John Spencer Letts

This case concerns a federal habeas corpus petition filed by a state prisoner who pled guilty to robbery and petty theft with a prior after a shoplifting incident at a Rite Aid store. The petitioner challenged his robbery conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his attorney advised him to accept a plea despite insufficient evidence to support the robbery charge. After state courts denied relief, the federal magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and recommended granting the writ on the ineffective assistance claim, concluding that counsel's performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced because he would have proceeded to trial. The district judge adopted the recommendation in full, ordering that the petitioner be allowed to withdraw his robbery plea or be released from custody within sixty days, while denying the second claim regarding a coercive plea.

criminal law

The case involves petitioner Sterling Fellows's federal habeas corpus challenge to his California state convictions for premeditated attempted murder and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, along with enhancements for personally inflicting great bodily injury and committing the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang. After the state courts affirmed the convictions and adjusted the sentence to life in prison with a 15-year minimum parole term, Fellows sought relief in federal court arguing insufficient evidence supported the gang-related findings. The magistrate judge recommended denial, and the district court adopted that recommendation after de novo review, concluding that the trial evidence—including expert testimony on the gang's primary activities such as murders and assaults, plus predicate offenses meeting statutory timing requirements—was sufficient under California Penal Code § 186.22 to uphold the enhancements. Judgment was entered denying the petition and dismissing the action with prejudice.

criminal law

The case involved defendants Sanco Grant III and Lamont Dinkins, who pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and distribution of cocaine base. The government sought a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) based on the quantity involved, but Grant moved to strike its application to him while Dinkins was relieved of it via a substantial assistance motion. The court granted Grant's motion, holding that the ten-year minimum could not be applied, and sentenced Grant to sixty months and Dinkins to forty months. The core reasoning was that post-Booker the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, mandatory minimums create unjust disparities between principal traffickers and peripheral offenders, and they conflict with the goal of a fair and rational sentencing system under the Guidelines.

criminal law

In Banyard v. Duncan, the petitioner challenged his conviction and sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison under California's Three Strikes Law for possessing a small amount of cocaine, based on two prior felony convictions. The district court granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus and vacated the sentence. The court reasoned that the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, that there was insufficient evidence that one of the prior convictions qualified as a strike, and that the petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The state court's contrary decision unreasonably applied clearly established federal law.

criminal lawfederal power

This case involves a habeas corpus petition by Thomas Buckley challenging his sentence after pleading guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for testifying against co-defendants in a 1986 murder case. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, finding that the plea agreement, as understood by Buckley and his counsel based on the prosecutor's letter and representations, limited his sentence to a maximum of 15 years. The core reasoning was that the government must fulfill the promise made to induce the plea and cooperation, even if it results in a sentence not otherwise authorized by state law, as Buckley had fully performed his obligations under the agreement. The petition was granted, directing enforcement of the 15-year term with appropriate credits.

criminal lawprocedure

In Lacy v. Lewis, petitioner Durnel Lacy filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging his 1996 California state conviction for possession of rock cocaine and a smoking device, as well as his 25-years-to-life sentence under the Three Strikes law, primarily on the ground that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by denying his motion for self-representation. The U.S. District Court, adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus based solely on that claim and did not reach the petitioner's other grounds. The court's reasoning centered on the determination that the denial of self-representation infringed the petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights as established in Faretta v. California, that the state appellate court's contrary conclusion was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and that the error was not harmless.

criminal lawcivil rights

In Cunningham v. Gates, a civil case involving claims against police officers and public official defendants regarding qualified immunity for decisions made over time about investigating and controlling alleged unconstitutional conduct, District Judge Letts issued an order recusing himself from further proceedings. The judge concluded that recusal was appropriate because the case's extensive pretrial appeals and likely en banc and Supreme Court review made it probable he would no longer be available on active status to try the case by the time it returned. He further reasoned that repeated defense allegations of bias against him had already caused significant waste of resources and distorted perceptions of the case, that one defendant's nomination to the Ninth Circuit created an undesirable conflict dynamic, and that counsel's attacks on his integrity had eroded his ability to proceed impartially.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved an order to show cause why attorney Diana Carloni Nourse should not be sanctioned for statements and arguments made during proceedings in a related matter, where she was accused of acting with reckless disregard for the truth. The court determined that Nourse and her counsel Richard Clouse had not shown cause to avoid sanctions, as her conduct rose to the level of objective bad faith, though it could not conclude whether subjective bad faith was present. Despite this finding, the court declined to impose sanctions, citing Ninth Circuit precedent such as In re Keegan and Barber v. Miller, which requires a specific finding of bad faith for inherent authority sanctions and suggests that an award based solely on recklessness would likely be reversed on appeal. The decision emphasized that misrepresentations undermine the judicial system regardless of intent but followed the circuit's law limiting sanctions in these circumstances.

procedure

In Fink v. Montes, the petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that his trial counsel violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by advising his brother to cooperate with the prosecution and his mother not to testify at trial. The court granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment on this claim and denied the petitioner's cross-motion, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The core reasoning was that no actual conflict of interest existed under Cuyler v. Sullivan because counsel did not represent the brother or have any special relationship creating divided loyalties, the advice encouraged truthful testimony that would not harm the petitioner, and any challenge would instead require showing deficient performance and prejudice, which was not established.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the United States seeking a permanent injunction against several California Indian tribes, including the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians, to halt their operation of uncompacted Class III gaming such as slot machines. The court granted the injunction and ordered a phased shutdown of the gaming devices, with options for compliance timelines tied to employee layoffs. The core reasoning rested on Ninth Circuit precedent in Rumsey holding that California prohibits these games for all persons, so the state had no IGRA duty to negotiate compacts over them and was not acting in bad faith; IGRA flatly bars uncompacted Class III gaming after one year regardless of any prior negotiation issues.

criminal lawfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involves petitioner Park Theck, an excludable alien detained by the INS since October 1995 after attempting entry with a fraudulent passport and receiving exclusion and deportation orders. Theck filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his prolonged detention as violating international law, the Constitution, and INS rules, along with additional claims regarding interference with his marriage and loss of property. The district court first addressed jurisdiction under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, determining that Section 242(g) of the INA does not bar review of constitutional claims concerning ongoing detention, even if it precludes challenges to removal orders themselves. The court distinguished this petition from challenges to final removal orders and cited precedents allowing habeas review for substantial constitutional questions. It proceeded to examine the petitioner's immigration status as an excludable alien and the basis for his continued custody.

immigrationcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

This case involved Avery Dennison Corporation suing defendants who registered over 12,000 domain names, including "avery.net" and "dennison.net," as alleged cybersquatters seeking to profit from licensing them. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on its federal trademark dilution claim under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and denied the defendants' cross-motion, ordering transfer of the domain names to the plaintiff for $600. The court found the Avery and Dennison marks famous based on their longstanding use and recognition, held that the defendants made commercial use in commerce by offering the names for license as domain names, and concluded this use lessened the marks' capacity to identify goods or services. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that their selection of names as common surnames or use for email addresses exempted them from the Act's requirements.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involves multiple lawsuits by plaintiffs against Los Angeles public officials—including the police chief, supervisory officers, police commissioners, city attorneys, council members, and the mayor—arising from the Cunningham incident and related shootings by LAPD's Special Investigative Services unit. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants knowingly maintained policies tolerating an officer 'code of silence,' falsification of evidence, and failure to discipline excessive force, allowing unconstitutional conduct to continue unchecked. The court had already ruled on related motions by the SIS officers, finding potential evidence of a pattern of misconduct across incidents like Smith, Gomez, and Berry, with no independent witnesses and corroborating officer testimony. In addressing the public officials' motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the opinion highlights the gravity of claims that policies assume officer truthfulness and ignore impeaching evidence, potentially undermining due process, while noting that issues like council members' indemnification decisions and reliance on counsel could present factual questions for a jury.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involves civil rights claims by Robert Cunningham and the estate of Daniel Soly against Los Angeles Police Department SIS officers arising from a June 1995 incident in which officers surveilled the pair, allowed them to commit a robbery, then fired without warning, killing Soly and wounding Cunningham while also injuring two officers. Plaintiffs allege this was part of a repeated pattern of conduct across multiple incidents in which officers permitted robberies, used excessive force, and fabricated evidence to justify shootings. Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The court examined whether evidence of the alleged common course of conduct, including prior incidents and credibility issues with officers' accounts, created genuine disputes of material fact precluding immunity at this stage, noting that the case would proceed to trial on the underlying claims regardless.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The United States brought a civil action seeking a preliminary injunction against nine Indian tribes, alleging that their operation of gambling machines and other gaming activities violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1166, and the Johnson Act. The court examined whether the United States was the proper plaintiff to enforce state gambling laws made applicable in Indian country under § 1166(a), analyzing the overall IGRA scheme that divides gaming into classes and relies on tribal-state compacts for Class III regulation. In its pre-Wilson analysis, the court concluded that the statute's language and structure vest enforcement authority with the states rather than the federal government or the National Indian Gaming Commission. The subsequent Ninth Circuit decision in Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson altered the contemplated holding and produced an anomalous result here, prompting the court to include its original analysis for appellate consideration while noting limited facts on the status of tribal-state negotiations.

criminal lawfederal power

In United States v. Foreman, the defendant was charged with attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 and use of a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) after participating in an attempted bank robbery. The government sought a jury instruction allowing aiding and abetting liability on the § 924(c) count even though it had not charged aiding and abetting in the indictment and offered no proof that the defendant personally used or carried a gun. The court denied the request, holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v. United States requires the government to prove that a defendant actively employed a firearm to establish “use” under § 924(c) and that aiding and abetting liability likewise requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally aided the specific acts constituting “use” or “carry.” The court reasoned that serving as a lookout or driver for an armed robbery does not, without more, establish aiding and abetting of the firearm offense itself, and any sentence enhancement for the presence of a gun would instead come through the Sentencing Guidelines.

criminal lawguns

The case involves four black defendants charged with crack cocaine offenses who sought discovery to support claims of selective prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's office. The court granted the motions for discovery, determining that the presented data established a colorable basis for concluding that prosecutorial decisions discriminated against blacks. The core reasoning was that the office's selection criteria, while purportedly race-neutral, were heavily weighted toward arrests from law enforcement task forces targeting black street gangs in minority areas, resulting in virtually all federal crack prosecutions involving black defendants and none involving white offenders. This focus on gang-related sting operations produced de facto racial disparities that the government's explanations did not dispel.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involved plaintiff Johanna Trevino's motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 after she prevailed in a civil rights action against LAPD officers and others stemming from the 1990 shooting death of her father during a robbery. The underlying suit alleged excessive force and a city policy of indemnifying officers for punitive damages awards, but the court granted summary judgment to the City and Council members on immunity and merits grounds, and a jury awarded Trevino only nominal compensatory damages of $1 against the officers along with stipulated punitive damages. The court granted the fee motion but awarded a substantially reduced amount after applying a lodestar analysis that excluded hours spent on unsuccessful claims, such as those against the Council members regarding absolute and qualified immunity, and adjusted for the limited degree of success achieved. The reasoning emphasized the challenges of determining a reasonable fee in § 1988 cases involving nominal damages and the need to exclude time not reasonably related to the result obtained.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Boyd Paulson suing his auto insurer, State Farm, for breach of contract, bad faith, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and fraud after the insurer initially denied his underinsured motorist claim for injuries from a 1992 accident. State Farm had based the denial on medical records showing full recovery and prior payments of $21,740 from the at-fault driver's insurer and workers' compensation, but later paid the full $8,260 policy limit. The court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment on all claims. It reasoned that the undisputed facts showed no unreasonable or bad-faith conduct by the insurer, that Paulson had received his full contractual entitlement, and that the facts did not meet any threshold for tort liability arising from a contract dispute.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In this civil case, IBM sued multiple defendants including Leon Brown, various individuals and companies for allegedly conspiring to defraud IBM of millions of dollars in computer products through a scheme involving a fictitious buyer, with claims of racketeering and related misconduct arising from the same events that led to state criminal charges against several defendants. The defendants moved to stay or continue the civil proceedings pending resolution of parallel criminal cases, arguing prejudice from having to choose between testifying (and waiving Fifth Amendment rights) or invoking the privilege (leading to adverse inferences). The court denied the motion, holding that defendants have no constitutional right to a stay in parallel civil and criminal matters, that such proceedings may proceed simultaneously, and that granting a stay would waste completed pretrial work and prejudice the plaintiff without sufficient justification.

criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory