The case involves two antitrust actions filed in the Eastern District of New York against a foreign corporation licensed to do business in New York State but not doing business in that district. The defendant moved to dismiss for improper venue under the specific antitrust venue provision in Section 12 of the Clayton Act or alternatively to transfer the cases to the Southern District of New York. The court held that venue was proper under the general federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), because a corporation licensed to do business in a state may be sued in any judicial district within that state. The reasoning was that Congress intended the general venue rule to supplement the specific antitrust provision and to align federal venue with state licensing practices that permit service of process statewide, without any indication of intent to restrict antitrust plaintiffs.
The case involved General Electric Co. suing defendant Schwartz for trademark infringement and unfair competition by using GE's registered "GE" monogram and "General Electric" marks on electric fans that were not genuine GE products or only partially so. The court decided in favor of the plaintiff, granting an injunction against the defendant's use of the marks on electrical apparatus. The reasoning was that the trademarks were validly registered, the defendant deliberately attempted to pass off non-GE or partially GE products as GE's to deceive the public, and jurisdiction existed over both the federal trademark claim and the unfair competition claim under the doctrine from Hurn v. Oursler.
In Roth v. W. T. Cowan, Inc., the plaintiff sued Cowan for the wrongful death of her husband in a New Jersey truck accident, alleging negligence by the driver of a Cowan-owned tractor-trailer. Cowan impleaded third-party defendants, including New Jersey resident Anthony Gamberdella, claiming he managed the vehicle under a lease and seeking contribution or indemnity. A marshal attempted service on Gamberdella outside a Manhattan building; after Gamberdella allegedly denied his identity, the papers were left on the truck seat, which he later retrieved. Gamberdella moved to quash service, arguing it was invalid without physical delivery. The court denied the motion, ruling that Gamberdella's evasion made the service effective under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1), as the papers were placed in an appropriate spot in his presence.
The case concerned a Pennsylvania corporation's suit against two New York corporations seeking a declaratory judgment that certain patents were invalid or not infringed, along with a counterclaim for damages based on unfair competition. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to obtain a certificate of authority to do business in New York, holding that state restrictions on foreign corporations do not apply to federal-question patent cases even when diversity jurisdiction is also present. It granted the plaintiff's motion to strike paragraphs of the answer raising venue objections that had already been resolved against the defendants in prior proceedings. The court denied summary judgment on the ground that genuine factual issues remained and refused to strike the defendant's jury demand on the unfair-competition counterclaim, reasoning that the claim sought only legal relief and was compulsory.
The case involved charges against defendant Cordova for assaulting the pilot, a stewardess, and another passenger on a U.S.-owned commercial airplane flying over the high seas from Puerto Rico to New York in 1948. The government relied on federal statutes granting U.S. courts jurisdiction over certain crimes committed within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and out of any state's jurisdiction, along with venue rules for such offenses. After a bench trial, the court found that Cordova committed the assaults as alleged but concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the statutes applied to vessels, not aircraft. The court therefore arrested judgment on the ground that an airplane does not fall within the maritime jurisdiction provisions even when flying over international waters.
This case involves a lawsuit by Roosevelt Field, Inc., an airport operator, against the Carle Place Water District and its commissioners seeking to enjoin construction of a 162-foot water tank near the airport, on grounds that it would obstruct flight paths, violate federal aviation regulations under the Civil Aeronautics Administration, constitute a public nuisance, and impair interstate air commerce; the complaint also sought declaratory relief for an easement by prescription. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (no federal question or diversity) and failure to state a claim, and alternatively to strike four paragraphs of the complaint as immaterial or false. The court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the action arises under the Commerce Clause and the federal Air Commerce Act of 1926, which protect navigable airspace and create enforceable federal rights even without an explicit private right of action, and denied the motion to strike because the challenged allegations were relevant to the controversy.
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