related to the legitimate state interest in collecting child support; the required stipulation for continued payments was also deemed consistent with procedural due process. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied the plaintiffs' motion.

family lawcivil rights

This case concerned whether the Farmers Home Administration retained a lien on real estate sale proceeds after Ralph and Delores Harmon completed payments under a confirmed Chapter 12 bankruptcy reorganization plan. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding that FmHA had no remaining claim on the escrowed proceeds once both the secured claim (capped at the property's bankruptcy valuation) and the agreed unsecured claim portion had been paid in full. The core reasoning was that Chapter 12 reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code bifurcates claims under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), limits secured claims to the property's value at plan confirmation, and releases liens upon full payment per the plan and 11 U.S.C. § 1227(c), distinguishing this from Chapter 7 lien survival precedents like Dewsnup v. Timm.

propertyfederal power

The case involved defendant Wayne Robert Haggerty, a Canadian citizen charged with illegal reentry into the United States after prior deportation following a conviction for an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). Haggerty moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his June 1994 California conviction for unauthorized possession of methamphetamine was not an aggravated felony because it was not a felony under state law. The magistrate judge recommended denial after finding that the offense qualified as a felony under California Penal Code provisions (as the court had suspended sentence without declaring it a misdemeanor) and met the federal definition of a drug trafficking crime punishable under the Controlled Substances Act. The district court conducted a de novo review, adopted the report and recommendations, and denied the motion to dismiss.

immigrationcriminal law

This case involved plaintiffs Chance Management, Inc., a South Dakota corporation majority-owned by a Wyoming resident, and William A. Sanders challenging South Dakota's statutory residency requirement for video lottery machine operator licenses after their application was denied. The court granted summary judgment to the state defendants on all claims. It reasoned that the Commerce Clause did not apply because the state was participating in the market through its control of lottery operations, programs, and machines rather than merely regulating private activity. The Equal Protection Clause was not violated because the residency rule was rationally related to legitimate state purposes. The individual plaintiff lacked standing to assert a Privileges and Immunities Clause claim, as corporations cannot invoke the clause and he suffered no separate injury.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved parents of an autistic student who sued a South Dakota school district and individuals after the district's payment for the student's out-of-state residential special education was publicized in local media, leading to tax increases and alleged harassment; the suit alleged a violation of FERPA privacy protections enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and related state claims. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both federal counts. It reasoned that FERPA does not create an enforceable right under § 1983 because its enforcement scheme lacks comprehensive remedies for plaintiffs and any disclosure was an isolated incident rather than district policy or custom, that families seeking special education services are not a protected class under § 1985(3), and that the remaining state claims should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction once the federal claims were resolved.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved Allstate Insurance challenging the constitutionality of South Dakota Senate Bill 220 (codified at SDCL §§ 58-33-72 and 58-33-73), which prohibited insurers from requiring or recommending specific auto glass repair providers or networks and restricted related referrals and arrangements. The court granted Allstate's motion for summary judgment and denied the state's, declaring the statutes unconstitutional and permanently enjoining their enforcement. The core reasoning was that the law imposed excessive restrictions on commercial speech protected by the First Amendment and placed an undue burden on interstate commerce, while other claims regarding federal antitrust preemption and the South Dakota Constitution were not resolved in Allstate's favor or required further factual development.

business & regulatoryfree speechfederal power

The case involved former members of two Hutterian Brethren religious colonies who were expelled amid a leadership dispute over the Senior Elder of their conference; the plaintiffs claimed they were employees entitled to benefits under ERISA, held protected property interests in colony assets under the Constitution, and raised related civil rights claims. The court dismissed the action in full for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It held that the plaintiffs were not employees under ERISA's common-law test given the colonies' communal structure, that no diversity jurisdiction existed, and that federal courts could not adjudicate the membership and property claims without impermissibly entangling themselves in religious doctrine and practice in violation of the First Amendment. The ERISA, § 1983, and § 1985 claims were dismissed with prejudice, while the property claims were dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court.

religious libertypropertyprocedure

The case concerned Herbert J. Eagle Thunder's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his 1988 convictions for two counts of aggravated sexual abuse involving an eleven-year-old victim on the Lower Brule Indian Reservation. After a jury trial with co-defendant Hobart Garneaux, Eagle Thunder was sentenced to 235 months in prison following an earlier appeal and remand. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendations in full, finding multiple grounds—including evidentiary issues, severance, and voir dire on racial bias—procedurally barred, rejecting Confrontation Clause and newly discovered evidence claims on the merits, and holding that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed both prongs of the Strickland v. Washington test. The court therefore dismissed the motion with prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves plaintiffs suing the South Dakota Department of Social Services and its employees for failing to protect children from physical and sexual abuse, claiming violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law. After the defendants removed the case from state to federal court, the plaintiffs moved to remand it, arguing that the Eleventh Amendment barred federal jurisdiction. The court granted the motion to remand the entire action, reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment prevents suits against states and state agencies in federal court, and extends to claims against officials where the state is the real party in interest, with limited exceptions for prospective injunctive relief that did not apply here to allow partial retention. The court also awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs due to the improper removal in light of prior precedent.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

In this bankruptcy appeal, the United States Trustee challenged the bankruptcy court's award of attorney fees to the debtors' counsel for work in disputing the amount of net disposable income the debtors owed to creditors under their Chapter 12 plan. The district court reversed the fee award, holding that such services did not benefit the bankruptcy estate but only the debtors themselves by potentially reducing payments to creditors. The court reasoned that compensation from the estate is only appropriate for services that benefit the estate, citing precedent, and remanded for determination of the allowable fees.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerns whether a debtor's attorney in a bankruptcy proceeding may charge interest on unpaid fees before those fees receive court approval under the Bankruptcy Code. The United States Trustee appealed a bankruptcy court order that permitted such pre-award interest, arguing that fees are unliquidated claims until properly noticed and awarded pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330, at which point they become administrative expenses under § 503(b) and interest may begin to accrue. The district court agreed, reversing the bankruptcy court's decision and holding that interest on attorney fees awarded under § 330 accrues only from the date of the award. The court reasoned that the statutory language requires notice and a hearing before fees become allowable administrative expenses, that attorneys may seek interim compensation under § 331 to address cash-flow concerns, and that other courts addressing the issue reached the same conclusion. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a bankruptcy appeal by the United States Trustee challenging the bankruptcy court's approval of fees in a Chapter 11 proceeding for Grenoble Apartments. The debtor's attorney sought compensation for services by a certified legal assistant at half his hourly rate and reimbursement for legal research performed by another attorney not formally employed by the firm. The court held that paralegal fees must be determined based on prevailing local market rates under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) rather than a fixed percentage of the attorney's rate, and that an independent attorney providing services must be appointed as a professional under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) before receiving estate funds. Both issues were vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the statutes and relevant case law on market rates.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved an appeal by the United States Trustee from a bankruptcy court's decision awarding compensation to a creditor, Farm Credit Bank of Omaha, for its efforts in a Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceeding, including reviewing financial data and participating in objections to discharge, which led to a settlement benefiting unsecured creditors. The court reversed the bankruptcy court's award, holding that there is no statutory authority under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) to compensate creditors for substantial contributions in Chapter 12 cases. The core reasoning was that the plain language of § 503(b)(3)(D) explicitly limits such compensation to cases under Chapter 9 or 11, and extending it to Chapter 12 would render that limitation meaningless, contrary to principles of statutory interpretation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case originated as a state court foreclosure action by William and Lisa Karras to quiet title to two South Dakota properties that had been transferred among family members, with the United States removing the matter to federal court due to its federal tax liens. The IRS had assessed substantial unpaid taxes against Chris and Dion Karras and filed liens on the properties, while other defendants including the Forsbergs held a prior mortgage. The court granted summary judgment to the Forsbergs, establishing their mortgage as superior on one parcel, and addressed opposing summary judgment motions from the United States and the Karras plaintiffs. Because the Karras family failed to respond to the government's statement of undisputed facts, those facts were deemed admitted, leading the court to conclude that the family transfers were fraudulent conveyances under South Dakota law and that the federal tax liens were therefore valid and enforceable.

taxespropertyfederal power

The case involves the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe suing South Dakota under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) to compel good-faith negotiations for a tribal-state compact on Class III gaming activities such as casino games, keno, and slot machines, and to potentially appoint a mediator if no agreement is reached. The State raised defenses including Eleventh Amendment immunity and argued it had negotiated in good faith while disputing the scope of permitted games and whether proposed locations qualified as Indian lands. After reviewing the record, the court denied the Tribe's motions for summary judgment and a preliminary injunction, denied the State's related motion, and stayed the action to permit additional negotiations, citing unresolved factual disputes on gaming types and land status under IGRA standards.

federal powerbusiness & regulatorycivil rightsprocedure

In Ross v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, tribal members living outside Moody County, South Dakota, sued the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe after being excluded from per capita distributions of profits from the Royal River Casino, which were paid only to members residing inside the county. The court held that the Tribe's per capita payment plan violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3), because the statute requires prior approval by the Secretary of the Interior for any such distributions from gaming revenues. The court reasoned that the Tribe's gaming ordinance, approved for authorizing gaming activities, did not constitute the specific Secretarial approval needed for a per capita allocation plan, and therefore enjoined further payments until approval was obtained while directing casino profits to be held by the court clerk. Claims against federal defendants were dismissed, and issues of standing, sovereign immunity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act were addressed but did not alter the core IGRA ruling.

federal powerbusiness & regulatorycivil rights

In Ashker v. Leapley, a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the petitioner challenged his South Dakota first-degree murder conviction and life sentence, which rested entirely on circumstantial evidence linking him to the 1985 stabbing death of Jerry Plihal through his association with a co-defendant. The district court granted relief on the ground that the prosecution improperly used portions of a witness's deposition testimony denying the destruction of bloody clothing, followed by extrinsic impeachment evidence from another witness describing the bloodstained items, in violation of the rule against employing impeachment as a subterfuge to introduce otherwise inadmissible hearsay. The court held that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the hearsay strongly tied the co-defendant (and thus the petitioner) to the crime in an otherwise close circumstantial case, and the evidence against the petitioner was not overwhelming. The petition was granted with an order directing the petitioner's release unless the state retries him within 120 days.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a dispute between Rita, Inc. and the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe over a 1991 Management Agreement for operating a Class III gaming casino on tribal land, under which the plaintiff had invested millions and managed operations for roughly 18 months. After a change in tribal government, the tribe attempted to remove the plaintiff and take over the casino, citing lack of required Bureau of Indian Affairs approval under federal Indian gaming statutes. The plaintiff sued to enforce the agreement and sought a temporary restraining order to prevent interference with its management. The court denied the TRO and a motion to intervene, held that it had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, and ruled that the tribe could not unilaterally exclude the plaintiff via self-help without first obtaining judicial determination of the agreement's validity, though the casino's operations required mutual cooperation beyond the court's oversight.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure