William Duffy Keller

The case involved a dispute over the scope of waiver of attorney-client and work product privileges in a patent infringement action, where the defendants asserted a good-faith belief defense based on advice from their counsel that their product did not infringe the plaintiff's reissue patent or that the patent was invalid. The magistrate judge had ruled that the waiver was limited to communications actually provided to the defendants and did not extend to counsel's uncommunicated work product. The district court reviewed this ruling, noting the absence of Federal Circuit precedent and that the key issue in willful infringement claims is the defendant's state of mind, which is not affected by materials never shared with the client; it therefore followed district court authority holding that the waiver does not reach internal attorney work product.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Doucette v. City of Santa Monica, plaintiffs brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging Santa Monica ordinances regulating solicitation, claiming the provisions violated the First Amendment by criminalizing homelessness. The court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Ordinance 1758 but possessed standing to facially challenge the solicitation provisions of Ordinance 1768. The court ruled that these provisions are constitutional because, even under the heightened scrutiny applied to speech restrictions in public forums, they are narrowly tailored to serve the significant governmental interest of preventing harassment and intimidation and leave open ample alternative channels for solicitation.

civil rightsfree speech

The case centers on plaintiff James Trenton, a radio host under contract with defendant Infinity Broadcasting, who sued in state court alleging 20 causes of action including misappropriation, conversion, and breach of contract over defendants' continued airing of the Loveline radio program format after his 1993 suspension, claiming he conceived and owned the format. Defendants removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that Section 102(b) of the federal Copyright Act bars any property interest in the uncopyrightable program format or ideas and that Section 301(a) preempts all state claims predicated on such an interest. Plaintiff moved to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447, arguing the claims were purely state-law matters, and sought sanctions. The court analyzed whether the format qualified as protectable subject matter or was preempted, ultimately addressing federal preemption and the propriety of federal jurisdiction over the removed action.

propertyprocedurefederal power

Sunbelt Television, a local broadcast station operator, sued Jones Intercable for refusing to carry its channel on Jones' cable system, alleging violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act through monopoly leveraging, denial of an essential facility, and attempted monopolization, plus a state unfair competition claim. Jones moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing the claims failed as a matter of law and were barred by the First Amendment as a protected editorial decision. The court denied the motion as to monopoly leveraging and unfair competition, finding the allegations sufficient and that the First Amendment does not shield anti-competitive conduct, while dismissing the essential facility and attempted monopolization claims without prejudice for lack of clarity on the relevant market and granting leave to amend.

business & regulatoryfree speech

In this criminal tax case, defendant Stribling moved under 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(5) for an order requiring the government to obtain from the IRS a yes-or-no response on whether any of approximately 300 prospective jurors had been audited or investigated. The court denied the motion on two independent grounds: it was filed after the extended Rule 12 cutoff date of January 15, 1991, and well after the multi-month process of compiling and mailing pre-voir dire questionnaires had begun, and it was not made with sufficient advance notice to permit the Secretary to process the request before the April 17 trial date without causing substantial delay. The court noted that the statute envisions early release of the jury list and that granting the motion at this stage would disrupt the carefully planned voir dire process and the validity of the 3,000 questionnaires already sent; as a practical alternative, it ordered the parties to propose a limited set of voir dire questions on the topic instead of a full IRS search.

criminal lawtaxesprocedure

This case involves the FDIC, acting as conservator for the failed Westwood Savings, suing former directors and officers for fraud and mismanagement; those defendants then filed cross-claims for indemnification against third-party professionals including Touche Ross & Co. and Stroock & Stroock & Lavan. The cross-claim defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted the motion and dismissed the cross-claims, holding that they were pendent-party claims requiring an independent basis of federal jurisdiction under precedents such as Finley v. United States. Although 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2) provides federal jurisdiction over civil suits to which the FDIC is a party, the statute does not extend to these ancillary third-party indemnification claims, which remain governed by state law and must be pursued in state court.

procedurefederal power

In United States v. Andonian, defendants moved to suppress video surveillance footage obtained from November 1988 to February 1989 at business premises during a federal criminal investigation, arguing that such surveillance was unauthorized by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and violated the Fourth Amendment. The court denied the motion, holding that Title III's silence on video surveillance does not prohibit it and that federal courts have inherent authority to issue warrants for such surveillance when it complies with Fourth Amendment standards of particularity and reasonableness, as supported by rulings from other circuits. The decision further relied on the good-faith exception from United States v. Leon, finding that officers reasonably relied on a prior judicial warrant authorizing the CCTV installation. The surveillance captured activities including alleged money-counting and visits by defendants.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a professional diver, Gary Griffith, employed by Martech International who suffered decompression sickness (the bends) while working aboard the vessel Misty Eserman, which Martech had time-chartered from owners Don and Thomas Croft along with a crew. Griffith and his wife sued the Crofts under general maritime law for unseaworthiness (and initially negligence), claiming the vessel and equipment were unfit, after similar claims against Martech had been dismissed or stipulated away. The Crofts moved for summary judgment, arguing Griffith was not a seaman with respect to them because he lacked a permanent connection to their vessel and was aboard primarily to perform diving work for Martech rather than to aid in navigation. The court granted summary judgment, holding that the duty of seaworthiness is relational and extends only to seamen connected to the vessel owner or operator, so the Crofts owed Griffith no such absolute duty; it denied their request for Rule 11 sanctions. The ruling rested on Ninth Circuit precedent requiring a seaman to satisfy specific factors including primary employment to aid navigation, which Griffith did not meet vis-a-vis the Crofts.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerns a qui tam action under the False Claims Act in which private relators sued defense contractors for alleged fraud against the government, prompting the defendants to move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants challenged the 1986 amendments to the Act's qui tam provisions as unconstitutional, claiming they violated separation of powers by encroaching on executive authority, improperly appointed private parties under the Appointments Clause, and failed to satisfy Article III's injury-in-fact requirement for standing. The court began its analysis by noting the strong presumption of validity for congressional enactments and the long historical tradition of qui tam suits dating back to the First Congress, which provides evidence of consistency with constitutional principles. It emphasized that the executive branch had not opposed the law and proceeded to examine whether the flexible system of checks and balances was disturbed, ultimately rejecting the constitutional challenges and upholding the amended statute.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

In Periera v. Chapman, the plaintiff, appearing pro se, alleged that defendants including county marshals, attorneys, and property owners violated the automatic stay in his bankruptcy proceedings by evicting him from a Palm Springs house after a foreclosure sale, thereby infringing his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and conspiring to do so under § 1985(3). The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It held that violations of the bankruptcy automatic stay are exclusively remedied through 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) and cannot support a § 1983 action. For the § 1985(3) claim, the court found the complaint failed to allege facts showing race- or class-based animus, as the eviction was tied to the plaintiff's status as a debtor rather than his race, and dismissed that claim with prejudice.

civil rightsprocedureproperty

The case involved the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), acting as conservator for Westwood Savings and Loan, suing former directors, officers, and others for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conspiracy under state law. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1), arguing that the proviso in the statute barred federal jurisdiction when FSLIC acts as conservator in cases involving only state-law rights of investors, creditors, stockholders, and the institution. The court denied the motion, holding that subsection (A) of the statute independently confers agency jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, allowing FSLIC to sue in federal court as a federal agency regardless of the limitations on federal-question jurisdiction in subsection (B). The court followed its prior decision in FSLIC v. Sajovich and rejected the contrary view of the Seventh Circuit in FSLIC v. Ticktin, finding that Congress intended the agency-jurisdiction provision to remain available.

federal powerprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over a 1984 License Agreement in which Avcar Leasing Systems, Inc. agreed to purchase a Dollar Rent A Car franchise for the Washington, D.C. area from Dollar Systems, Inc. (DSI) for a $500,000 fee plus installment payments. Avcar counterclaimed that DSI had violated franchise disclosure and registration requirements under California, Maryland, and Virginia law by failing to register or file exemptions, providing only an outdated 1982 FTC disclosure document after the agreement was signed, and making material changes to the deal at closing. The court found that DSI's net worth and number of existing franchises did not exempt it from registration and that the late disclosure constituted a violation, entitling Avcar to rescission. It awarded Avcar restitution of $350,000 in payments (less offsets for the value of assets received such as vehicles and equipment), plus attorneys' fees, while dismissing claims against most individual defendants and a Robinson-Patman Act counterclaim. Liability was imposed jointly and severally on DSI and two officers under California Corporations Code § 31302.

business & regulatory

This case involves multiple consolidated shareholder derivative suits against BankAmerica Corporation (BAC), its officers and directors, and others, alleging claims including improper loan practices and insider trading by defendant Charles Schwab. The court addressed BAC's motion to dismiss the consolidated derivative complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, which requires plaintiffs to plead with particularity either a demand on the board of directors or reasons why such demand would be futile. Applying Delaware law as the state of incorporation for substantive demand requirements and federal law for pleading standards, the court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice as to all allegations except the loan practices in paragraph 14, finding insufficient particularized pleading of demand futility or excusal for the other claims. For the remaining loan practice allegations, the court ordered additional briefing on whether a prior demand by one plaintiff was adequate and whether other plaintiffs could rely on it, while also directing briefing on the insider trading claim against Schwab.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), acting as conservator for Manhattan Beach Savings and Loan Association, suing the association's directors and two independent corporations for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and money had and received based on transactions that contributed to the institution's financial problems. Defendant Peter Sajovich moved to dismiss the federal action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1). The court denied the motion, ruling that the statute provided federal jurisdiction because FSLIC is deemed a U.S. agency under the provision allowing suits commenced by it, the proviso excluding certain state-law matters did not apply given that the action was initiated by FSLIC and involved non-proviso parties, and the claims raised questions under federal banking regulations.

federal powerprocedurebusiness & regulatory