District Court, S.D. Ohio — appointed by Lyndon B. Johnson
Chenoweth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2001-08-17 · cited 15×
Judith Chenoweth sued her former employer, Wal-Mart, after being terminated for missing work to care for her husband following his stroke, raising claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) for failure to provide timely notice of continued health coverage rights, and Ohio public policy regarding wrongful discharge. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court granted Chenoweth partial summary judgment on her COBRA claim, finding that Wal-Mart undisputedly failed to send the required notice until approximately eight months after termination due to a computer system error, and awarded her medical expenses, attorney fees, and a statutory penalty. The court denied Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment on the FMLA and public policy claims, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the circumstances of her termination and eligibility for reinstatement that required resolution at trial.
labor & employmenthealthcare
Treesh v. Taft
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2000-11-16 · cited 4×
This case involved two death row inmates challenging an Ohio prison policy that required last statements to be written hours before execution and gave the warden discretion to edit or censor them, claiming violations of the First Amendment in both a facial attack on the policy and an as-applied challenge to its implementation. Defendants moved to dismiss both counts for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA, which requires prisoners to complete available grievance procedures before suing over prison conditions. The court granted the motion in part by dismissing the facial challenge without prejudice, reasoning that it concerned prison conditions and that Ohio's grievance process was an available remedy as confirmed by Sixth Circuit precedent, but denied the motion as to the as-applied challenge, concluding it was not subject to the PLRA exhaustion requirement.
criminal lawfree speech
In Re Pannell
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2000-09-22 · cited 3×
This case involved two West Virginia attorneys who filed a bankruptcy petition for Ohio residents in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, despite the debtors having no connection to that venue. The bankruptcy court sanctioned the attorneys by requiring them to pay the trustee's fees and refund their clients' fees, finding the filing improper under bankruptcy venue rules. On appeal, the district court affirmed the sanctions, reasoning that the attorneys knew the venue was incorrect and their actions caused unnecessary delays and expenses, and that their conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances.
procedure
Treesh v. Taft
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 2000-03-20
In Treesh v. Taft, two Ohio death row inmates brought a First Amendment challenge to a prison policy that barred them from making a final oral statement audible to spectators at the time of execution and instead required any last statement to be written hours earlier, with the warden having discretion to edit or censor it before release. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the claims were moot after the policy was amended to remove editing authority and were not ripe because the inmates' convictions and sentences were still under appeal. The court denied the motion, holding that the claims were not moot because the core policy restrictions remained in force and were ripe for review because the policy was final and the constitutional issues could be addressed without waiting until the eve of execution, as supported by analogous precedent.
free speechcriminal law
United States v. Shalash
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 1999-02-17
In United States v. Shalash, the defendant pled guilty to twelve counts of structuring currency transactions to evade reporting requirements and agreed to forfeit $414,700 in assets, including a partial interest in his family residence. He moved for a downward departure of eleven levels from the applicable sentencing guideline range to qualify for probation, citing the forfeiture's impact, his family responsibilities, the conduct as aberrant behavior, and the totality of circumstances. The court denied the motion, holding that downward departures are permitted only for mitigating factors not adequately considered in the guidelines or for sufficiently unusual circumstances outside the heartland of cases. The court found the forfeiture already incorporated into the sentence, family ties a discouraged factor not present to an exceptional degree, the offenses consisting of repeated acts over years rather than a single aberrant act, and no basis for departure even when considering all factors together.
criminal lawprocedure
Ashiegbu v. Purviance
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 1998-12-17 · cited 11×
The case involves a pro se plaintiff who sued a city official, claiming she denied him employment with the City of Columbus and conspired to violate his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1980-1986 and Title VII by not responding to his job inquiries or a referral letter. The defendant moved for relief from a prior scheduling order under Rule 60(b) and for summary judgment under Rule 56, asserting she lacked hiring authority and directed the plaintiff to the proper civil service channels. The court granted both motions, determining there were no genuine issues of material fact and the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiff's later motion for reconsideration was denied, resulting in entry of judgment for the defendant and termination of the case.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure