This case involves the Upjohn Company's challenge to actions by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Commissioner sought to remove Upjohn's combination antibiotic drugs (such as Panalba and Albamycin-T) from the market by amending certification regulations, based on a National Academy of Sciences review finding a lack of substantial evidence that each ingredient contributed to the claimed effects, without first holding a hearing. Upjohn argued that the drugs had been certified as safe and effective since the 1950s and that the process violated statutory requirements. The court granted Upjohn a temporary injunction preventing enforcement of the removal order until 30 days after the Commissioner acted on Upjohn's objections, reasoning that the statute and legislative history require due process and a full opportunity to present evidence in the absence of an imminent public health hazard, and that no new evidence of risk had emerged.
business & regulatoryhealthcarefederal powerprocedure
The case involved a union representing three employees at Armour and Company's Marquette distribution plant seeking injunctive relief to block the plant's scheduled closure, on the grounds that it would violate the 1968 collective bargaining agreement's rules on work jurisdiction and its requirement for prior discussion of operational changes affecting employment. The court held that it had jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act to interpret the contract and grant temporary injunctive relief, despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act's restrictions on labor dispute injunctions, and ordered the closure halted pending a merits hearing in January. The core reasoning was that federal courts may fashion equitable remedies to preserve the status quo and their own jurisdiction while resolving contract disputes, as illustrated by precedents like Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, and that loss of seniority rights would constitute irreparable harm not adequately addressable through NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings.
This case involved a challenge by Naph-Sol Refining Company, a small oil company, to an order by the Interstate Commerce Commission, Division 2, that vacated a suspension of proposed tariff increases for use of a pipeline and discontinued an investigation into the rates. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the ICC's action and require suspension and investigation of the new rates filed by Marathon Pipe Line Company after a loss of traffic volume. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the ICC's summary decision under 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) unless the order was plainly without statutory authority, violated a clear statutory command, or involved gross abuse of discretion. The court found no such violation or abuse here, noting that the Administrative Procedure Act did not require a hearing or detailed reasons for refusing to suspend the tariffs, and that the plaintiff had other remedies available under 49 U.S.C. § 13 et seq.
This case concerned the scope of the physician-patient privilege in pretrial discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a federal court applying Michigan law. The court held that the privilege is not waived merely by the filing of a personal injury or malpractice action and remains in effect to bar discovery of protected information until the plaintiff actually calls an attending physician to testify at trial. The reasoning relied on the Michigan statute governing the privilege, which the court interpreted as creating a continuing protection against disclosure absent a specific statutory waiver, along with supporting state case law emphasizing that the privilege controls both publication and introduction of evidence. The court rejected arguments that waiver occurs upon commencement of suit or applies differently to malpractice claims versus other personal injury actions.
This case involved an insurance dispute in which White Pine Copper Co. sought coverage under a policy issued by Continental Insurance Co. for damage to its smelter furnace that occurred during the initial slagging-in process. The jury found that the damage resulted from an explosion within the meaning of the policy, rejecting the insurer's theory of faulty construction. The court denied the defendant's post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, and dismissal, holding that the evidence raised factual issues properly decided by the jury, that expert testimony on the occurrence of an explosion was admissible, and that the defendant had accepted the plaintiff's work-product designation of an undisclosed expert report without seeking court resolution. The court further concluded that the report contained no new material facts that would likely alter the outcome and that plaintiff's counsel had acted appropriately in the discovery process.
This case involved a negligence action by plaintiff Frank Horsey against Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. for workplace injuries, which ended in a $20,000 consent judgment. The dispute centered on apportioning attorney fees and recovery expenses under Michigan's workers' compensation statute (M.S.A. § 17.189) between the plaintiff and the employer's compensation insurer, which had paid $4,326.59 in benefits. The court held that the statute requires expenses of recovery—including reasonable attorney fees—to be apportioned proportionally between the parties according to their interests at the time of recovery, so the insurer must bear 21.63% of the total $7,559.43 in expenses before full reimbursement of its benefits. The reasoning rested on the plain language of the statute directing apportionment of "expenses of recovery" (explicitly including attorney fees) rather than deducting them solely from the employee's share.
