This case is an ancillary proceeding in which the government sought to collect restitution owed to a private victim from defendant Witham by garnishing his wages under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act using procedures from the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act. The court addressed whether FDCPA remedies are available when the United States has no direct financial interest in the recovery. Following controlling First Circuit precedent from United States v. Bongiorno and related cases, the court determined that the FDCPA applies only to debts owed to the United States and not to restitution for private parties, even though the MVRA authorizes enforcement similar to fines. The garnishment order was therefore vacated, with the government directed to other available civil remedies instead.
This case involved the government's attempt to forfeit firearms as substitute property in connection with a defendant's prior convictions for tax fraud and money laundering. The firearms had been surrendered by defendant Edward Brown as a bail condition and later transferred to claimant Bernhard Bastian pursuant to a court order after Brown's conviction and flight. The court granted summary judgment to Bastian and denied the government's motion, holding that Brown no longer held any interest in the firearms by the time the government sought forfeiture because he had validly transferred title beforehand, and that a convicted felon's non-possessory property interest could be transferred or disposed of by court order without violating possession prohibitions.
The case involves a product liability and negligence lawsuit stemming from a 2005 plane crash in Pennsylvania that killed six Rhode Island residents aboard a Pilatus PC-12 aircraft. The plaintiffs, as estates of the victims, sued Atlas Aircraft Center, Inc. (a New Hampshire corporation) and Pilatus Aircraft, Ltd. (a Swiss corporation) in federal court in New Hampshire under diversity jurisdiction. Pilatus moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting insufficient contacts with New Hampshire, and also sought dismissal in favor of a first-filed action in Colorado. The court denied both motions, holding that New Hampshire's long-arm statutes extend to constitutional due process limits and that Pilatus's substantial connections to the state (including a large fleet of its aircraft based there) established minimum contacts making jurisdiction fair and reasonable; it further found that efficiency and convenience weighed against transfer.
The case concerned atheist and agnostic parents and children challenging the routine classroom recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes the phrase 'under God,' in public schools operated by the Hanover and Dresden school districts; plaintiffs alleged violations of the Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Due Process, Equal Protection, and related state constitutional and statutory provisions. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the federal Pledge statute (4 U.S.C. § 4) and the New Hampshire Pledge statute (RSA 194:15-c) were constitutional. The court granted the motions to dismiss, holding that Pledge recitation is a patriotic exercise designed to foster national unity rather than an inherently religious practice, and that voluntary participation without compulsion or coercion does not violate the cited constitutional protections.
The case involved the Sierra Club and other environmental groups suing the U.S. Forest Service under the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming that the agency violated the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Forest Management Act by improperly approving two vegetation management projects in the White Mountain National Forest without following correct procedures. The court granted summary judgment to the Forest Service, upholding the approvals. The core reasoning was that the Forest Service had complied with all statutory and regulatory requirements, as judicial review under the APA is deferential and the agency had considered relevant factors and articulated rational connections between facts and decisions.
In this case, James Tobin, a Republican National Committee official, was charged with conspiracy to violate voters' civil rights and with conspiring to and aiding and abetting violations of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(D) by jamming telephone lines used by the New Hampshire Democratic Party and a firefighters' union for get-out-the-vote efforts on Election Day 2002. A jury acquitted Tobin on the civil rights conspiracy but convicted him on the two counts under subsection 223(a)(1)(D). After the First Circuit vacated the convictions due to an overly broad jury instruction on the meaning of "intent to harass," the district court on remand interpreted the statute to require proof of a subjective purpose to provoke adverse emotional reactions in the called parties, rather than mere knowledge that such reactions would result or an intent merely to disrupt communications. The court concluded that the trial evidence was insufficient to prove such intent beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore granted Tobin's motion for judgment of acquittal.