In Hodge v. Murphy, a pro se pretrial detainee at the Wyatt Detention Facility sued the warden, health services director, and U.S. Marshals Service, alleging that officials missed doses of his migraine and back-pain medication, ran out of medication, gave doses to the wrong inmate, and kept inaccurate records, seeking an order for correct medication and damages. The court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A and dismissed it for failure to state a claim. Treating the claims as arising under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause (with standards coextensive to the Eighth Amendment), the court found no plausible facts showing that defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, as there were no allegations of subjective awareness and conscious disregard of a substantial risk of harm; claims against the Marshals were also dismissed for lack of any factual allegations against them.
The case involved Blue Cross suing two health care providers for breach of contract, fraud, defamation, and tortious interference, alleging they miscoded services under provider agreements to obtain over $400,000 in unauthorized payments from ERISA-governed health plans. Defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting complete preemption under ERISA, while Blue Cross moved to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court rejected the magistrate judge's recommendation to remand, holding that federal jurisdiction existed because the state claims were completely preempted by ERISA and the counterclaims directly invoked ERISA provisions.
This case involves an objection by Timesharing Associates, Ltd. (TSA) to a receiver's recommendation denying its equitable claim for over $723,000 against the receivership estate of Fairway Capital Corporation, an SBA-licensed entity tied to a complex series of transactions and foreclosures involving a Virgin Islands timeshare resort development dating back to the 1980s. The court adopted the receiver's recommendation and denied TSA's claim in full. The core reasoning was that, although TSA's claim could fall within the receivership's supplemental bar date for Fairway's alter egos, it was barred by laches due to TSA's unreasonable delay in asserting its interests after the 1996 foreclosure judgment and 2001 receivership proceedings, which caused prejudice to the SBA and other parties as the receivership neared its conclusion.
The case involved surviving family members of American citizen Yaron Ungar and his wife, who were murdered by Hamas terrorists in Israel in 1996, suing the Palestinian Authority, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and others under the federal Antiterrorism Act for damages. After years of litigation where the PA and PLO chose not to defend on the merits, a default judgment of over $116 million was entered against them. The defendants moved to vacate the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), arguing exceptional circumstances. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the defendants had made deliberate strategic choices not to participate fully, including instructions from their leader not to recognize the court's jurisdiction, and that litigation must eventually conclude.
This case involved a proposed class action lawsuit brought on behalf of approximately 3,000 children in the custody of Rhode Island's Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), alleging that underfunding, understaffing, and mismanagement of the child welfare system violated the children's substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as rights under the federal Adoption Assistance Act and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by the state's Child Advocate and proposed "Next Friends," sought declaratory and injunctive relief for harms including unsafe foster placements and inadequate services. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), holding that the Child Advocate and Next Friends lacked standing and authority to sue because all named plaintiffs were already represented by court-appointed special advocates (CASA) attorneys appointed by the Rhode Island Family Court, which retains ongoing jurisdiction over the children. The core reasoning centered on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, which prioritizes duly appointed representatives, and the principle that federal courts should not interfere with the Family Court's established role in child custody and welfare matters.
This case is an appeal from U.S. Bankruptcy Court orders in a proceeding involving the bankrupt estate of Arnold Kilberg, where the trustee sought to sell real property at 165 Angell Street in Providence, Rhode Island, that was co-owned as tenants in common by the estate (50%) and appellants 56 Associates and 57 Associates (25% each). The bankruptcy court authorized the trustee to sell the entire property, ordered the appellants to provide keys for access to prospective buyers, and awarded the trustee counsel fees for related litigation. The district court affirmed, finding that the statutory conditions under 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) were satisfied because partition in kind was impracticable, a sale of the estate's undivided interest would yield significantly less, the benefit to the estate outweighed any detriment to the co-owners, and the property was not a utility asset; it also upheld the fee award as within the court's equitable contempt powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
