This case involved a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by plaintiff Mahtab Matin against the law firm Fulton, Friedman & Gullace LLP, alleging that the firm made false or misleading threats of litigation to collect a credit card debt without intending to file suit. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that Matin failed to produce evidence showing the underlying debt was incurred for personal, family, or household purposes, which is a threshold requirement for any FDCPA claim; her testimony that she could not recall her purchases on the GE Money Bank card, combined with the lack of other supporting facts, was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on this element.
This case involves plaintiff Nancy Thomer's claim that defendant Allstate Insurance Company acted in bad faith by delaying investigation and making unreasonable offers in handling her underinsured motorist (UIM) claim following a 2002 motor vehicle accident. Thomer alleged permanent injuries including traumatic brain injury and cognitive deficits that prevented her from working, supported by treatment records from multiple physicians showing post-concussive syndrome and related conditions. Allstate moved for summary judgment, arguing that objective medical evidence and its claims-handling process demonstrated a reasonable basis for its decisions on coverage and valuation. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, finding that some aspects of the bad faith allegations raised triable issues of fact regarding the reasonableness of Allstate's actions while others did not.
Paul A. Friend sued under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of his application for Supplemental Security Income benefits, which he claimed on the basis of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, hepatitis C, and angina with an onset date in 2007. The ALJ found that Friend met the listings for mental impairments due to repeated episodes of decompensation and was therefore disabled, but also determined that his substance dependence was a contributing factor material to the disability finding under 20 C.F.R. § 416.935, rendering him ineligible for benefits. On review, the court applied the substantial-evidence standard and the five-step sequential evaluation process, concluding that the ALJ properly assessed Friend's residual functional capacity and that, absent substance abuse, he could perform his past relevant work as an inventory clerk (as actually performed) or other light, unskilled jobs. The magistrate judge recommended, and the district court ordered, that Friend's request for review be denied and judgment entered for the Commissioner.
This case involves defendant George Georgiou's post-trial motion for a new trial under Rule 33 after a jury convicted him of conspiracy, four counts of securities fraud, and four counts of wire fraud. The court denied the motion in full, rejecting claims that it had improperly allowed interpretation testimony from government witnesses including an undercover FBI agent, that lay opinion testimony violated evidentiary rules, that the defendant was denied the ability to introduce evidence of a cooperating witness's other crimes, that jury instructions were erroneous, and that the government made improper or inconsistent arguments. The core reasoning was that the challenged testimony was properly limited to the witnesses' own understandings of events to explain their conduct rather than the defendant's intent, that objections were either untimely or addressed by curative instructions informing the jury of its role in determining intent, and that other asserted errors did not warrant relief.
This case concerns a multiemployer pension fund's appeal of an arbitration award under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, in which the fund sought to collect withdrawal liability from employer D.A. Nolt, Inc. after Nolt stopped contributing following the end of a collective bargaining agreement. An arbitrator ruled that Nolt owed no withdrawal liability, citing flaws in the fund's calculations, including improper retroactive adjustments to unfunded vested benefit liabilities and issues with the timing of Nolt's withdrawal from the bargaining association. The court affirmed the arbitrator's decision in full, holding that Nolt was not bound by the successor agreement and rejecting the fund's revised liability assessment as inconsistent with statutory requirements. The court also denied Nolt's request for attorneys' fees.
The case involved a former Sears employee who sued the company after being terminated in a November 2007 reduction in force while on FMLA leave for rheumatoid arthritis; he alleged FMLA interference and retaliation, plus breach of contract based on a leave expiration notice and employee handbook. The court granted summary judgment to Sears on all claims. It reasoned that the termination resulted from a legitimate, company-wide RIF decided without knowledge of the plaintiff's prior FMLA leave, that the plaintiff failed to show pretext or interference with FMLA rights, and that no enforceable contract arose because the employment was at-will with explicit disclaimers in the acknowledgment form and handbook.