Samuel Pailthorpe King

In Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, plaintiffs including a pastor and a wedding professionals association challenged Hawaii DLNR regulations requiring permits for commercial activities on unencumbered state lands, specifically targeting fee-based weddings on public beaches as violating the First Amendment. The court denied plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and granted defendants', ruling the regulations constitutional as applied and not overbroad. The decision rested on findings that the beaches are not traditional public forums for this purpose, the permit scheme qualifies as reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions that are narrowly tailored to significant government interests while leaving open ample alternative channels for expression. The court also dismissed a related breach-of-settlement claim for lack of jurisdiction and because subsequent valid regulations did not violate the prior agreement.

free speechbusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a 2007 incident in which Masumi Watanabe was fatally injured by a Terminix vehicle driven by employee Kirk Lankford; her estate and family sued Lankford and Terminix in Hawaii state court alleging negligence, respondeat superior liability, and gross negligence warranting punitive damages. Terminix removed the action to federal district court under diversity jurisdiction, asserting that the plaintiffs were Japanese citizens, Terminix was a Delaware/Tennessee entity, the amount in controversy exceeded $150,000, and Lankford had not been served. Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing improper removal and timeliness issues. The magistrate judge recommended denial, finding complete diversity, satisfaction of the amount-in-controversy requirement, and timely removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because the 30-day clock began only upon formal service, not mere receipt of a courtesy copy. The district judge adopted the findings and recommendation in full, denying the motion for remand.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerns a former Hawaii state prisoner who sued two Department of Public Safety employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after being held in custody for approximately 145 days beyond the end of his sentence due to an alleged miscalculation of his release date. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing the state constitutional claim because no private right of action exists under § 1983 and dismissing the negligence claim because § 1983 does not remedy negligence and the Eleventh Amendment bars damages against the state. The court denied the motion as to the federal claims, holding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding violations of the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to liberty and Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference, and that qualified immunity cannot be granted at this stage because disputed historical facts prevent a determination of objective reasonableness.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involves judicial review under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) of an administrative hearings officer's September 2007 decision finding that the Hawaii Department of Education's December 2006 Individualized Education Plan (IEP) for Blake C., a child with autism, provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the second half of the 2006-07 school year. The U.S. District Court reversed the hearings officer's ruling after examining the full procedural history, including prior findings of IDEA violations for earlier school years and an award of compensatory education, and determined that the IEP was deficient. The court awarded the plaintiff tuition reimbursement for private placement at the Pacific Autism Center from January through June 2007. The core reasoning centered on the inadequacy of the December 2006 IEP based on evidence of the student's needs and progress at the time it was developed.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Beth Amonette, who obtained a personal refinancing loan secured by her primary residence and later sought to rescind it under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) due to allegedly inadequate or misleading disclosures by IndyMac Bank. IndyMac moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that Amonette lacked standing because the property was held in her revocable living trust, which TILA exempts as an 'organization.' The court denied the motion, holding that Amonette had standing to pursue her TILA claims. The core reasoning was that TILA's exemption for organizations does not apply here, as the loan was for personal consumer purposes, Amonette retained full control over the revocable trust, and the lender's own disclosures treated her as an individual borrower rather than the trust itself.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involves an employment discrimination action brought by the EEOC and seven intervenors against NCL America Inc., alleging that employees of Yemeni or Middle Eastern descent who were Muslim were unlawfully terminated based on national origin and religion in violation of Title VII and the Hawaii equivalent under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2. The court denied the defendants' motion to partially dismiss the state-law claims of four intervenors whose administrative complaints were filed after the 180-day deadline under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 368-11(c). The decision permitted those four to proceed by piggybacking on the timely filings of three other intervenors under the single-filing rule, because all seven made essentially identical claims arising from the same circumstances and time frame that were investigated together by the EEOC as a class. The court reasoned that the established federal exception to individual exhaustion requirements applies equally to the parallel state-law claims given the shared factual basis.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case was a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action alleging excessive force by Maui County police officers during an attempted arrest of Richard Gregory, who died of a heart attack after resisting officers while trespassing and acting aggressively at a music studio. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity for the individual officers and on municipal liability for the county. The core reasoning was that the officers' actions were objectively reasonable under Graham v. Connor given Gregory's aggression, refusal to comply, and possession of a pen, with no evidence of choking or other unconstitutional force; there was also no deliberate indifference in training regarding excited delirium or restraint asphyxia, and no causation linking any policy failure to the heart attack death.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a federal civil rights lawsuit by the plaintiff against Honolulu police officer Patrick Sterling and the City and County of Honolulu, arising from Sterling's fatal shooting of Dustan Long in June 2001 during a standoff after Long had fired shots at others and was armed. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity for the officer and lack of municipal liability under Monell, along with related state claims. The court granted the motion, holding that Sterling was entitled to qualified immunity because, under the totality of the circumstances and the objective reasonableness standard from Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner, he had probable cause to believe Long posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm even if Long had not fired at officers immediately before the shooting. The court found no material factual dispute that would defeat immunity and dismissed the federal claims, with state claims following accordingly.

civil rightscriminal law

This case involves a lawsuit by the United States against Ryan International Airlines, Inc., seeking civil penalties exceeding $50,000 for alleged violations of Federal Aviation Act maintenance procedures in 1999. The defendant moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that a two-year statute of limitations under 49 U.S.C. § 46301(d)(7)(C) barred the action filed in 2004. The court denied the motion, holding that the two-year limit applies only to administrative penalty actions by the FAA, while judicial actions for larger penalties are governed by the five-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462. The reasoning relies on the plain language of the statute distinguishing between administrative and judicial actions, as well as legislative history indicating that the shorter period was intended solely for smaller administrative matters.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerns whether a marine liability insurance policy issued by Indemnity Insurance Company of North America to Eco-Adventures was a 'defense within limits' policy that reduced the $300,000 coverage amount by defense costs. Plaintiff Weber, who had settled an underlying Jones Act injury suit against Eco-Adventures for a $225,000 stipulated judgment and assignment of rights, sought a declaration that the policy was not a DWL policy to support her bad-faith claims against the insurer. The court granted Weber's motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the policy language expressly provided defense and settlement payments 'in addition to the limit of liability' and that the insurer's duty to defend ended only when the liability limit was exhausted by indemnification payments. It also granted in part and denied in part the insurer's summary-judgment motion on standing and related issues, while declining to certify questions to the Hawaii Supreme Court.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involves an ERISA claim for long-term disability insurance benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) after the insurer terminated payments to a claimant diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's, holding that she remained entitled to benefits. It applied de novo review because the policy did not unambiguously confer discretionary authority on the administrator. On the merits, the court found the claimant totally disabled from the essential duties of her non-sedentary occupation as a field nurse case manager, relying on consistent opinions from treating physicians that her condition had not improved and no material change justified the termination.

labor & employmenthealthcare

In Batacan v. Reliant Pharmaceuticals, the plaintiff alleged she was wrongfully terminated after giving birth and taking pregnancy-related and medical leave, asserting claims under the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, state discrimination statutes, breach of contract, and a Hawaii common-law claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The court granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the public-policy claim. It reasoned that under Hawaii law, as established in Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., no separate common-law cause of action is available where the asserted public policy is already embodied in statutes that provide their own adequate remedies for violations.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case concerned the National Marine Fisheries Service's 2003 classification of the Hawaii commercial longline fishery as a category III fishery under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, despite occasional interactions with false killer whales. Plaintiffs argued that the agency should have reclassified the fishery to category I or II based on estimates of whale population and mortality rates exceeding regulatory thresholds, claiming the decision violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the Service's decision to maintain the category III classification was not arbitrary or capricious, as the available population data was inadequate and unreliable for precise calculations, and the agency properly exercised its discretion while planning to incorporate newer survey data in future classifications. The court also noted that the suit was approaching mootness because a revised classification incorporating updated information was imminent. It granted summary judgment to the defendants and intervenor while denying the plaintiffs' motion.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The United States sued Maui County under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) after the Maui Planning Commission denied a church's application for a special use permit to operate in an agricultural district, paralleling a related private lawsuit. Maui County moved to dismiss on grounds including the statute of limitations, lack of standing, and RLUIPA's alleged unconstitutionality. The court denied the motion, holding that a four-year federal catch-all limitations period applies to the 2000-enacted RLUIPA (or that even a two-year period would not bar the suit based on the effective denial date), that the United States has standing, and that RLUIPA is constitutional as within Congress's authority and not violating the Establishment Clause. The court also substituted Maui County as the proper defendant.

religious libertyfederal powercivil rights

The case concerns claims by Marshall and Anna Flowers against First Hawaiian Bank and Fort Jackson Federal Credit Union under the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) for disclosing financial records to the U.S. Army in response to subpoenas issued during military Article 32 proceedings. The court granted summary judgment to Fort Jackson FCU on RFPA and related claims, finding it covered by the litigation exception, and dismissed claims for punitive damages, tortious interference, and compensatory damages for lack of causation on undisputed facts. For First Hawaiian Bank, which admitted an RFPA violation, the court granted partial summary judgment on liability and awarded statutory damages of $100 to each plaintiff but denied further relief. All rulings rested on legal questions after ample discovery, with no showing that additional evidence would alter the outcome regarding causation of alleged harms like early military separation.

procedurefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involves plaintiff Gary Cisneros suing multiple credit reporting agencies and furnishers of credit information, including Trans Union, Capital One, and Providian, for allegedly including or failing to correct erroneous information on his credit reports and for inadequate responses to his disputes. The plaintiff asserted claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) sections such as 1681s-2(b), 1681e(b), and 1681i, along with state law claims for negligence, defamation, and debt collection violations. Defendants moved to dismiss certain counts, arguing lack of a private cause of action, preemption of state claims by the FCRA, and failure to state cognizable claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted the motions in part and denied them in part, addressing issues of private rights of action under the FCRA and the viability of the pleaded claims based on the allegations of failed investigations and re-reporting of disputed items.

business & regulatory

Plaintiff Gary Cisneros sued multiple credit reporting agencies and creditors, including Western Funding, Inc. and Central Carolina Bank & Trust Company, under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and related state laws, alleging they included or failed to correct erroneous negative information on his credit reports stemming from a paid-off car loan and a disputed tuition agreement. The court addressed motions by Western Funding and Central Carolina to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The court granted the motions, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate specific personal jurisdiction over either defendant in Hawaii. The core reasoning was that the defendants' limited contacts—responding to disputes forwarded by credit agencies—did not show purposeful availment of the Hawaii forum or make it reasonable to expect being haled into court there, as the underlying events occurred elsewhere and any effects in Hawaii were not sufficient under due process standards.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiff Marshall Flowers, a former active-duty Army sergeant major, along with his wife, sued the U.S. Army and federal officials under the Right to Financial Privacy Act after his bank records were disclosed to military investigators via subpoenas during an Article 32 proceeding on larceny charges. The district court granted the federal defendants' motion to dismiss the claims against the government. The court held that the Feres doctrine bars the suit because the alleged injuries arose from activity incident to military service, extending the doctrine from the Federal Tort Claims Act to RFPA claims. The court also resolved cross-appeals from a magistrate's discovery order, reversing it in part regarding re-deposition of Army witnesses and affirming it as to conditions on other depositions.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

This case is an insurance coverage dispute in which excess carrier Pacific Employers Insurance Company (PEIC) seeks declaratory relief against its insured Servco Pacific Inc. and primary carrier Island Insurance, after Servco settled with Island for $1.5 million over environmental remediation liabilities at a leased Honolulu property and related CERCLA proceedings. Servco counterclaimed, asserting that PEIC owes duties to defend and indemnify for both a state Department of Health cleanup order and a related PRP lawsuit. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on issues including whether primary coverage was exhausted by the Island settlement (triggering excess duties), whether PEIC's policy covers agency enforcement proceedings or is barred by a qualified pollution exclusion for non-sudden pollution, and whether PEIC acted in bad faith by refusing to defend. The court granted the motions in part and denied them in part, finding among other things that the primary limits were exhausted and that a duty to defend exists due to potential coverage.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a plaintiff seeking attorneys' fees and costs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) after prevailing in an administrative hearing against the Hawaii Department of Education, without seeking any substantive review of that hearing's outcome. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the suit was untimely under a 30-day statute of limitations. The court denied the motion, ruling that a 2-year limitations period from Hawaii law applies instead. The core reasoning was that an action solely for fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) is an independent cause of action rather than an appeal of an administrative decision, making the shorter period for judicial review of education placements inapplicable.

civil rightsprocedure