Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc. v. Gallagher
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1959-07-20 · cited 20×
The case involved a federal constitutional challenge by a kosher supermarket owned and operated by Orthodox Jews, along with associated customers and a rabbi, against enforcement of Massachusetts' Lord's Day statute prohibiting most business activity on Sundays. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the law burdened their religious observance of the Jewish Sabbath (observed from Friday sundown to Saturday sundown) by effectively preventing operation on both weekend days. A three-judge district court reviewed the statute's colonial origins as a blue law, its numerous exceptions for certain activities and industries, and its application, to determine validity under the U.S. Constitution. The court analyzed whether the law's purpose, structure, and enforcement provisions could withstand scrutiny on grounds including religious liberty.
religious libertycivil rightscriminal lawbusiness & regulatory
Toohill v. Cunard Steamship Co.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1955-02-24 · cited 4×
The plaintiff sued the defendant steamship company for personal injuries she allegedly suffered due to negligence while a passenger on its vessel traveling from New York to Ireland. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the passenger ticket contained a contractual provision barring any suit for bodily injury unless commenced within one year, and the plaintiff had filed suit more than a year after the July 1953 injury. The court denied the motion, holding that the one-year limitation was not part of the contract of carriage because it was not incorporated by reference into the boxed portion of the ticket that contained the essential terms and the carrier’s signature. Under applicable American maritime law governing the tort that arose during performance of a U.S.-made contract, such a provision therefore did not bind the passenger, leaving any factual issue about whether the limitation was otherwise brought to her attention for resolution at trial.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Rotary Lift Company v. Clayton
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1954-09-27 · cited 1×
This case involves a dispute between Rotary Lift Company and its former employee, A. Wiley Clayton, over an invention Clayton developed during his employment. The company sought specific performance of an employee agreement requiring Clayton to assign rights to his by-pass valve invention and sign a patent application, while Clayton counterclaimed for rescission of the agreement due to alleged duress. The court dismissed both claims, reasoning that the agreement, signed after Clayton conceived the invention, was ambiguous regarding coverage of prior inventions and should be construed against the company as the drafter, and that there was insufficient evidence of duress at the time of signing.
labor & employmentpropertybusiness & regulatory
Pino v. Nicolls
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1954-02-01 · cited 16×
The case involved a habeas corpus petition by Anthony Pino challenging a deportation order under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which was based on his two convictions after entering the U.S. for crimes involving moral turpitude: carnal abuse in 1928 and larceny of golf balls in 1949. Pino argued that the larceny matter, which ended with the case being placed on file after probation and a suspended sentence in Massachusetts state court, did not qualify as a final conviction under the Act or state law, and that due process was violated in the proceedings. The court examined Massachusetts precedent defining conviction to include a finding of guilt followed by judgment, determined that Pino had indeed been convicted of both offenses, and held that larceny and carnal abuse qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude under established circuit precedent. It therefore concluded that the deportation order was proper and discharged the writ.
immigrationcriminal law
Wetherell Bros. Co. v. United States Steel Co.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1952-05-15 · cited 7×
This case involved a dispute over whether the plaintiff corporation could enforce or claim commissions under a 1930 sales agency contract (later amended) that had been entered into by a predecessor Massachusetts corporation, Wetherell-Massachusetts, which had served as the exclusive selling agent for the defendant's steel products in New England until the contract's termination in 1952. The predecessor liquidated in 1950, distributing assets to its shareholders who then transferred them (including an attempted assignment of the contract) to the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation, for tax reasons; the plaintiff then sought recovery on orders it claimed to have facilitated. The court entered judgment for the defendant. It reasoned that the plaintiff was a legally distinct entity from the predecessor, that the personal-services nature of the agency agreement made it non-assignable without the defendant's consent, that the original parties had treated the contract as terminable and non-transferable, and that no implied contract or unjust-enrichment claim arose from the plaintiff's post-liquidation efforts.
business & regulatory
Lund v. United States
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1952-02-05 · cited 9×
This case involved a claim by a U.S. Navy ensign under the Federal Tort Claims Act for $80 in damage to his personal automobile, which was parked in a designated area at a naval air station and pitted by stones and sand from an airplane's propeller wash. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the damage resulted from negligence by an unidentified government employee acting within the scope of employment when operating the plane. It held that the plaintiff's choice to use and park his own vehicle was not incident to his military service, distinguishing the facts from the Feres precedent that bars FTCA recovery for service-connected injuries to servicemen. The court concluded that the government had a duty of reasonable care when taxiing planes near the parking area and that the plaintiff bore no contributory negligence.
torts & liabilitypropertyfederal power
Sterling Brewing, Inc. v. Cold Spring Brewing Corp.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1951-07-02 · cited 14×
This case involved a trademark infringement and unfair competition claim by Sterling Brewing, Inc., an Indiana-based brewer with longstanding use and federal registrations of the 'Sterling' mark for beer since 1933 and ale since 1936 under the 1905 Trademark Act, against Cold Spring Brewing Corp. for its use of the mark in New England. The court ruled for the plaintiff, granting injunctive relief and dismissing the defendant's counterclaim. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff's valid registrations provided constructive nationwide notice of ownership under the Lanham Act, rendering the defendant's subsequent use unlawful irrespective of geographic limits or good faith, while the plaintiff's prior exclusive use for beer and continuous sales established superior rights even as ale and beer markets converged post-Prohibition.
business & regulatoryproperty
Grigalauskas v. United States
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1951-05-03 · cited 21×
This case under the Federal Tort Claims Act concerns claims by a minor child and her father for injuries from negligent post-natal care at an Army hospital, where a doctor administered an undiluted solution causing severe scarring and deformity. The court found facts showing the error occurred after the child was admitted for treatment as a military dependent. It rejected the government's motion to dismiss and its later defense of charitable immunity under Kansas law, reasoning that the hospital was operated with public funds for military health and morale purposes rather than as a charity, so the immunity did not apply.
torts & liabilityfederal power
Lacey v. L. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1951-01-05 · cited 25×
This case involved a wrongful death claim under the Death on the High Seas Act brought by the estate of a pilot who died when his plane crashed into the ocean due to engine failure. The respondent had performed an inspection and repairs on the aircraft while it was on land at Boston's airport, and the suit alleged that negligence during that work caused the crash on the high seas. The court addressed whether the Act applied when the alleged wrongful act originated on land but resulted in death at sea. It overruled the respondent's exception to the libel, holding that jurisdiction existed because the substance and consummation of the tort took effect on the high seas, constituting a maritime tort under the statute.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Pocahontas Steamship Co. v. the Esso Aruba
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1950-09-11 · cited 8×
This admiralty case involved cross-libels over a May 1948 collision in dense fog between the steam collier Mann (owned by Pocahontas Steamship Co.) and the tanker Esso Aruba (owned by Standard Oil Co.) in Narragansett Bay's East Passage. After reviewing witness testimony, depositions, and ship logs from both vessels, the court found that the Aruba violated Inland Rules Article 16 by failing to stop its engines upon first hearing the Mann's fog signals forward of its beam and by proceeding at immoderate speed for at least twelve minutes in the fog. The court concluded the Aruba was solely at fault and the collision's proximate cause, while the Mann committed no contributing fault, and referred the matter for determination of damages.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Contemporary Arts, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1950-08-11 · cited 4×
This case involved a copyright infringement claim by Contemporary Arts, Inc., the owner of a registered sculpture titled 'Cocker Spaniel in Show Position' created in 1942 and assigned to the plaintiff in 1943, against F.W. Woolworth Co. for selling lower-priced ceramic copies of the dog figurine in its stores. The court determined that the defendant's models, sourced from third-party manufacturers, were copied from the plaintiff's copyrighted work, which was validly protected as an original sculpture under federal copyright law. It found infringement based on the similarities, the presence of copyright notices on plaintiff's models, and the lack of credible evidence supporting the defendant's claims of independent creation. The court awarded the plaintiff the maximum statutory damages of $5,000 under the Copyright Act in lieu of actual damages, given the number of infringing copies sold, while declining to issue an injunction.
property
Wadell v. Green Textile Associates, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1950-06-23 · cited 8×
The case involves a negligence claim by plaintiff Earl F. Wadell, a North Carolina resident, against several railroad and textile companies for injuries sustained while unloading a freight car in Swannanoa, North Carolina. Defendant Southern Railway Company, a Virginia corporation, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in the District of Massachusetts, asserting it was not doing business there and that jurisdiction would violate due process and unduly burden interstate commerce. The court found that Southern maintained a Boston office since 1921, with local employees, advertising, ticket arrangements, a bank account, and other activities that amounted to doing business in the state. It denied the motion, concluding that federal jurisdictional and venue statutes applied and imposed no unreasonable commerce burden.
proceduretorts & liabilityfederal power
Hayes v. Luckenbach SS Co.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1950-06-12 · cited 6×
The case involved a libel in admiralty filed by the captain and crew of the trawler Lucky Star against the operators of the steamship Lynchburg Victory and two tugs, alleging that the respondents' negligent maneuvering caused a collision that damaged the Lucky Star while it was berthed and led to the libellants' loss of wages from at least three missed fishing trips. The respondents filed exceptions arguing that the facts alleged failed to state a cause of action. The court sustained the exceptions and dismissed the libel, reasoning that the libellants had alleged no ownership interest in the vessel or contractual relationship with its owner, and under controlling precedent such as Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, they could not recover against a third-party tortfeasor for negligent deprivation of an economic opportunity to work aboard the damaged vessel.
torts & liability
United States v. Cowen's Estate
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1950-04-20 · cited 1×
The case involved the United States, as Housing Expediter, seeking a court order for restitution of overpaid rents under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 against the defendant's estate. The defendant requested a jury trial, but the plaintiff moved to strike that claim. The court decided that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial because the action for restitution alone is equitable in nature rather than an action at law for damages. The reasoning centered on the fact that restitution is a traditional equitable remedy aimed at restoring the status quo and enforcing compliance with the acts, which can be ordered independently of injunctive relief under the courts' equitable discretion.
federal powerbusiness & regulatoryprocedure
R. P. Hazzard Co. v. Emerson's Shoes, Inc.
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1950-02-02 · cited 9×
This case involved a claim by R. P. Hazzard Co. against Emerson's Shoes, Inc. and related entities for trademark infringement and unfair competition over the use of marks containing "The Emerson Shoe." The plaintiff sought only an injunction after waiving damages. The court decided in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove that its mark had acquired a secondary meaning associating it with their product in the relevant market, and that the defendants' use of "Emerson’s Shoes" stemmed from a legitimate prior business name without intent or likelihood of deceiving the public.
business & regulatory
Reardon v. United States
District Court, D. Massachusetts · 1949-11-07 · cited 3×
This case involves a motion to dismiss a claim brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States for an incident involving the Post Office Department. The plaintiff had first presented an administrative claim for $450 and later filed suit seeking $750, prompting the government to argue that the higher amount violated 28 U.S.C.A. § 2675(b). The court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the statute limits recovery to the amount of the administrative claim but does not bar the action entirely when a larger sum is initially sought. It also permitted the plaintiff to amend the complaint to reduce the demand to $450, consistent with the statutory cap and prior decisions such as Siciliano v. United States.
torts & liabilityprocedurefederal power