This case concerns a bankruptcy appeal by debtor Frank Barracco challenging JP Morgan Chase Bank's proof of claim for a deficiency judgment after foreclosure on properties owned by Barracco's company, DelVallo Construction. Chase had obtained a default judgment against Barracco under a personal guaranty from a 2005 loan and later pursued deficiency amounts following a 2007 foreclosure sale on the 2006 loan properties. The parties submitted the deficiency valuation dispute under Michigan law to arbitration, and the state court confirmed an award finding no deficiency claim against Barracco. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's order overruling Barracco's objections to the claim, vacated the denial of reconsideration as moot, and remanded the case, holding that collateral estoppel from the state court's rulings barred the bankruptcy court from allowing the claim.
This case involves a dispute over indemnification under a Closing Protection Letter (CPL) issued by First American Title Insurance Company to Washington Mutual (WaMu) in connection with a $4.5 million residential loan closed by First American's agent, Patriot Title. The FDIC, as receiver for WaMu after its failure, sought to enforce the CPL against First American for losses stemming from Patriot Title's fraud, which prevented WaMu from obtaining a valid mortgage lien. First American moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of standing and no actual loss, while the FDIC cross-moved, asserting liability and damages exceeding $1.7 million. The court denied First American's motions in full and granted the FDIC's motion in part, finding that the FDIC had standing as successor, that the fraud triggered the CPL's indemnity obligation, and that First American suffered no prejudice from delayed notice, but denied summary judgment on the exact amount of damages due to factual disputes over the loan's value in a subsequent sale to Chase. The ruling focused on contract interpretation, successor rights under the Purchase & Assumption Agreement, and evidence of actual loss.
This case arose from a FELA lawsuit filed by plaintiff James Thornberry against his former employer Grand Trunk Western Railroad after he was injured while operating a switch at a GM automotive yard; Grand Trunk later filed a crossclaim against Armond Cassil, a contractor hired by GM to maintain the tracks, seeking indemnity or contribution. The court granted Armond Cassil’s motion to dismiss the crossclaim under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56. The core reasoning was that Grand Trunk failed to show it was an intended third-party beneficiary of any contract between GM and Armond Cassil, as there was no written agreement, no objective evidence of a direct promise by Armond Cassil to benefit Grand Trunk, and Grand Trunk was at most an incidental beneficiary; common-law indemnity or contribution claims were also rejected on the facts presented.
This ERISA case involved plaintiff Sandra McCandless, a former employee insured under a group long-term disability policy issued by defendant Standard Insurance Company, challenging the administrator's denial of continued benefits after an initial 24-month period. Plaintiff had received benefits based on a mental disorder diagnosis but sought to extend them under the policy's any-occupation disability definition due to alleged physical conditions; defendant also filed a counterclaim to recover $23,332 in overpaid benefits stemming from her receipt of Social Security disability payments. The court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted defendant's motion for judgment on the administrative record, affirming the denial of further benefits. It reasoned that the policy expressly limited mental-disorder benefits to 24 months, that medical evidence did not establish qualifying physical disability under the stricter any-occupation standard after that period, and that the reimbursement provision authorized recovery of overpayments as equitable relief.
The case involved a prisoner suing a prison doctor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments after radiation treatment for prostate cancer. The district court reviewed the defendant's objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that had advised denying summary judgment. The court overruled the objections, adopted the report, and denied the motion for summary judgment. It determined that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the plaintiff's condition was a sufficiently serious medical need, whether the defendant subjectively disregarded that need, and whether any delay in treatment caused detriment.
This case arose from a fraudulent mortgage transaction on a Michigan property where an agent for First American Title Insurance issued a $4.5 million title policy to Washington Mutual (later assigned to Chase), but WaMu failed to obtain a valid lien due to the fraud. First American acquired the property and sought to convey it to Chase to fulfill its obligations under the policy's limitation of liability clause, while Chase refused and sued for breach of contract and damages. The court granted First American's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, ruling that tendering title satisfied the insurer's duties because the policy allowed it to establish title or remove defects in a reasonably diligent manner. The decision followed the Tenth Circuit's approach in First Federal over the Seventh Circuit's contrary holding in Citicorp, treating the issue as one of first impression in the Sixth Circuit, and the court certified it for interlocutory appeal while staying proceedings.
