The case involved a dispute over whether performance and payment bonds issued by Hartford Casualty Insurance Company for the City of Marathon's Area 3 wastewater treatment construction project also covered a separate Area 7 project added later through a change order with contractor Intrastate Construction Corp. After Intrastate became insolvent and defaulted, Marathon sought coverage under the bonds for the new project, prompting Hartford to file for declaratory judgment that no such coverage existed. The court granted summary judgment to Hartford, ruling that the Area 7 change order constituted a cardinal change because it involved an entirely separate project at a different location with independent plans and timelines, rather than a modification of the original Area 3 contract. This determination meant the bonds, which were tied specifically to the Area 3 contract, did not extend to the new work, relieving Hartford of any obligation for Area 7.
This case involved former employees of a South Florida landscaping company who sued their employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for unpaid wages, raising the threshold issue of whether the business qualified for enterprise coverage to establish federal jurisdiction. The district court had previously granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no enterprise coverage because the company's local purchases did not meet the interstate commerce requirement under the now-rejected 'coming to rest' doctrine. On remand from the Eleventh Circuit, which clarified that items like equipment could qualify as 'materials' under the FLSA's handling clause if they moved in interstate commerce and had a significant connection to the business, the court reviewed undisputed facts showing the company used seven GMC trucks manufactured outside Florida to transport workers and equipment to job sites. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on enterprise coverage, holding that the trucks qualified as 'materials' in commerce and satisfied the statutory test, thereby limiting the remaining trial issues to the defendants' alleged FLSA liability.
This case was a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action by plaintiff Ernest Heflin against three Miami-Dade police officers alleging excessive force, failure to intervene, and false arrest arising from their response to a domestic argument at his home on May 2, 2005. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice. The decision rested on findings that the officers acted within their discretionary authority, had arguable probable cause to arrest Heflin for obstruction after he confronted them and resisted instructions, that any force applied was de minimis, and that one officer arrived only after the arrest was complete.
This case is a class action in which checking account holders sued several banks, alleging they were charged unlawful excessive overdraft fees. The defendant banks filed renewed motions to compel arbitration under their deposit agreements, following an earlier denial of such motions and a remand from the Eleventh Circuit after the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. The court denied the renewed motions, holding that the arbitration provisions remained unenforceable as unconscionable under applicable state law even without considering the class-action waivers, due to other one-sided terms such as unequal allocation of risks and remedies that favored the banks. The reasoning focused on the FAA's savings clause allowing invalidation of arbitration agreements on general contract grounds like unconscionability, and found that Concepcion did not preempt those independent state-law bases for non-enforcement.
This case involved a wrongful death action brought by Vidhya Balachander on behalf of her husband, who died after nearly drowning while swimming at Great Stirrup Cay, a private island owned and operated by cruise line NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. as a resort stop for passengers of the Norwegian Sky. The plaintiff alleged negligence by NCL for inadequate lifeguard supervision, failure to warn of swimming dangers, and insufficient medical care, and by the ship's doctor for negligent treatment, while also seeking to hold NCL vicariously liable under respondeat superior, apparent agency, and joint venture theories. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, ruling that the claims were governed exclusively by the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), which limits recovery to pecuniary damages and bars non-pecuniary claims; that NCL had no duty to warn of open ocean risks; and that cruise lines cannot be held liable for a ship's doctor's negligence due to lack of control. The court struck the personal jurisdiction defense as waived under Rule 12 and dismissed most counts with prejudice while allowing one negligence count against the doctor to be amended. Core reasoning centered on DOHSA's preemptive effect, established Eleventh Circuit precedent against vicarious liability for ship doctors, and the implausibility of the pleaded facts under Twombly and Iqbal standards.
The case involved a plaintiff convicted of identity theft offenses who filed a FOIA request with the Department of Justice seeking various records related to the prosecutors and offices handling his criminal case. The DOJ denied the request under FOIA exemptions in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C), which protect against unwarranted invasions of personal privacy in personnel files and law enforcement records. After the plaintiff challenged the denial and the court ordered in camera review of the documents along with supporting declarations, the district court granted the defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment, affirmed the withholding, and closed the case on the grounds that the records fell within the claimed exemptions.
