Harry F. Barnes

Plaintiff Regina Terwilliger, a housekeeper at Howard Memorial Hospital, took approved FMLA leave for back surgery in early 2009 and returned to work shortly afterward. While she was on leave, the hospital installed a camera after a series of thefts and later terminated Terwilliger based on video footage showing her near a desk where money had been stolen, though the footage did not clearly show her taking anything. Terwilliger sued the hospital and related defendants under the FMLA, claiming both interference with her leave rights and retaliation for taking leave. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the retaliation claim, holding that Terwilliger presented no evidence showing the hospital's stated reason for termination—attempted theft—was a pretext for discrimination. The interference claim was allowed to proceed to trial.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute between two behavioral healthcare providers, Texarkana Behavioral Associates (TBA) and Universal Health Services (UHS), arising from failed negotiations in 2004 and 2007 for UHS to acquire TBA's facilities. TBA alleged that UHS misused confidential business information shared under confidentiality agreements to build a competing facility in Fayetteville, Arkansas, asserting claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, tortious interference with business expectancies, and violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. UHS moved for summary judgment, arguing the agreements did not restrict competition or require a purchase and that TBA failed to show improper use of information or interference. The court granted summary judgment to UHS, finding no genuine issues of material fact because the agreements permitted UHS to evaluate but not commit to a deal, TBA lacked evidence of breach or misuse, and the interference and deceptive practices claims failed due to insufficient proof of improper conduct or causation.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved an appeal by First State Bank of Crossett from a U.S. Bankruptcy Court order in Joe Ann Fowler's Chapter 13 proceeding. The bankruptcy court found, after a hearing with bank records and witness testimony, that Fowler had overpaid her mortgage debt by $638.96, ordered repayment of that amount along with release of the lien on her home, and awarded attorney fees and costs. The district court reviewed factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, concluding that the bankruptcy court did not err in determining the overpayment based on the evidence or in applying Arkansas law and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to award fees and costs.

procedurepropertyfederal power

This case involved migrant agricultural workers employed by Pittman Nursery Corporation who alleged that a former employee extorted kickbacks from them over several years, reducing their net wages below federal and state minimum wage levels. The plaintiffs brought claims under the FLSA, RICO, the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, and for negligent supervision. Pittman Nursery moved for partial judgment on the pleadings seeking dismissal of the non-FLSA claims on grounds of preemption and failure to state a claim. The court ruled that the FLSA does not provide an exclusive remedy and therefore does not preempt the other claims, citing the statute's savings clause and district court precedents within the Eighth Circuit. However, the court dismissed the RICO, AWPA, negligent supervision, and related claims because the complaint failed to adequately plead them, while permitting the FLSA claims to continue.

labor & employment

Luxpro Corp., a Taiwanese manufacturer of MP3 players, sued Apple Inc. alleging that Apple used injunctions obtained in German and Taiwanese courts, along with subsequent warning letters to Luxpro's business partners, to interfere with Luxpro's contracts and business expectancies. Apple moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that many claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the interference allegations did not meet the required elements under Arkansas or California law. The court determined that Luxpro's claims based on pre-injunction litigation conduct were time-barred but that post-injunction warning letters could proceed as a basis for the interference claims. It further held that the tortious interference claims failed because Luxpro did not sufficiently allege an actual breach or disruption of its contractual relationships or expectancies. The opinion analyzes the claims under both states' laws and dismisses the commercial disparagement claim for similar pleading deficiencies.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a civil rights lawsuit filed by Anthony Hicks under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officers at the Ouachita County Detention Center, alleging that Captain David Norwood used excessive force against him during booking and that Lt. Gregory and Sgt. Baker failed to intervene. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed the official capacity claims, finding no evidence of an unconstitutional policy, custom, or failure to train amounting to deliberate indifference. It denied summary judgment on the remaining individual capacity claims due to genuine issues of material fact regarding the alleged excessive force and failure to intervene. The decision was based on the absence of supporting evidence for official capacity liability and disputes over the facts of the incident at the summary judgment stage.

civil rightscriminal law

The case concerned Allen Bishop, an African-American chicken catcher employed by Tyson Foods, who alleged that coworkers displayed a noose, made Klan references, and assigned him disproportionate work duties on the catching crew; he reported these incidents to company officials in 2005. Tyson investigated the complaints, directed employees to cease using the offending terms, and confirmed that no further similar conduct occurred after the initial response. Bishop later raised additional issues regarding cage counting and attendance points, which Tyson also reviewed. On the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court evaluated whether the incidents were sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim and whether the employer had taken prompt remedial action.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a bus driver injured in an Arkansas collision with a truck driven by defendant Vanderbilt, who had spent many hours drinking at Harrah’s casino in Louisiana before driving home. Plaintiff sued Harrah’s, claiming it over-served Vanderbilt, failed to prevent him from driving while intoxicated, and negligently entrusted his vehicle to him. The court granted Harrah’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Arkansas choice-of-law rules required application of Louisiana’s anti-dram-shop statute, which grants vendors of alcohol immunity for injuries caused by intoxicated patrons off the premises. The court also found no evidence that Harrah’s knew or should have known Vanderbilt was intoxicated when it returned his keys.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case arose after plaintiffs Deborah and Randella Lindsey were injured in a 2005 Louisiana car accident caused by an underinsured driver; their attorney, William Grant, missed the statute of limitations on claims against the driver and her $10,000 liability insurer, prompting the plaintiffs to sue Grant for legal malpractice and their own insurer, Southern Farm Bureau, for breach of contract after Farm Bureau denied underinsured-motorist benefits. The policy contained an exhaustion clause requiring the tortfeasor's liability limits to be paid by judgment or settlement before UIM coverage would apply, plus a subrogation clause. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court analyzed Arkansas UIM statutes and case law to determine whether the exhaustion requirement barred the claim, whether a $20,000 judgment against Grant could functionally satisfy exhaustion, and whether the absence of a settlement impaired Farm Bureau's subrogation rights.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Russell v. Ashland, Inc., plaintiffs Arnold and Pamela Russell sued chemical manufacturers Ashland, Inc., UNOCAL, and others, alleging that the defendants' benzene-containing rubber solvents caused injury to Arnold Russell while he worked at Cooper Tire and Rubber Company, based on claims that the suppliers failed to adequately warn of the products' dangers. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they owed no duty to warn the ultimate user under the "sophisticated user" doctrine from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, because the employer was a sophisticated intermediary that already knew the hazards. The court denied the motion, holding that Arkansas has not adopted § 388 and that the focus must be on whether the end user himself knew of the dangers rather than the knowledge of the intermediary employer. It further rejected an analogy to the learned intermediary doctrine used in prescription drug cases, as there was no evidence that Russell was aware of benzene's specific hazards.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a lawsuit brought by Linda Finch as next friend of her son Johnny Ebert, a special education student with autism in the Texarkana School District, alleging that the district improperly removed his personal aide without notice or consent on two occasions, which contributed to him being raped in a locker room by another student with a known history of inappropriate physical conduct. The district moved for summary judgment, contending there were no genuine issues of material fact supporting the claims, particularly the Arkansas tort of outrage. The court granted summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the plaintiff did not demonstrate the required elements of extreme and outrageous conduct or severe distress under Arkansas precedents that narrowly construe this tort, but denied summary judgment on the remaining claims due to factual disputes, allowing them to proceed to trial.

civil rightstorts & liability

This case involves six Mexican H-2A visa holders who worked harvesting peppers and performing other tasks for P & H Forestry, LLC, and related defendants in Arkansas; they sued under the FLSA, Arkansas law, and H-2A regulations, alleging that unreimbursed recruitment, visa, and travel expenses functioned as de facto wage deductions that dropped their first-week pay below the federal minimum, that piece-rate pepper harvesting failed to meet minimum wage, and that highway trash pickup work was not paid at overtime rates. The plaintiffs moved for expedited court-authorized notice so that similarly situated H-2A workers could opt into the FLSA collective action. The court granted conditional certification under the two-stage FLSA framework, finding that the pleadings and affidavits showed the workers were similarly situated due to common employer policies and practices, and it ordered defendants to produce contact information while directing plaintiffs to submit a revised notice addressing statute-of-limitations issues.

immigrationlabor & employment

In Bourgeois v. Vanderbilt, Cynthia Bourgeois, a Louisiana resident, sued for damages after being injured in an Arkansas bus accident caused by defendant Vanderbilt, seeking underinsured motorist coverage from the National Interstate policy on the bus she drove and from two separate State Farm policies on her personal vehicles. State Farm filed a partial motion for summary judgment asserting that Bourgeois could not stack both of her State Farm UM policies onto the National policy. Applying Louisiana law under La. Rev. Stat. § 22:680(1)(c), the court granted the motion, ruling that the statute permits recovery of primary UM coverage from the occupied vehicle's policy and excess coverage from only one additional UM policy when the injured party was in a non-owned vehicle. The court also noted that the State Farm policies' anti-stacking language supported limiting recovery to one policy for a total of $25,000.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a negligence claim brought by Deshanda Crussell on behalf of her minor child J.C. against Electrolux Home Products after Crussell, while pregnant with J.C., was struck by a forklift at her workplace, causing her to sustain injuries that allegedly led to J.C.'s premature birth and subsequent physical and mental ailments. Electrolux moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that Arkansas law does not recognize a cause of action for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries to a surviving child. The court denied the motion, holding that such a claim is cognizable. It reasoned that the Arkansas Supreme Court would extend its prior decision in Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Association—which recognized wrongful death claims on behalf of viable fetuses—to allow recovery for prenatal injuries where the child survives, rejecting the outdated single-entity view that treated the fetus and mother as one and finding no persuasive barriers regarding duty, proof, or causation.

torts & liability

In Bradford v. Union Pacific Railroad, plaintiffs sued the railroad after a 2005 train collision near Texarkana, Arkansas, that caused a derailment, gas leak, explosion, and fire damaging homes and killing one person, alleging nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability. Union Pacific moved to dismiss, arguing that federal regulations under the Federal Railroad Safety Act and Hazardous Material Transportation Act preempt all state-law claims. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing claims related to inspection, speed, engineer training, train design, and hazardous materials handling as preempted by specific federal rules, but denied dismissal for claims of negligent operation and crew fatigue, finding no covering federal regulations on those subjects.

business & regulatoryfederal powertorts & liability

Darlene Hogan, a firefighter for the City of El Dorado, sued the city and several officials under federal civil rights statutes, the ADA, Title VII, and related state laws, alleging she faced sexual harassment by a supervisor, gender and disability discrimination, and retaliation through progressive discipline and demotion for tardiness. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and after limited discovery on qualified immunity, the court addressed only that issue. It granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on the § 1983 claims, finding no evidence that their conduct violated Hogan's constitutional rights under the Fourteenth or Ninth Amendments. All other claims were denied without prejudice as premature, to be refiled after full discovery.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case was a declaratory judgment action by insurer Bituminous Casualty Corporation against its insured Tri-State Oil Tool Company and well owner Zadeck Energy Group, arising from Tri-State's negligent swabbing operation that damaged Zadeck's oil and gas well. Bituminous had denied coverage and refused to defend Tri-State in the underlying negligence and breach-of-contract suit, but later assumed the defense under a reservation of rights after Zadeck amended its complaint to allege surface damages. The court granted Bituminous partial summary judgment, holding that the policy provided no coverage for the claims, that Bituminous owed no duty to defend until the amended complaint, and that providing independent counsel satisfied any defense obligation without also reimbursing Tri-State for its original attorney fees; it denied Tri-State's cross-motion and dismissed the counterclaim for consequential damages.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involves landowners suing an oil company for contamination and improper waste disposal from decades of oil and gas exploration and production on their Arkansas property, asserting claims including common law trespass and nuisance as well as violations of federal RCRA and state ASWMA statutes. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It denied summary judgment on the trespass and statutory claims, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding a storage contract, that ASWMA is remedial and may apply retroactively, and that the statute of limitations does not bar the claims due to the nature of the injury. However, it granted summary judgment on the nuisance claim because, as a matter of law, a lessor cannot maintain a common law nuisance action against a prior lessee for activities on the leased tract.

environmentpropertytorts & liabilityprocedure

In Highland Industrial Park, Inc. v. Bei Defense Systems Co., the plaintiff landowner sued the defendant former lessee for contaminating groundwater with hazardous wastes from rocket manufacturing, alleging trespass, negligence, and violations of state environmental law. The sole issue before the court on cross-motions for partial summary judgment was whether damages should be measured by the diminution in property value or by the cost of restoration. The court ruled that the proper measure is the cost of remediation plus any lost rental value, as Arkansas law permits recovery of restoration costs for temporary, remediable property damage, and undisputed evidence established that the contamination could be effectively cleaned up through methods like air-stripping.

environmentpropertytorts & liability

In Stanley v. General Media Communications, Inc., two plaintiffs sued the publisher of Penthouse magazine and a condom manufacturer after a photo of them participating in a voluntary spring-break condom-application contest was published in the magazine, along with a caption describing the event. The plaintiffs asserted claims for libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage), false-light invasion of privacy, and appropriation invasion of privacy. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed all claims, holding that the plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public contest they entered voluntarily, that the photo and text were accurate and not defamatory, that the publication did not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct, and that the plaintiffs suffered no severe emotional distress or reputational harm. The court further noted that the condom manufacturer had no role in the publication.

torts & liabilityprocedure