This case involved consolidated class action lawsuits by white male Detroit police officers claiming that the city's affirmative action program for sergeant promotions violated federal civil rights statutes, the Fourteenth Amendment, and state laws by intentionally passing over higher-scoring white candidates to promote black officers. After a bifurcated trial on liability, the court found that the disputed promotions from the 1974 eligibility register—where approximately 200 white officers were skipped in favor of lower-ranked black candidates—were made with discriminatory purpose and motive based on race. The core reasoning was that the evidence demonstrated purposeful different treatment of plaintiffs due to their race, that the program functioned as an unconstitutional racial quota rather than a remedy for specific victims of past discrimination, and that such practices conflicted with principles of individual merit and equal opportunity under the law.
The case involved a Canadian corporation, Koffler Stores, Ltd., which operated retail drug stores and franchises under the name and mark 'SHOPPERS DRUG MART' with a mortar-pestle logo, suing a Michigan corporation, Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., that began using the same name, mark, and logo for its Detroit-area stores. The plaintiff alleged unfair competition and violations of the Lanham Trademark Act and the Paris Convention. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact, and issued a permanent injunction barring the defendant from further use of the name, mark, and logo. The decision rested on the plaintiff's earlier adoption and use of the mark, its U.S. trademark registration, and the likelihood of consumer confusion given the parties' similar operations and products; the defendant failed to establish priority through innocent appropriation under federal trademark law.
This case was a federal civil forfeiture action under 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-788 and 21 U.S.C. § 881 seeking to seize a 1973 Dodge van owned by Robert Nickel. The government alleged the vehicle had been used to transport and possess marijuana. After the parties stipulated that Nickel was arrested in the parked van while holding 10.3 grams of marijuana for personal use and later pleaded guilty to possession, the court entered an order of forfeiture. The core reasoning was that the stipulated facts alone supplied probable cause to institute the action, shifting the burden to the claimant who failed to show the vehicle was not involved; the broad statutory language requires forfeiture whenever any contraband is physically in the vehicle, regardless of quantity or personal-use intent, and any prosecutorial delay was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
This case involves a Michigan distributor (Levine) suing a Louisiana kraft products manufacturer (Calkraft) and its parent company (Unijax) after the manufacturer ended their oral distributorship arrangement amid a tight national market for kraft goods. Levine alleged that the termination resulted from an antitrust conspiracy violating the Sherman Act (Count I), that Calkraft wrongfully refused to fill existing orders breaching their contract (Count II), and that the termination violated a common-law duty to maintain a valuable franchise (Count III). The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on Counts I and III, finding insufficient probative evidence of any conspiracy and determining that the at-will distributorship was properly terminated with reasonable advance notice that allowed Levine time to secure alternative suppliers. It denied summary judgment on Count II, concluding that material factual disputes remained regarding whether specific shipping orders had been wrongfully refused.
This case involved an employee who sued his employer, Chrysler Corporation, for breach of a collective bargaining agreement regarding layoffs and discharge, and his union, UAW Local 412, for breaching its duty of fair representation by not further pursuing his grievance, under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. It reasoned that a union breaches its duty of fair representation only through arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad-faith conduct, as established in Vaca v. Sipes and Sixth Circuit precedents like Balowski v. UAW, and found no such evidence here, noting the union's wide discretion in handling grievances and that the impartial chairman had already resolved the discharge issue by reinstating seniority rights.
Beaute Craft Supply Company sued Revlon, Inc., alleging that Revlon's termination of their long-standing franchise agreement violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act by attempting to exclude competitive products from the Detroit market. The court granted Beaute Craft's motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering Revlon to continue doing business with the plaintiff pending the outcome of the litigation. The decision rested on the conclusion that the plaintiff had raised serious, substantial questions going to the merits of an antitrust claim that warranted further litigation, and that Beaute Craft would suffer irreparable harm from the immediate loss of 20-25% of its sales volume while Revlon would incur no comparable injury from preserving the prior relationship.
