Shirley Brannock Jones

The case involved a former Chrysler-Plymouth and Dodge dealer suing the manufacturer under diversity jurisdiction for alleged breaches of direct dealer agreements, specifically claiming in Count I that Chrysler shipped and billed for dozens of unordered new vehicles during 1976-1978 and in Count II that it failed to repurchase remaining inventory within 90 days of the dealership's 1978 termination; Chrysler counterclaimed for the value of one vehicle it had repurchased but never received. After a bench trial, the district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law detailing the parties' long-term relationship, the plaintiff's minimum sales responsibilities, financing through Chrysler Credit, and evidence that unordered vehicles arrived amid a model-year build-out period and financial difficulties at the dealership. The court reasoned that while some vehicles were indeed shipped without orders, the plaintiff's substantial claimed losses were not caused solely by those shipments but by independent factors such as ineffective sales efforts and market conditions, thereby limiting the damages recoverable on the claims.

business & regulatory

This case involves a minor child's claim for Social Security surviving child's insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) based on his deceased father's earnings record. The Secretary of Health and Human Services denied the benefits, finding that the child did not qualify as a "child" under the Act because he would not inherit under South Carolina intestacy law, the domicile of the deceased wage earner. The court reviewed the administrative decision and determined that Maryland law, the child's current domicile, should apply instead, under which the child would be considered legitimate. Consequently, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to benefits and reversed the Secretary's decision.

federal powerfamily law

In Bradley v. Davis, the petitioner, convicted in Maryland state court of assault with intent to murder, assault with intent to maim, assault and battery, and use of a handgun, sought federal habeas corpus relief after his state post-conviction petition was denied. The petitioner had not sought leave to appeal that denial to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals despite being advised of the required steps. Although the court determined that state remedies were exhausted because the time to appeal had passed and no further state relief was available, it concluded that the failure to appeal amounted to a deliberate bypass of state procedures, given the petitioner's education level and demonstrated familiarity with legal research. The court therefore denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on grounds of procedural default.

criminal lawprocedure

This Title VII case involved plaintiff Thomas J. Johnson, a Black employee at Armco Inc., who alleged racial discrimination in the denial of a promotion to crane operator. The position was posted and awarded to a less senior white employee, Gerald Pakula, who was the only applicant. Johnson did not sign the posting during the application period and only expressed interest after returning from medical leave, at which point the job had already been filled. The court found that Johnson failed to establish a prima facie case because he did not properly apply for the position and that, even assuming he had, Armco's actions were based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons such as the company's posting and seniority rules plus medical restrictions that would have disqualified him. Judgment was entered for the defendant.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Polk v. Montgomery County, MD, plaintiff Mary Bracken Polk sued ten defendants, including Sheriff James A. Young, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, claiming her arrest under a bench warrant and subsequent imprisonment in a county detention center violated her rights. The court considered Sheriff Young's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, noting that the complaint contained no specific factual allegations of his personal involvement and only broad, conclusory claims of conspiracy. The sheriff's uncontroverted affidavit and deposition established that he had no direction or control over the police department or detention center involved and did not participate in the events. Under Maryland law, the sheriff's responsibility for prisoners had been transferred to the director of the Department of Correction and Rehabilitation by county code, so no duty existed that could support liability. The court granted the motion to dismiss as to Sheriff Young but denied his request for costs and attorneys' fees.

civil rightsprocedurecriminal law

This case involved a maritime insurance dispute in which plaintiff's vessel sank and the parties disagreed over the amount of repair damages owed under the policy. After an initial ruling on damages, the plaintiff moved to amend the findings, arguing that it had met its burden of proof on certain disputed mechanical repair items through a stipulation on causation, actual repair costs, and expert testimony on reasonableness, without needing separate expert evidence on the scope of repairs. The court reconsidered and held that in admiralty cases a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for damages by showing causation and the actual costs of repairs needed to restore the property, with necessity of specific repairs included in that burden but supportable by non-expert testimony in some instances. It therefore allowed recovery on additional items totaling $26,280.57 and amended the judgment accordingly.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

Vivian Anderson Smith sued Montgomery County and officials on behalf of herself and others, challenging the Montgomery County Detention Center's policy of performing visual strip searches—including inspections of body cavities—on all detainees, including temporary ones like her (arrested for contempt of court), without probable cause to believe they possessed weapons or contraband and sometimes not in private. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief plus damages, while conceding the county's right to less intrusive searches or probable-cause strip searches, and moved for a preliminary injunction to restrict the practice accordingly. The opinion sets out the undisputed facts of Smith's search, describes the uniform policy applying to temporary detainees, pretrial detainees, and convicted persons alike, and discusses the applicable Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard, noting distinctions between categories of detainees and that probable cause may be required for highly intrusive searches of temporary detainees with minimal facility contact.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involves two lawsuits filed by J. H. Lawrence Company seeking to block NASA from releasing detailed unit work and prices (UWP) schedules that Lawrence had submitted as part of public bids for construction contracts, in response to FOIA requests. The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that the schedules were not protected trade secrets or confidential information and that disclosure was permitted. The court denied the motions, holding that NASA regulations on bid opening and examination did not satisfy the Chrysler Corp. v. Brown criteria for authorizing release of potentially confidential material under the Trade Secrets Act, and that material factual disputes existed over whether the schedules qualified for FOIA exemption (b)(4) as confidential commercial or financial information.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

The case concerned disputes arising from a Small Business Administration (SBA) subcontract with G & M Construction for a federal building project, including an advance payment and later loan deposited into a special bank account at Equitable Trust that required SBA approval for disbursements. Equitable Trust sued G & M for breach of contract and fraud, while G & M counterclaimed against Equitable and the SBA for breach and conversion, with Equitable also asserting a third-party claim against the SBA. After a bifurcated trial on liability, the court made findings on the sequence of events involving cash flow issues, loan approvals that were never fully finalized due to unmet conditions like life insurance, the SBA's withdrawal of funds over tax concerns, and G & M's subsequent attempts to alter account signatures and withdraw money. The court entered judgment for Equitable on its contract claims against G & M, dismissed G & M's counterclaims and third-party claim against the SBA with prejudice, and found SBA liability to Equitable but entered judgment for Equitable only on costs since no damages were proven.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In this bankruptcy case, a bank repossessed a debtor's automobile before learning of his Chapter 7 filing and refused to return it after receiving notice, prompting the bankruptcy court to hold the bank in contempt and award damages to the debtor. The district court affirmed the contempt finding, concluding that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 acts as a court order effective upon filing and that the bank's retention of the vehicle violated the stay by failing to restore the status quo. The court reasoned that creditors must take affirmative steps to return property upon notice, as inaction can be as disruptive as affirmative collection efforts, and that other turnover provisions like § 542 do not make the stay's protections exclusive. It rejected arguments that no formal order existed or that damages could not be awarded via civil contempt powers.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

The Secretary of Labor sued Kentwood Development Company and its president under the Fair Labor Standards Act for failing to pay overtime compensation to 29 employees, overtime and minimum wage to one other employee, and for violating recordkeeping requirements, seeking backpay, liquidated damages, and injunctive relief. The defendants stipulated to coverage if found applicable and to owing backpay for 22 employees but contested FLSA coverage, an exemption for certain employees, amounts owed to one worker, and good faith reliance on administrative interpretations. The court held that the FLSA applied because KDC employees handled goods and materials that had moved in interstate commerce, including maintenance supplies and appliances for the apartment complex operations, and that the 1974 amendment to the Act's definition of enterprise coverage extended to such handling, rejecting the ultimate consumer exception under 29 U.S.C. § 203(i). It awarded backpay in specified amounts plus equal liquidated damages and issued injunctions against future violations by both defendants.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved federal criminal charges against Martin Thomas Bradley for placing a bomb in his wife's suitcase at their Maryland home, which was later checked onto a flight at Washington National Airport in Virginia, under statutes prohibiting destructive substances or explosives aboard aircraft in interstate commerce. Bradley moved to dismiss two counts for lack of venue. The court granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that the offenses of placing or causing a bomb to be placed on an aircraft are not continuing crimes and occur only where the placement or causing act takes place. The core reasoning examined the statutory language of the offenses, constitutional and statutory venue rules requiring trial in the district where the crime occurs, and the effect of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) on liability for causing acts through intermediaries, concluding venue was improper in the charging district.

criminal lawprocedure

Metromedia, Inc. challenged a Baltimore City ordinance amending an urban renewal plan that restricted outdoor signs in the Midtown Belvedere area to those identifying the property or its use, effectively banning off-site billboards. The company sought summary judgment, arguing the ordinance violated the First Amendment. The court held the ordinance facially invalid under the First Amendment, relying on the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego. The core reasoning was that the ordinance permitted on-site commercial identification but prohibited noncommercial messages, impermissibly discriminating against noncommercial speech while the city's interests in traffic safety and aesthetics could be served by content-neutral size and appearance rules.

free speechbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Dr. Davie L. Paice, who was dismissed without notice or a pretermination hearing from his position as chief veterinarian for the Maryland Racing Commission after long-term per diem employment without a written contract. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the dismissal deprived him of protected property and liberty interests in his employment without due process, and that the Commission violated its own rules. The court granted summary judgment on the property interest claim, holding that Paice had no cognizable entitlement to continued employment under state law because he served at the pleasure of the Commission and lacked any mutual understanding or contract guaranteeing ongoing employment. It denied dismissal on the liberty interest claim, finding a factual dispute over whether statements to the press implying misconduct stigmatized Paice and impaired his future job prospects without due process. The court also dismissed the claim that internal Commission procedures required a hearing before termination.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

Velma O’Neil brought a class action against Marriott Corporation and plan fiduciaries alleging that they induced employee contributions to the company’s profit-sharing, savings, and retirement plan through material misrepresentations and omissions, and that they used plan assets to benefit the employer by maintaining a large block of Marriott stock. The suit asserted claims under federal and state securities laws, ERISA fiduciary provisions, and state common law. The court dismissed the securities claims, holding that an interest in the plan was not a “security” under the 1933 and 1934 Acts because participants made no investment of money with an expectation of profits derived solely from the efforts of others, following Supreme Court precedent in Teamsters v. Daniel. The ERISA and state-law claims were allowed to proceed, with the court exercising pendent jurisdiction over the latter after finding that limitations would likely bar a separate state action.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

Three female employees of Frostburg National Bank sued the bank under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, alleging sex discrimination in pay, benefits, promotions, training opportunities, and retaliation against two of the plaintiffs for asserting their rights. The district court confirmed jurisdiction after the plaintiffs exhausted administrative remedies with the EEOC and Maryland Commission on Human Relations, noted a prior conciliation agreement between the bank and the state commission, and conducted a bench trial with extensive factual findings on the bank's structure, teller roles, salary histories, and personnel practices. The court outlined the legal framework for proving disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, including shifting burdens of production and persuasion, and applied those standards to the evidence regarding differences in compensation and advancement between male and female employees.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a marine insurance dispute after the yacht GEORGEJAN, owned by the plaintiff, sank in January 1979. The insurer, Insurance Company of North America, denied coverage under an all-risks policy, leading to a lawsuit filed in May 1980. Following an earlier ruling in favor of the plaintiff on liability, the court addressed the amount of damages, including disputed repair costs for items like engines, furnishings, and painting, as well as a claim for prejudgment interest. The court found that the plaintiff met its burden of proof on some items through testimony about pre- and post-sinking conditions but disallowed others due to insufficient expert evidence on necessity and reasonableness. It awarded $45,150.60 in damages plus prejudgment interest calculated at varying market rates derived from corporate bond yields, starting from the date coverage was denied.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In Petrou v. United States, a painter employed by a Coast Guard contractor fell from a defective railing on a Chesapeake Bay lighthouse into a boat after finishing work, breaking both heels, and sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligent maintenance and failure to warn. The court considered whether admiralty jurisdiction applied and thus required maritime law under the FTCA. The court held that maritime law did not govern the claim. Although the locality test was satisfied because the injury occurred on navigable waters at a lighthouse, the tort lacked a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity since the alleged negligence involved general structural repair rather than the lighthouse's navigational purpose, following the test in Executive Jet Aviation and precedent in Gowdy v. United States.

torts & liabilityprocedurefederal power

In this bankruptcy appeal, General Motors Acceptance Corporation sought to reclaim a 1980 Datsun vehicle from debtor Richard Abel after he filed a Chapter 7 petition, claiming a default and arguing that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 and potential discharge under § 524 left its security interest inadequately protected. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of the reclamation complaint, ruling that no default had occurred and that granting relief from the stay would contradict the purpose of the stay to provide the debtor a breathing spell from creditors. The court vacated the award of attorneys' fees, finding insufficient evidence or factual findings to support a determination of bad faith by GMAC.

propertyprocedure

Taxpayers Rodger and Jo Ann Alspach sued the IRS to stop collection of a 1976 tax assessment of $9,953.24, claiming the agency had mailed the notice of deficiency to their old address despite knowing their new one. The IRS abated the collection, leading to dismissal of the suit by stipulation while preserving the plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs. The court denied the request for $2,850 in attorneys' fees under the newly amended 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) of the Equal Access to Justice Act, finding the government's initial position substantially justified because it conceded the case promptly after locating and reviewing the file. However, the court awarded the requested $66 in filing and service costs under § 2412(a), as those are recoverable separately and the government offered no reason to deny them.

taxesprocedure