District Court, D. Maryland — appointed by Lyndon B. Johnson
Campbell v. Masten
District Court, D. Maryland · 1997-03-11 · cited 19×
In Campbell v. Masten, a former employee sued her employer Wildlife International and a colleague for sex discrimination, quid pro quo sexual harassment, and hostile work environment under Title VII, along with related state-law claims including wrongful discharge. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the federal claims, holding that the plaintiff failed to allege facts showing disparate treatment on the basis of gender or conduct of a sexual nature, as the relationship was consensual and post-breakup criticism was not tied to protected characteristics. The court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and granted the plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, noting no discovery had occurred.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Rhoads v. Federal Deposit Insurance
District Court, D. Maryland · 1997-02-22 · cited 40×
This case involved Lori Rhoads suing the FDIC as receiver for her former employers, Standard Federal Savings Bank and its successor, after her 1993 termination for excessive absences stemming from asthma and migraines triggered by workplace cigarette smoke. Rhoads brought claims under the ADA for failure to accommodate and retaliation, under the FMLA for interference with protected leave, and under various state laws including Montgomery County human rights provisions, a duty to provide a safe workplace, and wage payment statutes. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court granted the defendants' motion in part and denied it in part while denying Rhoads's cross-motion entirely. The decision turned on the existence of genuine disputes of material fact regarding Rhoads's disability status, the reasonableness of requested accommodations like remote work, her eligibility and notice under the FMLA, and related state-law elements, precluding judgment as a matter of law on multiple counts.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Cremi v. Brown
District Court, D. Maryland · 1997-02-05 · cited 18×
The case involved a Mexican bank and its Cayman subsidiary suing their U.S. securities brokers for over $23 million in losses on investments in complex collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), specifically inverse floaters and inverse IOs, alleging violations of federal securities laws under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Maryland Securities Act, and state common law claims including breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud, plus a control-person claim under Section 20(a). The defendants moved for summary judgment after the bank had communicated its conservative investment criteria and received disclosures about the securities. The court granted the motion, applying relevant federal and state law standards to the undisputed facts regarding the nature of the derivatives, the parties' interactions, and the disclosures made.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
Lincoln National Life Insurance v. Evans
District Court, D. Maryland · 1996-12-18 · cited 12×
The case concerns two insurance companies that issued accidental death policies under an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan and sought a declaratory judgment that they owed no benefits for the death of Milton Hawkins, who was killed when his wife set fire to the bed where he was sleeping. The insurers argued that the death was not accidental because it resulted from a pattern of domestic violence that should have led Mr. Hawkins to reasonably expect such an outcome, while the estate maintained that the policies covered the loss. The court denied both the insurers' motion for summary judgment and the estate's cross-motion, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the history of abuse, whether Mr. Hawkins knew or should have known his wife might kill him, and the applicability of concepts like battered spouse syndrome to the reasonable-expectation test under the policy language. The policies defined covered losses as those resulting directly from bodily injury due to an accident independent of all other causes, and the ERISA context required close adherence to those written terms. The case was therefore set for further proceedings to resolve the factual disputes.
federal powerbusiness & regulatorycriminal law
Bodoy v. North Arundel Hospital
District Court, D. Maryland · 1996-11-20 · cited 7×
In this employment discrimination case, plaintiff Angelo Bodoy, a Puerto Rican Latino maintenance mechanic, sued North Arundel Hospital and several supervisors under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging unequal discipline and working conditions, harassment, denial of advancement opportunities, retaliation, and retaliatory discharge based on race and national origin. After the EEOC case was dismissed and a co-plaintiff withdrew, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which Bodoy opposed while proceeding pro se. The court granted the motion, holding that Bodoy failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and that the hospital's documented criticisms of his performance—such as slow completion of rounds, inadequate skills in electrical and plumbing work, and failure to pursue training—provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the discipline and termination that Bodoy did not rebut with evidence of pretext. The court noted that performance reviews and warnings were consistent and that Bodoy lacked the specialized skills of other mechanics, with no sufficient link shown between his complaints and adverse actions.
civil rightslabor & employment
Cross v. Bally's Health & Tennis Corp.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1996-11-19 · cited 6×
In Cross v. Bally's Health & Tennis Corp., the plaintiff, an African-American former employee of Bally’s, alleged racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by claiming he was treated differently than non-African-American employees in the enforcement of the company’s lateness policy, along with related retaliation claims under Title VII, the FLSA, and Maryland wage laws. The court granted Bally’s motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that the plaintiff did not present direct evidence of discriminatory animus and failed to make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas framework because his time-card analysis did not identify employee races, account for varying schedules, or demonstrate that similarly situated non-African-American employees received more lenient discipline.
civil rightslabor & employment