The case involves Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, L.P. alleging that GEICO infringed sixteen claims across multiple related patents on interactive call processing systems. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found several claims invalid as anticipated or obvious in light of prior art such as Student Registration and Moosemiller, or indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, and determined that certain GEICO systems did not infringe other claims; it also granted Katz summary judgment on defenses including equitable estoppel, inequitable conduct, and best mode. The rulings rested on direct comparison of claim elements to prior art disclosures, assessment of whether references were cumulative, and evaluation of whether the specifications adequately described the claimed subject matter.
The case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Marcos Florez after his state court conviction for selling/transporting heroin and possessing heroin for sale, along with related weight enhancements and prior convictions. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denying the petition with prejudice and declining to issue a certificate of appealability. The sole claim was that Florez was denied his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation under Faretta v. California. Applying AEDPA deference, the court found the state court's denial reasonable because Florez's request to represent himself was equivocal, as he initially sought a state-appointed attorney, later indicated he did not need the public defender, and did not renew the request at sentencing.
This case involves a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his 2003 conviction for second-degree robbery and sentence of 28 years to life. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation to grant the respondent's motion to dismiss the petition. The court found that the petition was filed after the one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA had expired, as the prisoner's state habeas petitions did not toll the entire period due to unreasonable delays between filings, and the actual innocence exception did not apply because no evidence of innocence was presented.
In Browne v. McCain, singer Jackson Browne sued Senator John McCain, the Republican National Committee, and the Ohio Republican Party for copyright infringement, vicarious copyright infringement, and violation of the Lanham Act after the defendants used his song "Running on Empty" in a 2008 web video criticizing Barack Obama's energy policy. The RNC moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing fair use protected the use and that no likelihood of confusion existed regarding endorsement. The court denied the motion, holding that fair use did not bar the claims as a matter of law at the pleading stage and that the complaint sufficiently alleged facts that could support likelihood of confusion under the Sleekcraft factors without needing to resolve all factors at this time. The court deferred ruling on the right of publicity claim to a separate order on a special motion to strike.
In Browne v. McCain, singer Jackson Browne sued Republican presidential candidate John McCain, the Republican National Committee, and the Ohio Republican Party over their use of his copyrighted song "Running on Empty" in a 2008 web video criticizing Barack Obama's energy policy. The present order addresses the RNC's special motion to strike Browne's common law right of publicity claim. The court denied the motion, finding that the RNC had not met its burden to show the use was transformative because the commercial featured an unaltered, verbatim copy of portions of the song, including Browne's voice. The decision rested on application of California's transformative use test to the political advertisement.
Moroccanoil, Inc. sued Moroccan Gold, LLC and Fantasia Industries Corp. for trademark infringement and related claims under federal and state law, alleging that the defendants' "Moroccan Miracle Oil Hair Treatment" and packaging were confusingly similar to the plaintiff's "Moroccanoil Oil Treatment" products made with argan oil. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendants from using the similar marks, trade dress, and certain sales practices. The court reasoned that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits due to a likelihood of consumer confusion from the similar marks and packaging, which the defendants adopted despite notice from the USPTO; that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm without relief; that the balance of equities favored the plaintiff given the defendants' intentional conduct; and that an injunction served the public interest in preventing consumer deception.
