This case concerned a challenge by judicial candidates and a nonprofit group to portions of Pennsylvania's Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically the 'pledges and promises' and 'commits' clauses of Canon 7B(1)(c), which bar judicial candidates from making certain statements about issues likely to come before the court. The plaintiffs argued that these restrictions violated the First Amendment by preventing candidates from responding to questionnaires on disputed legal and political issues. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, denied the plaintiffs' motion, and vacated a prior preliminary injunction, upholding the clauses. It adopted a narrow construction limiting the clauses to actual or apparent commitments on cases or issues before the court, excluding mere announcements of general views, and found that this interpretation served Pennsylvania's compelling interest in preserving judicial impartiality and open-mindedness while being narrowly tailored under strict scrutiny.
The case involved judicial candidates and a nonprofit group challenging provisions of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct that barred candidates from making pledges or promises about their conduct in office or statements that commit or appear to commit them on cases or issues likely to come before the court. Plaintiffs argued these 'pledges and promises' and 'commits' clauses were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the First Amendment and prevented them from answering questionnaires on disputed legal and political issues. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the clauses, finding a likelihood of success on the merits based on precedents striking down similar rules, irreparable harm from chilled speech, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored allowing candidates to respond to the questionnaires while the litigation proceeded.
The case concerns a First Amendment challenge by the Pennsylvania Family Institute and several judicial candidates to two clauses in Canon 7B(1)(c) of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct, which bar judicial candidates from making pledges or promises of conduct in office (other than faithful performance of duties) or statements that commit or appear to commit them on cases or issues likely to come before the court. Plaintiffs argued that the pledges-and-promises and commits clauses are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on their face and as applied to their proposed answers to questionnaires from advocacy groups. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the dispute was ripe because the candidates faced a credible threat of disciplinary enforcement and because prior advisory bodies had provided no clarifying guidance on the clauses' scope.
The case involved a plaintiff convicted on multiple counts in a federal criminal prosecution for an international conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and related money laundering offenses, who then filed a civil action against fifteen federal employees, four agencies, and the United States seeking $750 million in damages plus administrative discipline for alleged constitutional and statutory violations during the investigation and trial. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Core reasoning included that sovereign immunity barred claims against the United States and its agencies, absolute immunity protected prosecutors for actions in court, and many claims failed to state viable causes of action or were preempted, while certain claims against individual defendants could proceed under exceptions in statutes like the Federal Tort Claims Act or civil remedies provisions.
The case arose from a failed purchase of a pickup truck, where the Pennsylvania plaintiff alleged that Alabama defendants failed to provide required federal odometer disclosures and other information, leading to claims for rescission, fraud, and violations of state consumer protection laws, with damages capped below $75,000. After the defendants removed the action from state court to federal district court, the plaintiff moved to remand, contending that removal was untimely and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion, holding that the notice of removal was filed within the thirty-day window under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) measured from service of the complaint and that Count II for rescission presented a substantial federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because it required interpretation of 49 U.S.C. § 32705. The court further concluded it could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
In Nelson v. Warden of C.F.C.F., a prisoner sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his placement in medical quarantine after refusing a mandatory blood draw, along with resulting restrictions on library access, showers, phone use, and recreation, violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. Defendants Lt. Brent and Lt. Sweeney moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had not exhausted available prison administrative remedies before filing suit. The court granted the motion, finding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires exhaustion of grievance procedures in all inmate suits concerning prison conditions, that the plaintiff received the inmate handbook describing those procedures, and that no grievances were filed.