This case involved an equity action by the United States to recover $118,773.14 in 1917 income and excess profits taxes from former stockholders of the dissolved Crefeld Waste & Batting Company, which had distributed all assets after the tax liability accrued. The dispute centered on Crefeld's attempts to deduct a $365,000 loss from loans and investments in its subsidiary South Atlantic Waste Company, including timing of the deduction, a state court judgment on related notes, and efforts to claim credits or offsets in the collection proceeding. The court held that the loss was not properly deductible in 1917, that the state court action had no legal effect, and that section 3226 barred any allowance of credits or refunds in this suit because statutory limitations on claims against the government had expired. Core reasoning emphasized that suits against the government require explicit consent that cannot be expanded by implication and that permitting the offsets would circumvent the Revenue Act's time bars.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a preferred stockholder of the Providence Biltmore Hotel Company seeking to block charter amendments that would eliminate a required annual sinking fund for retiring first preferred stock, along with related reorganization changes. The court ruled that the amendments purporting to remove the sinking fund obligation were invalid and that the complainant's interests must be protected. The core reasoning was that the sinking fund constituted a contractual commitment between the corporation and its preferred stockholders that fell outside the state's reserved power to authorize majority amendments binding on dissenters, as it involved no creditors, public interest, or core matters like corporate purpose or management structure. The original charter's protections, including the need for high consent thresholds on certain changes, could not be overridden in this manner.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case was a suit in equity by the patent assignee Koppe against Burnstingle to enjoin alleged infringement of U.S. Patent No. (issued 1924 to Meyer) on a two-dice game called “Golf Dice” and for an accounting of profits. The defendant raised defenses of a subsisting oral license from the original patentee, invalidity as a gambling device contrary to public policy, and lack of invention. The court found the license claim unsupported by the evidence, held that a device capable of lawful amusement use is not invalid merely because it can be used for gambling, but concluded the patent was invalid for lack of invention because prior art already disclosed dice- or top-controlled indoor golf and baseball games; Meyer’s only advance was omitting the game board and relying on memory, which did not produce a new function or result. The bill of complaint was therefore dismissed.

property