District Court, N.D. Indiana — appointed by Ronald Reagan
Royer v. USAA Casualty Insurance
District Court, N.D. Indiana · 2011-03-11 · cited 3×
This case involved homeowners Brian and Stephanie Royer who filed an insurance claim with USAA Casualty Insurance Company after their home burned down in February 2007; USAA denied the claim on suspected fraud grounds, and the Royers sued for breach of contract and bad-faith handling more than two years later. The court considered cross-motions for summary judgment focused on whether the policy's one-year suit limitation period barred the action. The court granted USAA's motion for summary judgment and denied the Royers' partial motion, dismissing the case. It reasoned that the policy's explicit one-year limit from the date of loss was enforceable under Indiana law, the suit was filed outside that period, and a later statute potentially extending such periods could not be applied because it would constitute an impermissible retroactive impairment of the existing contract.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Smith v. Housing Authority of Southbend
District Court, N.D. Indiana · 2010-09-30 · cited 3×
The case involved African-American tenants, including one with a claimed disability, suing the Housing Authority of South Bend, its officials, board members, the local mayor, and the U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. The plaintiffs alleged that their apartment and complex failed habitability standards, that staff retaliated against complaints by inaction and rude treatment, that officials failed to stop bullying by another resident, and that the project reflected intentional racial concentration of non-white residents, all in violation of the Fair Housing Act, ADA, Rehabilitation Act, Civil Rights Act, U.S. Housing Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and related doctrines. Claims against the Housing Authority were dismissed without prejudice, while claims against the board and individual commissioners were dismissed with prejudice; claims against the mayor and HUD Secretary were dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend certain aspects by a set deadline.
civil rightsfederal powerproperty
Neighborhood Housing Services of America, Inc. v. Turner-Ridley
District Court, N.D. Indiana · 2010-09-24 · cited 11×
This case involved a dispute over insurance coverage where Neighborhood Housing Services of America sued Rainbow Community Organization and its employees, including Nicole Turner-Ridley, for damages related to the servicing of mortgage loans. Rainbow and its employees filed a third-party claim seeking a declaration that their insurer, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, had a duty to defend and indemnify them under a directors and officers policy. The court granted Philadelphia's motion for summary judgment and denied Turner-Ridley's cross-motion, finding that the underlying complaint alleged only acts excluded from coverage by the policy's professional services exclusion. The court reasoned that the exclusion did not render the policy illusory because the directors and officers coverage still applied to some reasonably anticipated risks not involving professional services.
business & regulatory
Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Indiana · 2010-08-31 · cited 6×
In this case, plaintiff Stephen Hoffman sued his former employer, Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc. d/b/a Advanced Healthcare, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act as amended in 2008. Hoffman claimed that his renal cell carcinoma, which was in remission, qualified as a disability, that the employer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation by allowing him to work from home in Angola rather than commuting daily to Fort Wayne, and that he was terminated because the employer regarded him as disabled. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hoffman was not disabled under the ADA and that no prima facie case of discrimination existed, and also moved to strike an affidavit and notes submitted by Hoffman. The court denied both motions, finding the evidence admissible and concluding that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether Hoffman had a disability, whether he was regarded as disabled, and whether the requested accommodation was reasonable under the circumstances. The court noted that the defendant had not provided sufficient evidence on undue hardship or the specifics of the proposed accommodations to resolve the claims at the summary judgment stage.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Stevens v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SOUTH BEND
District Court, N.D. Indiana · 2010-06-23 · cited 4×
This case involved a tenant's challenge to her eviction from public housing after a shooting occurred on the property involving her daughter's boyfriend and another visitor, which the housing authority deemed a lease violation. The plaintiff, an African American resident, alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act through segregation, interference with contract under section 1981, due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment via section 1983, and related state law claims including breach of contract and Indiana constitutional violations; she also sought to invalidate Indiana's ejectment statute. The court granted the State of Indiana's and defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding the statutory challenge moot because the plaintiff no longer lived in the housing, dismissing federal claims with prejudice for lack of genuine issues of material fact supporting the allegations, and dismissing state claims without prejudice. The reasoning centered on the lease terms holding tenants responsible for guests' criminal activity threatening safety, the absence of evidence for discriminatory intent or continuing violations, and the plaintiff's voluntary departure after receiving eviction notices.
civil rightspropertyprocedure
United States v. Robinson
District Court, N.D. Indiana · 2010-02-18 · cited 1×
The case involved defendant Aaron Robinson, who was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Robinson filed a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, arguing that the court improperly limited rehabilitation of his expert witness and refused to give his requested theory-of-defense jury instruction on the knowledge element. The court addressed the motion's timeliness in light of a recent amendment to Rule 33 that extended the filing deadline from 7 to 14 days, finding it just and practicable to apply the new deadline and that the government had waived any timeliness objection. On the merits, the court concluded that the existing jury instructions sufficiently covered the defense theory, the evidentiary rulings did not jeopardize the defendant's rights, and therefore the interests of justice did not require a new trial.
criminal lawprocedureguns