This case involves commercial liability insurers seeking a declaratory judgment that they owe no duty to defend or indemnify drywall subcontractors for bodily injury and property damage claims arising from defective Chinese-manufactured drywall installed in Florida homes. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment solely on the duty to indemnify, asking the court to resolve choice-of-law questions under Florida's lex loci contractus doctrine and to hold that a total pollution exclusion in the policies bars coverage. The court denied the motion as premature, explaining that no discovery had occurred and that determining the place where the insurance contracts were formed required additional factual development before the choice-of-law and coverage issues could be decided.
In Holland v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, plaintiff Susan Holland sued defendant debt collector under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging that the company made over 30 harassing phone calls about an alleged $2,000 AT&T debt without properly identifying itself, leaving voicemails, or sending required debt validation notices. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of evidence of a covered "debt," insufficient proof of harassment or deception, proper disclosures in some calls, and compliance with notice requirements via a letter sent to plaintiff's son. The court granted the motion in part as to the withdrawn § 1692g claim but denied it on the remaining claims, finding genuine issues of material fact under the "least sophisticated debtor" standard regarding the volume and nature of calls, identity disclosures, and potential deceptive practices that a jury must resolve.
In Walker-Hall v. American International Life Assurance Co., plaintiff Bobbi Walker-Hall sued under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, to recover long-term disability benefits allegedly due under an employer-sponsored plan after her insurer denied continuing coverage for a knee injury and hallux rigidus of the toe. The court applied the Eleventh Circuit's multi-step review framework to the administrative record and determined de novo that the denial was not wrong. For the knee condition, the plaintiff had not satisfied the plan's "regular care of a physician" requirement, and for the toe condition, she submitted insufficient medical evidence that it prevented her from working as a litigation specialist. The court granted the defendant's motion for final judgment.
In Cherry v. City of St. Petersburg, plaintiff Aunterrio Cherry sued a St. Petersburg police officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when serving a misdemeanor arrest warrant by tasing him. The court denied the officer's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. It determined that disputed facts must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor at this stage, under which the plaintiff was compliant with commands, posed no threat, and did not advance toward the officer, making the tasing disproportionate. The court further found that the right to be free from such force was clearly established under precedent involving similar taser use on non-threatening individuals.
This case involved a wrongful death claim brought by Mercedes Bedoya on behalf of the survivors of Wilder Bedoya, who was killed in a 2009 Florida car accident while driving for his employer. The plaintiff sought uninsured motorist coverage under an auto insurance policy issued by Travelers to the employer, arguing that there was no valid rejection of such coverage and that the insurer had violated Florida law by not offering it. Travelers counterclaimed for a declaration that the policy provided no UM benefits. The court granted summary judgment to Travelers, holding that the employer's authorized representative had validly rejected UM coverage on an initial policy form in 2007, that this rejection carried forward by operation of Florida law to the renewal policy in effect at the time of the accident because no different selection was made on the 2008 renewal form, and that the forms complied with statutory requirements.
This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court's order confirming Chapter 11 reorganization plans for two related assisted living facility entities and granting a cramdown over the objection of their primary secured and unsecured creditor, SPCP Group, LLC. The district court affirmed the confirmation, finding the plans feasible under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) based on the debtors' post-petition performance and cash position. It also upheld the application of the cramdown provision under § 1129(b), approving an interest rate of 5.25% using the prime rate plus a 2% adjustment as consistent with Supreme Court precedent in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., and accepting the property valuation of $5.4 million.