This ERISA case involves plaintiff Michelle Ricca's challenge to Prudential's denial of long-term disability benefits under her employer's group policy after a 2004 car accident left her with neck and back injuries. The court reviewed Prudential's decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard because the insurer both administered and funded the plan. Prudential had determined that Ricca could perform the duties of her regular occupation and had not satisfied the policy's 180-day elimination period, but the court found this conclusion unreasonable given the supporting medical records from her treating physicians. Both parties' summary judgment motions were denied due to remaining factual disputes about her disability status, and the case was remanded to Prudential for further administrative proceedings.
This case involves a former employee of a state youth development center who sued the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation after he filed internal grievances and EEOC charges following workplace injuries and terminations. The defendant moved to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds. The court denied the motion, holding that the retaliation provisions of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act directly enforce the First Amendment right to petition as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the claims arise within the actual guarantees of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than as prophylactic legislation, no congruence and proportionality analysis was required to uphold Congress's abrogation of state immunity.
This case is a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging Pennsylvania convictions for first-degree murder and possessing an instrument of crime. The petitioner argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly raise on direct appeal the trial court's denial of his request to present alibi testimony from his medically incapacitated father, which implicated Sixth Amendment compulsory process rights. After remand from the Court of Appeals, the district court applied AEDPA deference standards to the state court decisions and adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation to grant relief. The court ordered the Commonwealth to afford a new trial within 120 days or vacate the conviction and release the petitioner. The core reasoning was that the father's testimony was not cumulative, filled a critical gap in the alibi, and the state courts had unreasonably applied federal law in rejecting the ineffective assistance claim.
The case involved competing claims to the internet domain name chambord.com between plaintiff Chatam International, which owns the trademark Chambord for liqueur and related products, and defendant Bodum, which holds a trademark for Chambord on non-electric coffee makers. Plaintiff sued for violations of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, trademark infringement, and dilution after defendant registered and used the domain to advertise its coffee and tea makers. The court granted summary judgment to defendant and dismissed the action. It reasoned that defendant possessed a valid subsisting trademark in Chambord for coffee makers since 1991, along with rights under a prior consent decree, and that no evidence supported a finding of bad faith in the domain registration or use, which was limited to legitimate offerings consistent with its trademark.
This declaratory judgment action between Fireman's Fund Insurance Company and Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Company concerned the priority of coverage under their respective policies for liability and cleanup costs from a tractor-trailer accident and fuel spill. The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability. It determined that the tractor was leased to a trucker, making Empire's policy excess under its "Other Insurance" provision because Fireman's Fund's policy constituted "other collectible insurance," and the two excess clauses were mutually repugnant, requiring equal sharing of the loss under Pennsylvania precedent. On cleanup costs, the court addressed Empire's pollution exclusion but did not impose primary responsibility on Empire given the policy terms.
In this diversity case, Mobile Transport Technologies sued ScooterWorks after the latter failed to pay on a promissory note tied to a license agreement for electric scooter technology, leading to a confessed judgment under Pennsylvania procedure. ScooterWorks moved to open the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and Pa. R. Civ. P. 2959, citing defenses including breach of the agreement regarding patent prosecution and fraudulent misrepresentations about the scooter's performance that induced the contract. The court granted the motions to open the judgment and stay execution, holding that the defenses raised triable issues under a directed-verdict standard—particularly fraud in the inducement, which equity permits despite parol-evidence-rule objections—and that a stay was appropriate once the judgment was opened.