Damon Jerome Keith

This case involved a challenge to the Detroit Police Department's affirmative action program for promotions from sergeant to lieutenant, which used a 50/50 Black/White ratio to address past discrimination. The court had previously upheld the program but required an end-date, which the Board of Police Commissioners established as 50% Black representation at those ranks, subject to demographic changes. After reviewing the Board's resolution and hearing arguments, the court approved the end-date as reasonable and entered a final judgment upholding the affirmative action plan. The court also addressed motions for costs and attorney's fees, determining that fees should be awarded against the union intervenors.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case concerned a challenge by white sergeants in the Detroit Police Department to the city's 1974 affirmative action program for promotions to lieutenant, which required promoting equal numbers of black and white officers from eligibility lists rather than strictly by rank order. This resulted in some higher-ranked white candidates being bypassed in favor of lower-ranked black candidates. The court upheld the voluntary plan under Title VII and the Constitution after reviewing extensive evidence of the department's history of discriminatory hiring and promotional practices from the 1940s through the 1970s. The reasoning centered on the city's past violations of antidiscrimination laws, as analyzed under the Weber standard, along with the plan's reasonableness in addressing those violations and meeting operational needs for a police force reflective of the community it serves.

civil rightslabor & employment

In Baker v. City of Detroit, a class of white police officers and their union sued the city, claiming that its affirmative action program illegally discriminated against them by promoting equal numbers of white and black sergeants to lieutenant. The court granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims for actual and punitive damages other than back pay. The core reasoning was that city officials were entitled to good-faith qualified immunity because the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious promotion programs was not clearly established at the time, the officials' actions were not malicious, and summary judgment is appropriate to protect such good-faith conduct by public officials. The court also addressed and rejected the plaintiffs' procedural objections regarding pleading of the immunity defense.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved white Detroit police officers challenging the city's affirmative action program, which promoted equal numbers of white and black sergeants to lieutenant, alleging violations of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e), other federal civil rights statutes, the Fourteenth Amendment, and state law, and seeking damages, back pay, and injunctive relief. The primary issue addressed was whether the plaintiffs had a right to a jury trial on their claims. The court held that no jury trial attaches to Title VII claims for back pay and injunctive relief, as these remedies are equitable and restitutionary rather than legal damages. It further reasoned that bifurcation of liability and damages or the addition of § 1983 damages claims did not create a jury right in this employment discrimination context, and suggested that summary judgment could resolve damages issues to leave only equitable matters for trial.

civil rightslabor & employment

In Baker v. City of Detroit, plaintiffs challenged the Detroit Police Department's promotion policies as racially discriminatory against white sergeants seeking lieutenant positions, asserting claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 2000d, the Fourteenth Amendment, and related state laws. The court addressed plaintiffs' motion to disqualify Judge Keith under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) due to his friendship with Mayor Coleman Young, a nominal defendant, and Young's role in the judge's nomination and swearing-in. The court denied the motion, holding that the objective standard requires facts showing a reasonable person would question the judge's impartiality, and that mere friendship or limited official interactions do not meet this threshold, consistent with precedents like Parrish v. Board of Commissioners. The decision emphasized that recusal is not automatic and prior rulings against the city in other cases do not indicate bias here.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved a Black employee who sued his employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that his demotion from pumper to utilityman at the Detroit Refinery was racially discriminatory. The court decided to deny the requested relief of reinstatement, back pay, costs, and attorney fees. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff had committed five tank overflows and other misoperations during his time as a pumper—far more than his peers—had received multiple warnings, and had never performed the job satisfactorily, while a white employee offered for comparison had a long record of acceptable performance before his own issues and thus was not similarly situated.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involved a defendant's motion to suppress narcotics evidence seized from his luggage during an airport stop by a DEA agent in Detroit. The agent had observed the defendant arriving from Los Angeles, noted his nervousness, recognized his name from DEA reports as a suspected drug distributor, and stopped him for questioning before taking him to a private room, X-raying the locked suitcase, and breaking the lock to search it after the defendant refused to provide the combination. The court granted the motion to suppress, holding that the initial investigative stop was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it lacked specific and articulable facts justifying suspicion of criminal activity, relying instead on subjective observations like nervousness, and that the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful stop must be excluded.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved organizations representing elderly and handicapped persons suing federal, state, and local defendants, including the Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority, to block the purchase of transit buses inaccessible to mobility-impaired individuals with federal funds. Plaintiffs alleged violations of section 16(a) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and other federal and state laws requiring special efforts for accessibility and prohibiting discrimination in federally assisted programs. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, citing a recent decision recognizing a private cause of action under section 504, and denied their motion for summary judgment while permitting plaintiffs to amend the complaint; it dismissed one claim against the General Services Administrator as unsupported by statute. The decision turned on interpretations of statutory requirements for accessibility in public transit and the existence of private enforcement rights.

civil rightsfederal power

This case concerns Wayne State University's challenge to Veterans Administration regulations and a DVB circular that set measurement standards for determining full-time courses in the College of Lifelong Learning's Weekend College Program, affecting veterans' eligibility for educational assistance allowance benefits under Title 38. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment after denying an earlier motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding the University had standing due to the VA's refusal to accept its self-certification of full-time status. It dismissed non-veteran plaintiffs and one veteran plaintiff for failing to present an actual case or controversy under Article III, as their alleged injuries were speculative. The court certified a subclass of full-time veteran students receiving benefits, based on common questions of law and fact and the general applicability of the regulations. Core reasoning centered on constitutional standing requirements, the zone of interests test, and Rule 23 class action criteria, while noting that the amount of benefits does not depend on economic need.

federal powerprocedure

This case concerns a claim by plaintiffs Seven D. Enterprises and Bradford Trucking Co. that defendant Angelo Fonzi, acting as an officer of Interstate Motor Freight Systems, tortiously interfered with their contracts by terminating them three months after execution to divert business to his own company, TMC. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the terminations were justified due to poor performance and that Fonzi was immune as a corporate agent, but the court granted reconsideration and denied the motion. The court held that genuine issues of material fact exist, particularly whether Fonzi acted with just cause or for personal benefit, as the parties' affidavits conflict on this point. Under Rule 56, summary judgment requires no disputed material facts, and questions of justification or good faith in interference claims are factual matters typically reserved for trial rather than resolved on affidavits alone.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Wayne State University and several students seeking to enjoin Veterans Administration regulations that classified participants in the university's Weekend College Program as part-time students, thereby affecting their eligibility for veterans' educational assistance benefits. The court addressed whether 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) barred judicial review of the Administrator's actions in promulgating those regulations under 38 U.S.C. §§ 210(c)(1) and 1788. It held that the statute did not preclude jurisdiction because the challenge concerned the scope of the Administrator's statutory authority and the constitutionality of generally applicable regulations, rather than individual benefit claims. Drawing on Johnson v. Robison and the legislative history of the provision, the court reasoned that § 211(a) finalizes only specific decisions on benefits for veterans, not review of regulatory validity.

federal powerprocedure

In this case, borrowers who received a conventional mortgage from First Federal Savings & Loan sued as a class action, alleging that the lender violated the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z by failing to properly disclose late payment and acceleration clauses as finance charges or default charges, and violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and Regulation X through non-conforming settlement statements, excessive escrow deposits, inadequate seller disclosures, and improper fees for preparing disclosure forms. The defendant moved for summary judgment on multiple counts, asserting that its mortgage documents and practices complied with both statutes and their implementing regulations. The court examined whether the 4% late charge on monthly installments qualified as an "actually unanticipated" charge under Regulation Z § 226.4(c), distinguishing the single-advance mortgage from open-end credit plans in prior cases like Kroll, and reviewed the acceleration clause language against TILA disclosure mandates in 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(7) and RESPA fee prohibitions in 12 U.S.C. § 2610. It further assessed whether the lender's HUD-1 form variations and escrow practices satisfied Regulation X requirements.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a state prisoner suing prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by seizing his personal diary during a cell search and using its contents in a hearing that led to his removal from a prison work assignment. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact. The diary was state property considered contraband in an inmate's possession, making its seizure permissible, and inmates have no protected property or liberty interest in specific prison jobs, with the plaintiff having received a hearing before the Clinic Action Committee.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendants Finazzo and Licavoli moving to suppress evidence from oral communications intercepted via microphones installed by FBI agents on the premises of AAA Store Fixtures, Inc., under Title III court orders authorizing electronic surveillance. The orders permitted interception of conversations but were silent on whether agents could enter the premises surreptitiously or forcibly to install and remove the devices, which they did on two occasions without explicit authorization. The court granted the motions to suppress, ruling that such entries onto private property require prior judicial scrutiny and specific approval in the authorizing orders rather than being implied from the surveillance authorization or left to investigative discretion.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Miles, the defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin after DEA agents at Detroit Metropolitan Airport approached him based on an anonymous tip describing a traveler arriving from Los Angeles with drugs. The agents followed Miles, asked him to accompany them to a private baggage room, advised him of his Miranda rights, and obtained his consent to open his suitcase, which contained marijuana, heroin, and cash; he was then formally arrested. The court granted the motion to suppress the evidence, holding that Miles was effectively arrested without probable cause when escorted to the private room solely on the basis of the uncorroborated anonymous tip, rendering the subsequent seizure invalid under the Fourth Amendment and Wong Sun v. United States.

criminal lawprocedure

The Wright-Austin Company sued under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act for a declaratory judgment vacating an arbitrator's award that reinstated employee Joseph Barrow after his termination for three consecutive days of absence without notice. The union counterclaimed to enforce the award. The court granted the company's motion for summary judgment, vacated the award, and ordered the parties to share the arbitrator's fees under the collective bargaining agreement. It reasoned that the arbitrator exceeded his authority because the award did not draw its essence from the contract, which permitted loss of seniority for unexcused absences meeting the three-day threshold. The court distinguished cases involving wildcat strikes and emphasized that the agreement left penalty determinations to the company rather than the arbitrator.

labor & employment

This case involved defendants Floyd and Roseborough who moved to suppress approximately 468 grams of heroin seized from Roseborough at Detroit Metropolitan Airport on October 2, 1975, without a search warrant. The court granted the motion to suppress, ruling that the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The agent's initial stop was based on observations fitting a drug courier profile, but the court determined this did not constitute reasonable suspicion, making the stop illegal; subsequent searches and the arrest also lacked probable cause, and no warrant exceptions applied.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Whitlock, the defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute and unlawful importation of cocaine after a controlled delivery of packages from Colombia containing the drug. The court considered the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from a search of his wife's car and his briefcase, which occurred during execution of a warrant for his apartment. The court decided that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment, as the government failed to show it fell within any established exception such as consent. The reasoning focused on the lack of valid consent, given the coercive circumstances with multiple armed agents present, the defendant's handcuffing, and the agents' failure to inform him of his right to refuse the search of areas beyond the warrant's scope; the court also rejected arguments based on forfeiture statutes due to insufficient probable cause for arrest or vehicle seizure at the time.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved plaintiff Annie Thompson challenging her forced retirement under Chrysler's "special early" pension plan as age discrimination, first under Michigan law and then under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in a separate action. The court had previously granted partial summary judgment to the defendant in the state-law case, finding that the plan did not violate the applicable Michigan statute. In this federal action, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the ADEA exempts bona fide employee benefit plans such as retirement or pension plans that are not a subterfuge to evade the law's purposes. The court reasoned that the uncontroverted evidence, including affidavits, showed the plan was negotiated with the union and applied based on the plaintiff's health information provided by her physician, and the plaintiff had not submitted anything to rebut that evidence.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involves multiple pre-trial motions by defendant Lauricella in a federal criminal prosecution charging conspiracy to violate bribery and interstate travel statutes, along with related substantive counts. The court denied the motions for discovery and a bill of particulars except to the extent already provided by the government, for an order establishing the sequence of proof regarding hearsay co-conspirator statements, to dismiss the indictment for alleged lack of authorization of special government attorneys under 28 U.S.C. § 515, and to dismiss Count V. It also deferred a ruling on claims of grand jury abuse for pre-trial discovery while enjoining further subpoenas related to the defendant pending in camera review. The decisions rested on the government's compliance with statutory appointment requirements, established district practice for conditional admission of evidence, and acknowledgment of limits on grand jury use without demonstrated prejudice to the defendant.

criminal lawprocedure