The case concerned whether damage to unsold wallpaper inventory caused by flood-induced moisture (without submersion) was covered under a federal flood insurance policy. Plaintiffs, store owners, sued the insurer for denying their claim following a 1995 flood. The court ruled that the loss was compensable as a direct physical loss by or from flood under the policy terms, granting summary judgment on liability for breach of contract but denying it on bad faith and damages. The reasoning centered on the policy's coverage for proximate flood damage and inapplicability of the moisture exclusion clause.
This case involves a qui tam action brought by a union and individual workers against a construction company under the federal and California False Claims Acts, alleging that the defendants submitted false claims for payment on federally funded projects by misrepresenting wages, hours, and worker classifications, among other violations related to the Davis-Bacon Act. The court granted in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing without prejudice the claims based on worker misclassification because such disputes fall exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and cannot form the basis of an FCA claim without prior resolution there. However, the court denied dismissal of the remaining FCA allegations involving misreporting of actual wages paid and hours worked, as these do not require classification determinations. The court also denied the motion to dismiss the union as a plaintiff, holding that there was no public disclosure of the allegations through the statutorily specified channels that would trigger the FCA's jurisdictional bar.
Plaintiffs, former UCSF scientists, sued the University Regents, Salutar, and its parent over the assignment of their MRI-related invention (the '744 Patent) under employment Patent Agreements, the University's exclusive licensing of it to Salutar for a $25,000 lump sum, and related claims including breach of contract for failing to secure running royalties, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference, and a §1983 civil rights violation, while also seeking a declaratory judgment that they were sole inventors. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their breach claim and granted the University's cross-motion for summary judgment on all claims except the inventorship declaration, holding that the Patent Agreement gave the University discretion over licensing terms rather than mandating a royalty-bearing non-exclusive license, that mandate law barred contract claims against the public university, and that plaintiffs failed to show evidence of fraud, unilateral mistake, or other torts. The court certified the contract interpretation issue for interlocutory appeal.
In this case, plaintiff Darlene Carter sued the Building Material and Construction Teamsters Union Local 216, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and individual defendants in San Francisco Superior Court, alleging employment-related claims including violations of Title VII. She mailed courtesy copies of the complaint to the defendants in November 1995 with a letter noting that formal service would follow, and the defendants were formally served in February 1996. The defendants then filed a notice of removal to federal court on March 18, 1996, which the plaintiff moved to remand as untimely. The court granted the motion to remand, holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) the thirty-day removal period begins upon a defendant's receipt of the initial pleading through service or otherwise, which occurred when the defendants received the courtesy copies in November 1995, and following the plain language of the statute as interpreted by several circuit courts.
This case involved defendants charged under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act with conspiring to possess and distribute tens of tons of hashish aboard a vessel on the high seas, after part of the load was offloaded toward North America. On remand from the Ninth Circuit, the district court addressed unresolved questions about the required 'nexus' between the defendants' conduct and the United States as a matter of due process. The court ruled that nexus is an issue for the court to decide, not the jury, and must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence; it defined nexus as a sufficient connection between the criminal conduct and the United States to justify U.S. prosecution of its interests. After an evidentiary hearing, the court found that evidence of the conspiracy's U.S. ties, including involvement of U.S. participants and plans touching U.S. territory, established the required nexus for both defendants.
This case involves a consolidated securities class action against Media Vision Technology alleging violations of federal securities laws in connection with stock and debenture purchases. Plaintiffs' counsel sought reimbursement of approximately $797,000 in costs and expenses from a $1 million partial settlement fund, along with reservation of remaining funds for future litigation against non-settling defendants. The district court reviewed and adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations on allowable expenses, referring the matter back for specific calculations of awards to each firm while denying or discounting items such as excessive travel, meals, and first-class accommodations. The core reasoning rests on equitable principles from common fund doctrine allowing reasonable cost recovery, combined with statutory limits under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and the need for detailed documentation to ensure expenses are necessary and not excessive. The court further ordered pre-approval for future unusual expenditures like extensive travel or nonlegal experts and required all applications to break down costs with explanations of necessity.