This case concerns an appeal from a bankruptcy court order in the Chapter 11 proceeding of Union Trust Philadelphia, LLC, the operator of a Philadelphia restaurant. After Singer Equipment Company obtained a state court judgment against Union Trust's non-debtor owners for nearly $500,000 in equipment debts tied to assets transferred to the debtor, the bankruptcy court issued a preliminary injunction extending the automatic stay to halt those state proceedings. The district court affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court had authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and that unusual circumstances justified the extension. The core reasoning was that the owners' active role in the debtor's daily operations and reorganization efforts meant continued state litigation would substantially hinder the bankruptcy case. The injunction was temporary and set to expire after a period for plan preparation.
This case involved plaintiff De Lage Landen Financial Services (DLL) suing defendants Rasa Floors, Viewpoint, and NCC for breach of contract after they stopped payments on equipment lease agreements tied to a now-defunct phone and internet service program offered by Capital 4. The contracts were finance leases governed by Pennsylvania law, and DLL sought summary judgment on its breach claim as well as on the defendants' counterclaims alleging fraud, violations of consumer protection laws, and RICO violations. The court granted summary judgment to DLL on the breach claim, holding that the defendants had breached the leases as a matter of law by failing to make payments and that defenses such as unconscionability, mutual mistake, illegality, and breach by DLL were without merit. The court also granted summary judgment to DLL on the counterclaims, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding fraudulent misrepresentation by DLL or its agents, no basis for imputing Capital 4's conduct to DLL under agency theories, and insufficient evidence to support the other claims. The decision rested on the plain terms of the finance lease contracts and the lack of evidence supporting the defendants' affirmative defenses and counterclaims.
This case involves employees at a chicken processing plant suing their employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid time spent donning and doffing personal protective equipment before shifts, after shifts, and around meal breaks. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on the compensability of that time, liquidated damages, and the applicable statute of limitations. It denied both motions in relevant part after finding genuine disputes of material fact on the type and necessity of the PPE, whether donning and doffing qualified as compensable work, and related issues. The court applied FLSA precedents defining work and the Portal-to-Portal Act to conclude that these factual disagreements precluded judgment as a matter of law.
This case was a qui tam action brought by plaintiff Hollander against defendant Ranbaxy under the False Marking Statute, 35 U.S.C. § 292, alleging that Ranbaxy marked dermatology products with expired patent numbers to deceive the public and seeking statutory fines split between the relator and the United States. Ranbaxy moved to dismiss, contending that the qui tam provision in § 292(b) violates the Take Care Clause of Article II by denying the Executive Branch adequate control over enforcement litigation. The court denied the motion, holding the provision constitutional on grounds including the long history of qui tam statutes, the ability of the United States to intervene, and distinctions from precedents such as Morrison v. Olson that require specific controls for independent prosecutors.
This case arose from the January 2008 detention of plaintiff Gunser Verdier by Darby Borough police officers while he was eating in his parked car during a work break; officers approached him, removed him from the vehicle, patted him down, and searched his car, leading to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for unlawful seizure, excessive force, and due process violations, plus Pennsylvania common-law claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It granted summary judgment on all claims against Officers Simpkins and Pitts, on most claims against Officer Evans except excessive force, and on most claims against Officer Ray except the unlawful search of the car. The court denied summary judgment on the remaining excessive-force, assault, and battery claims against Evans and the unlawful-search claim against Ray. The core reasoning was that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, genuine disputes of material fact existed as to those surviving claims but not as to the others.
The case involves a campus police officer suing her university employer for sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII after a coworker made unwanted advances, including a physical incident, and her reports were not properly handled, leading to continued harassment and wage deductions. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims. It reasoned that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged severe and pervasive harassment, supervisor involvement, lack of prompt remedial action, and adverse actions linked to her complaints through temporal proximity and antagonism.
