Robert Ernest Keeton

In United States v. Weikert, a defendant on supervised release after convictions for cocaine conspiracy and escape challenged the government's attempt to collect a blood sample for DNA analysis under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act to enter into the CODIS database, arguing it violated the Fourth Amendment absent a warrant or individualized suspicion. The district court granted the defendant's motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the collection and denied the government's request to revoke supervised release. The court found the constitutional question was one of first impression in the First Circuit, determined the defendant showed a likelihood of success on the merits along with irreparable harm, concluded the balance of harms favored the defendant, and held that the public interest supported protecting Fourth Amendment rights.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Chukwuma Azubuko suing MBNA America Bank and Experian Information Solutions after MBNA cancelled his credit cards based on negative credit information from Experian concerning a school loan repayment. The complaint asserted incoherent claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, contract theories like unconscionability, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil rights violations, due process, and other matters, while demanding millions in damages and reinstatement of credit lines. The court dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice, as the claims were deemed vexatious and unfounded—particularly since the plaintiff admitted MBNA correctly cancelled one card—and because the plaintiff had a documented history of frivolous filings that disregarded prior court orders and judicial resources.

civil rightsprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a legal malpractice claim filed by plaintiff Michael Frankston in Massachusetts Superior Court against defendants Brackett B. Denniston III and Dennis M. Perluss, alleging breaches of their duty of care in representing him. Denniston removed the action to federal court, asserting that Perluss did not object, but Perluss's later attempts to consent occurred after the statutory deadline and were not properly directed to the court. Frankston moved to remand, arguing improper removal due to lack of timely consent by all defendants. The court granted the motion to remand, holding that each defendant must independently notify the court of consent within the 30-day period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, and that statements in the removal notice or subsequent filings did not satisfy this requirement. It denied the other pending motions as moot.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a civil action filed by plaintiff Bleau against defendant Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Association, including a defamation claim. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the defamation claim, finding that the complaint failed to specify the statements at issue or when they were made. The core reasoning clarified that federal courts apply the notice pleading standards of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9 rather than any heightened state-law requirements for defamation claims, as established by First Circuit precedent in Andresen v. Diorio that overruled prior district court decisions to the contrary. The opinion designated this portion for publication to resolve confusion about applicable pleading rules in federal defamation cases.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves multiple parties, including insurance companies Great Northern, CNA, and National Grange, along with the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), Paino Associates, Transcore, and Caliber One Indemnity, arising from disputes over contracts, indemnification, and insurance coverage related to MTA projects. The court addressed numerous motions for summary judgment and related filings concerning the authenticity of contract documents and the parties' respective obligations. It granted MTA's motions for summary judgment against Caliber One and Transcore on key legal issues regarding their duties, denied the opposing cross-motions for summary judgment, and allowed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' direct claims against MTA while keeping MTA in the case for its remaining cross-claims and third-party claims. The rulings turned on interpretations of the contracts and undisputed facts in the record without resolving factual disputes.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involves multiple motions for summary judgment in a dispute among insurance companies, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, and contractors including Paino Associates and Transcore, Inc., arising from claims related to liability and indemnification. The court addressed numerous filings concerning whether certain parties were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on issues of coverage and responsibility. It denied Transcore's motions for summary judgment against the plaintiffs and Paino Associates, finding that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact for trial. Various other motions were withdrawn by the parties or denied as moot, including an oral motion to strike unauthenticated expert reports. The decisions emphasized adjudication on the merits over procedural technicalities where evidence supported allowing the claims to proceed.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involves a legal malpractice claim by plaintiff Katherine Andrews against attorney Barry Elwell for his representation of her in Massachusetts juvenile court proceedings that resulted in the termination of her parental rights, along with claims against alleged law firm partners Paul Pappas, John Carlson, and Neil Colicchio seeking to hold them vicariously liable. The movants sought summary judgment on the ground that no partnership existed with Elwell. The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the defendants held themselves out as partners through shared office space, telephone listings, and court filings using the firm name Pappas, Carlson & Elwell. The court reasoned that these representations could support liability under partnership-by-estoppel principles or professional conduct rules requiring clarification of non-partnership status, and that Colicchio's later involvement did not entitle him to summary judgment either.

family lawproceduretorts & liability

Plaintiffs, a class of Auto Damage Appraisers employed by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, filed a nationwide class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act seeking unpaid overtime compensation. The parties disputed whether the fluctuating workweek method under 29 C.F.R. § 778.114 could be used to calculate any overtime owed, given that appraisers received a fixed weekly salary plus additional payments for Saturday work even when total hours fell below 40. The court ruled that the fluctuating workweek method does not apply. It reasoned that the second required condition was not satisfied because the Saturday payments meant the salary was not fixed and independent of hours worked, and there was accordingly no clear mutual understanding that pay would remain fixed regardless of hours.

labor & employment

This case involved judicial review under 26 U.S.C. § 7429 of an IRS jeopardy assessment against Richard Settipane II for unpaid taxes on illegal bookmaking income from 1997 through 2002. The plaintiff had transferred his home, his only major asset, to his wife for nominal consideration and refinanced to extract equity while under IRS investigation for concealed wagering activity. The court held a bench trial and determined that the IRS's decision to make the jeopardy assessment was reasonable under the circumstances due to the risk of asset dissipation, the plaintiff's control over family finances, and his history of concealing income. The court also concluded that the amount assessed, calculated from recovered betting slips extrapolated over the tax years plus penalties, was appropriate because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the method was fatally defective or arbitrary.

taxescriminal law

This MDL proceeding involved tag-along cases from Mississippi alleging improper life insurance sales practices by Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. and related defendants, which had been removed from state court and transferred to the federal MDL court. Plaintiffs moved to remand the four remaining cases directly to state court, while defendants challenged the transferee court's authority to do so. The court held that an MDL transferee court has authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and Judicial Panel precedents to remand cases directly to state courts, as the Panel's transfer does not resolve jurisdictional questions. Applying that authority, the court granted the motions to remand in Kendall, Henderson, Caston, and Pike County, returning each case to its originating state court and denying other motions as moot.

procedurefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

In Bates v. MacKay, a Saugus police detective and union president sued the police chief after receiving a written reprimand for publishing a letter to local newspapers criticizing inadequate security and violence at town nightclubs, which the department deemed a violation of its media policy. The plaintiff claimed the discipline infringed his First Amendment rights to speak on matters of public concern. The court ruled that the letter addressed issues of public safety and thus constituted protected speech, making the reprimand unconstitutional, but granted the chief qualified immunity from damages because the law was not clearly established at the time. It denied full summary judgment to the defendant and directed further briefing on injunctive relief and municipal liability.

free speechcivil rights

This case is a shareholder derivative action brought on behalf of John Hancock Financial Services against its directors and executives, alleging excessive compensation awards, improper stock acquisitions by insiders, and inadequate disclosures in a 2003 proxy statement following the company's 2000 IPO and demutualization. The court addressed motions to disqualify counsel and to dismiss the complaint under Rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6). It dismissed the motion to disqualify without prejudice and granted the motion to dismiss in part, dismissing without prejudice all claims except those based on May 12, 2003 director compensation, which survived because the plaintiff sufficiently alleged demand futility was not required or was shown and the claims met the plausibility standard for breach of fiduciary duty and related counts.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act brought by auto damage appraisers employed by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, who seek unpaid overtime compensation for work performed between 1998 and the present, including time spent on certain tasks at home and driving to their first and from their last appraisal locations each day. The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on whether the driving time to and from home is compensable, along with a joint stipulation for partial judgment, objections to evidence, and a motion to compel documents. The court allowed the stipulation in part, providing for double damages on any unpaid overtime while preserving the defendant's right to argue that commuting time is non-compensable and that the fluctuating workweek method applies. It overruled the defendant's objections to evidence in part, allowed the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment in part and denied it in part, allowed the defendant's cross-motion in part and denied it in part, and allowed the motion to compel in part and denied it in part. The rulings address the scope of compensable hours worked under the FLSA and related procedural matters in the litigation.

labor & employment

The case involved Comcast suing defendant Marco Naranjo for using a prohibited electronic device to unlawfully intercept its cable television signal, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553. After the defendant failed to respond, the court entered default against him, granted default judgment, and held a hearing on damages. The court awarded the plaintiff $2,780 in statutory damages (chosen within the $250–$10,000 range under § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii)), $1,320.36 in costs and attorneys' fees, a permanent injunction barring further unauthorized interceptions, and post-judgment interest. The award was based on the statute's provisions allowing injunctive relief, damages, costs, and fees, along with evidence of the violation and reasonable calculation of fees at $200 per hour for 5.7 hours worked.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves ongoing management of a receivership estate for Indian Motorcycle Manufacturing, Inc. (IMMI), including disputes over a 1995 settlement agreement between the Receiver and Michael Mandelman and separate tax issues raised by the United States. The court addressed Mandelman’s motion for attorneys’ fees stemming from the Receiver’s unsuccessful attempt to reform the agreement due to an alleged misrepresentation about a satisfied judgment, as well as IRS motions to finalize IMMI’s 1999 tax liability and impose a substantial understatement penalty. The court awarded Mandelman $91,762.22 in fees and costs but barred collection pending further order, set IMMI’s tax at $1,065,270 plus interest (subject to later modification), allowed the penalty under I.R.C. § 6662, and permitted discovery on the Receiver’s affirmative defense of reasonable reliance on tax advice. It also directed the Receiver to release lists of disbursed funds to facilitate any potential recoupment proceedings with notice to affected parties. These rulings were based on the terms of the parties’ agreements, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requirements for pleading fraud, and applicable tax code provisions.

proceduretaxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involves petitioner Samuel Patrick's post-conviction challenge to his 1999 federal sentence of life imprisonment following convictions on racketeering, drug conspiracy, and related charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841. After the district court denied his pro se § 2255 motion raising claims including due process violations, Apprendi errors, Brady issues, and ineffective assistance of counsel, Patrick sought a certificate of appealability (COA) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and leave to proceed in forma pauperis for his appeal to the First Circuit. The court denied both requests, holding that Patrick failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether the denial of his constitutional claims was wrong or that the court abused its discretion in rejecting his Rule 59/60 motion, and thus no substantial showing of a constitutional right existed to warrant a COA.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff suing Sprint in Massachusetts state court over monthly charges labeled as regulatory fees for E911 services, claiming violations of state consumer protection law (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A), unjust enrichment, and seeking equitable relief. Sprint removed the case to federal court, asserting federal question and diversity jurisdiction, prompting the plaintiff's motion to remand and Sprint's motion to compel arbitration. The court found no federal question jurisdiction because the complaint pleaded only state-law claims without presenting a substantial disputed federal issue on its face or complete preemption, and no diversity jurisdiction because individual claims could not be aggregated to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. It therefore granted the motion to remand to Suffolk Superior Court, dismissed the arbitration motion and related extensions as moot, and declined to award costs.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute between an investment advisory firm, Richard C. Young & Co., Ltd., and its clients, the Leventhals, over the location of arbitration proceedings under their investment management agreements. The agreements contained clauses requiring arbitration in Boston, Massachusetts, through the American Arbitration Association, but the Leventhals initiated arbitration in California. The firm sought injunctive relief to halt the California arbitration and compel proceedings in Boston, while the Leventhals moved to dismiss. After hearings and review of evidence, the court denied the motion to dismiss in relevant part, enjoined the California arbitration, and ordered that any arbitration under the agreements be submitted to the Boston office of the AAA, based on the explicit terms of the arbitration provisions and principles of contract enforcement and personal jurisdiction over the parties.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case was a civil enforcement action by the SEC against Robert D. Happ alleging insider trading in Galileo Corporation stock. A jury found that Happ possessed and used material nonpublic information about Galileo's fiscal quarter when selling his shares on June 29, 1998, that he was an insider, and that he violated duties of trust and confidence with intent. The court imposed a declaratory judgment of violation along with a monetary award of $85,242.63 (including disgorgement, interest, and a civil penalty) against Happ. It also granted sanctions of $87,036.63 against the SEC for its unjustified refusal to stipulate to the authenticity and completeness of telephone records that disproved a key allegation in the complaint. The court structured the judgment with a partial stay of enforcement resulting in a net payment of $1,794 to Happ.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves the receivership estate of Indian Motorcycle Manufacturing, Inc., where the receiver alleged that Michael Mandelman fraudulently sold a judgment (the Zanghi Judgment) that had already been satisfied, seeking rescission of the contract and restitution of funds paid. The court addressed numerous pending motions from the receiver, the United States (including the IRS), Mandelman, and others concerning procedural issues, discovery rights, sanctions, and the fraud claims. It denied most motions as inadequately supported, premature, or without prejudice, while allowing Mandelman’s and the U.S.’s motions to dismiss the receiver’s fraud-based motion for reformation and restitution. The core reasoning focused on procedural defaults, lack of evidentiary support for the claims, and ripeness of issues, leading to dismissal of the fraud motion while permitting further submissions on tax penalties and final judgment.

business & regulatoryprocedure