George P. Kazen

In Eliserio v. Floydada Housing Authority, migrant farmworkers and the United Farmworkers of America sued the housing authority, alleging that it operated substandard farm labor housing in violation of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act's safety and health standards and engaged in race- and national-origin discrimination affecting housing availability and conditions under the Fair Housing Act. The defendant moved to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The magistrate judge recommended denial, concluding that the plaintiffs' allegations sufficiently stated claims under both statutes and that the UFW had organizational standing based on its resource diversion and harm to its mission. The district court adopted the report and recommendation in full, denying the motion to dismiss.

civil rightslabor & employment

In this case, migrant farm workers residing in the Southern District of Texas sued the Floydada Housing Authority, a Northern District entity, alleging that the housing they rented in 2004 violated federal standards under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA) as well as Texas lease and habitability laws. The defendant moved to transfer venue to the Lubbock Division under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), claiming greater convenience for itself, its witnesses, and access to evidence. The court denied the motion, holding that the defendant failed to show the balance of private and public interest factors from In re Volkswagen AG outweighed the plaintiffs' choice of forum, given the potential burden on the migrant plaintiffs, the AWPA's emphasis on accessible private enforcement, and the lack of demonstrated hardship in securing witnesses or proof.

procedurelabor & employment

Migrant farm workers residing in the Southern District of Texas sued the Floydada Housing Authority, a public entity operating low-income housing only in Floyd County in the Northern District, alleging violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA) as well as Texas lease and habitability laws for substandard conditions during their 2004 occupancy. The defendant moved to dismiss for improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer the case to the Lubbock Division of the Northern District. The court held that venue was proper in the Southern District under the AWPA’s special jurisdictional provision, which permits suit in any district court with personal jurisdiction over the parties, without regard to traditional venue rules under 28 U.S.C. § 1391; because the defendant is located and was served in Texas, personal jurisdiction existed. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss but directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the convenience factors for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and In re Volkswagen.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a former animal control officer for the City of Laredo who sued after his 2001 termination, claiming retaliation for complaints to supervisors about personal and coworker safety equipment and for informal discussions with other employees about those issues. He alleged violations of the First Amendment and Texas Labor Code sections protecting associational rights. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It concluded that the statements constituted mixed speech made primarily in the plaintiff's role as an employee rather than as a citizen on matters of public concern, and found no competent evidence supporting a labor code claim regarding union-related activity.

labor & employmentfree speechcivil rights

The case involved a lawsuit by Steven Ames against several defendants, including Border Transfer Services, alleging injuries from a defective tire on a Ford Explorer in an accident in Mexico. The court granted summary judgment to Border Transfer, finding it was not a "seller" under Texas products liability law. The reasoning centered on Border Transfer's role as a customs broker providing import paperwork services without ever taking possession or ownership of the vehicles, distinguishing it from entities that place products in the stream of commerce. Texas law and precedents do not impose strict liability on such service providers for defects in incidental products.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a claim by Prolec-GE against Union Pacific Railroad for damage to an electrical transformer during rail shipment from Texas to Mississippi. The bill of lading incorporated a tariff limiting the railroad's liability to $50,000 per rail car under 49 U.S.C. § 10709. After the railroad tendered and the shipper cashed a $50,000 check explicitly offered as full satisfaction of the claim, the railroad moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, holding that the elements of accord and satisfaction under Texas UCC § 3.311 were satisfied because the tender was made in good faith with conspicuous notice of full payment, the claim was subject to dispute, and the shipper accepted payment without repudiation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in which the plaintiff alleged she was demoted and suspended after internally complaining to her employer that a policy denying overtime pay for unapproved extra hours violated federal law. The defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the anti-retaliation provision in 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) does not protect informal complaints made only to the employer. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff's allegations went beyond abstract grumblings and that the majority of circuit courts have interpreted the FLSA to protect employees who communicate the substance of their wage complaints to their employers.

labor & employment

In this eminent domain case, the United States filed a declaration of taking for 14.36 acres of land in Texas owned by Dale and Abbie Crenwelge, seeking to limit compensation to the reduction in value of their 964.14-acre tract rather than a larger combined 2,218.31-acre ranch that includes an adjacent parcel owned by a corporation of which Dale Crenwelge is the sole shareholder. The court denied the government's motion for partial summary judgment, which argued against treating the parcels as a single unit due to separate ownership. The decision rested on the principle that unity of ownership for calculating severance damages in partial takings should be interpreted flexibly when there is physical unity and unity of use, to ensure just compensation reflecting marketplace realities, even if one parcel is held by a corporation.

propertyfederal power

This case involves a negligence and products liability action filed in Texas state court by Mexican nationals and U.S. citizens against Bridgestone, Firestone, Ford, and a local Texas car dealer, Sames Motor Co., arising from an automobile accident. The defendants removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds, and the plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that Sames's Texas citizenship destroyed complete diversity and that removal was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). The court denied the motion to remand, holding that Sames was fraudulently joined because the state-court pleadings at the time of removal contained no specific factual allegations supporting any negligence claim against it. The court reasoned that even under liberal notice-pleading standards, the petition's conclusory statements did not provide Sames with fair notice of any actionable conduct, and post-removal theories or amendments could not be considered to cure the deficiency for jurisdictional purposes. The case will proceed in federal court without Sames, though the dismissal was without prejudice.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a lawsuit by Rogelio Morales and others against Bayer and retailers including Circle K for severe injuries allegedly caused by exposure to PPA in over-the-counter products like Alka Seltzer Plus purchased at a Circle K store. Bayer removed the case from Texas state court to federal court, arguing that Circle K was fraudulently joined to destroy diversity jurisdiction. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand, holding that Circle K was not fraudulently joined because the pleadings, as clarified by affidavit, stated a potential cause of action against the retailer under Texas law for failure to warn of dangers in the product. The reasoning centered on the possibility that Texas imposes a duty to warn on sellers of OTC drugs, distinct from the learned intermediary doctrine applicable to pharmacists dispensing prescription drugs, and thus federal diversity jurisdiction was lacking.

proceduretorts & liability

This case is a negligence suit brought by Olga Hinojosa individually and on behalf of her daughter against several doctors, medical practices, and hospitals, alleging substandard medical care after a traffic accident and seeking damages under theories including negligence and vicarious liability. The defendants removed the case from Texas state court to federal court, first citing a reference in the amended petition to 42 C.F.R. § 482.12 and later also invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd as grounds for federal question jurisdiction. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that the well-pleaded complaint did not present a federal question because the cited regulation creates no private right of action and serves only as an element of a state-law claim, that federal issues were not substantial under Fifth Circuit precedent, and that removal could not be sustained on grounds not stated in the original removal notice.

proceduretorts & liability

In United States v. Ramirez, the defendant moved to suppress marijuana discovered in his truck after a traffic stop, arguing that the initial stop violated the Fourth Amendment and that his subsequent consent to search was invalid. The court denied the motion to suppress. It found the stop justified at its inception because the trooper had reasonable suspicion of a lane violation under Texas law and possible intoxication or fatigue, based on the truck crossing the shoulder line and the driver's nervous behavior and inconsistent statements. The detention's scope was reasonable, including a brief safety sweep that revealed additional suspicious facts, and the consent to search was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, as the driver cooperated without coercion.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Rendon-Rodriguez, the defendant, who had pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2), moved to withdraw his plea and dismiss the indictment, claiming his 1999 removal order was invalid because the immigration judge denied him a continuance for counsel, failed to advise him of potential discretionary relief under former INA § 212(c) as discussed in INS v. St. Cyr, and otherwise violated due process. The court denied both motions, holding that the defendant could not collaterally attack the removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) because he had not exhausted administrative remedies (having withdrawn his appeal and made no effort to reopen proceedings), had not been improperly deprived of judicial review, and had not shown the order was fundamentally unfair. The court further found that the defendant had waived any St. Cyr argument by failing to pursue it on appeal despite being aware of it and that allowing withdrawal of the plea would waste judicial resources.

immigrationcriminal lawprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs' motion to remand a lawsuit to state court after it had been removed by some defendants. The court examined whether the removal was valid, specifically focusing on whether all properly joined defendants had properly consented to the removal as required by federal law. Defendant Ford Motor Company sent a letter stating it was "not joining" in the removal attempt but did not oppose it. The court concluded that this language did not meet the requirement for unambiguous and affirmative consent, leading to the decision that the removal was procedurally defective and granting the motion to remand.

procedure

In United States v. Maldonado, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained after a vehicle stop and a subsequent search of his residence, arguing that the stop lacked probable cause and that his consent to the search was involuntary or obtained in violation of Miranda. The court denied the motion after finding that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on information from a cooperating informant who identified the occupants and described prior drug deliveries. The court further held that the defendant's oral and written consents to search his home were voluntary because he was not in custody during the traffic stop, was not subjected to interrogation, and was informed of his right to refuse consent. The search of the home uncovered cocaine, firearms, and currency, which the court ruled admissible.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Henry Caine, who had been acquitted by a jury in the Western District of Tennessee in 1999 on federal charges of conspiracy and attempt to possess with intent to distribute over 1,200 pounds of marijuana, as well as possession of a separate quantity. He faced new charges in the Southern District of Texas for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana and conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, based on overlapping events from late 1998 involving the same participants, locations, and transactions. Caine moved to dismiss the new indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The court granted the motion after applying the Blockburger test and analyzing five factors from circuit precedent (time, co-conspirators, offenses charged, overt acts/scope, and places), concluding that the pending charges arose from the same single conspiracy for which he had already been acquitted.

criminal lawprocedure

In Castro v. Serrata, plaintiffs Crisoforo Castro and his family sued defendant Rick Day for negligent hiring of independent contractor Matías Serrata after Castro, an employee of Serrata, lost a leg in an auger accident while installing a ranch fence. The sole remaining claim was that Day failed to exercise reasonable care in selecting a competent contractor under Restatement of Torts (Second) § 411. The court granted Day's second motion for summary judgment, holding that Texas law does not treat employees of an independent contractor as "third persons" entitled to recover under this negligent hiring theory. This conclusion rested on Simonton v. Perry and subsequent Texas appellate decisions such as Hammack v. Conoco, along with Fifth Circuit precedent, which uniformly exclude contractor employees from the scope of § 411 liability.

torts & liability

The case involved a worker, Cristoforo Castro, who suffered a severe leg injury while employed by independent contractor Matías Serrata to build a fence on property leased by defendant J. Rick Day. Castro sued Day for negligent supervision and negligent hiring under Texas tort law, alleging Day retained or exercised control over the work through site visits by his foreman. The court granted Day's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact because the evidence showed only general inspections for progress and supplies, with no contractual right or actual exercise of control over the specific activities causing the injury, as required by precedents like Redinger v. Living, Inc. and Koch Refining Co. v. Chapa.

torts & liability

This case involved a defendant challenging a petition to revoke his supervised release, arguing that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) to reimpose supervised release after revocation violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws because the statute was enacted after his original 1994 sentence. The court denied the motion to dismiss, finding no ex post facto violation. The reasoning centered on the fact that the change did not increase the maximum penalty of imprisonment for the offense, which remained two years for a Class C felony, and that the court was merely resuming the original supervised release term rather than imposing a new one. The court drew on Supreme Court precedent emphasizing that ex post facto concerns focus on actual increases in punishment, as well as decisions from other circuits holding that revocation proceedings punish new violations rather than the original offense.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff injured at work who was transported by the defendant hospital district's ambulance to a different hospital, as directed by his supervisor at the scene; he sued under the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), claiming the ambulance should have taken him to the defendant's facility instead. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the EMTALA claim. It reasoned that EMTALA imposes two conjunctive requirements—an individual must come to the emergency department (satisfied here because federal regulations include a hospital-owned ambulance) and a request must be made for examination or treatment at that hospital (not satisfied, as no such request was made and the supervisor explicitly instructed transport elsewhere). The court concluded that EMTALA is not designed to override a specific request to go to another hospital.

healthcareprocedure