In Richter v. GEICO Indemnity Co., the plaintiff sued his auto insurer after it denied collision and Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits for a totaled vehicle and related medical expenses, claiming the car was not listed on the policy; the complaint included breach of contract (Count I), bad faith under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8371 (Count II), and remedies under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL) § 1716 (Count III). The defendant moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Count II to the extent it sought PIP benefits, arguing preemption by MVFRL § 1797, and to dismiss Count III entirely, contending that § 1716 provides no private right of action for an insured. The court denied the motion, holding that § 1797 applies only to disputes over the reasonableness or necessity of medical treatment (not coverage denials based on policy listing), so it does not preempt the general bad-faith statute, and that existing precedent supports an insured's ability to pursue interest, costs, and fees under § 1716.
This case involved Tanya Clark's motion for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act after her earlier lawsuit seeking judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of Supplemental Security Income benefits. The underlying action challenged the ALJ's findings on Clark's heart failure impairment, rejection of her treating physician's opinion, reliance on vocational expert testimony, and evaluation of her subjective complaints; the magistrate judge recommended remand solely on the vocational expert inconsistency with the ALJ's limitation to simple tasks, and the court adopted that recommendation. The court denied the fee motion, finding that the Commissioner's overall position was substantially justified because the remand addressed only one of four issues raised and the agency's stance was reasonable under the facts and law. The decision rested on EAJA standards requiring the government to show substantial justification to avoid fee awards to prevailing parties in agency review cases.
In this case, plaintiff Antonia Garcia sued Newtown Township and its officials after her 2008 termination from a full-time administrative assistant position, alleging sex, age, and race discrimination under Title VII, the ADEA, and related state laws, plus First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for her prior complaints about workplace issues. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on nearly all claims. It reasoned that Garcia failed to produce sufficient evidence of discriminatory motive or pretext, that her speech did not qualify as protected under the relevant First Amendment standards for public employees, and that equal protection theories such as class-of-one claims are unavailable in the public employment context.
In Brenner v. Consolidated Rail Corp., a railroad trackman sued his employers under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for knee injuries allegedly caused by repetitive occupational activities such as climbing, bending, and walking on uneven ballast. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of admissible expert evidence on causation, that the claims were time-barred, and that federal law precluded the ballast-related claim. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, primarily excluding the treating physician’s causation opinion for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) expert report requirements while addressing the other defenses under FELA’s negligence standards and preemption rules.
The case involves a black male former employee of an independent charter school who was terminated pursuant to a blanket policy barring employment of individuals with certain criminal convictions within five years, which he claimed had a disparate impact on black males in violation of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint solely on statute of limitations grounds. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff's timely submission of a Charge Questionnaire to the EEOC constituted a valid charge under Title VII and that equitable tolling applied to the PHRA claim because delays in formalizing the dual-filed charge were attributable solely to the EEOC, not the plaintiff.
In Zafarana v. Pfizer Inc., plaintiffs brought a civil consumer class action alleging that Pfizer engaged in fraudulent and misleading off-label marketing of twelve FDA-approved prescription drugs, including Lyrica and Geodon, in violation of the FDCA, and sought recovery under New Jersey and Pennsylvania consumer protection statutes as well as claims for conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and related theories. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety. The decision rested on a determination that the alleged marketing practices did not state viable claims under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act or Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, and that the remaining common-law counts likewise failed to state causes of action under the applicable state laws. The court further denied leave to amend, finding any further amendment would be futile, and dismissed class claims because no named plaintiffs remained.