Walter Thomas McGovern

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit brought by plaintiff Lara against his employer Arctic King Ltd. under the Jones Act and the maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness, along with claims for maintenance, cure, and unearned wages, after he was injured while working aboard the defendant's vessel ARCTIC TRAWLER on December 17, 1997. The central issue was whether Lara qualified as a "seaman" at the time of his injury, a prerequisite for recovery on these claims. The court found that Lara was not a seaman but rather a shore-based harbor worker, as his employment consisted solely of day-labor repair and maintenance work on a vessel moored in a shipyard, without any crew contract, sailing, or exposure to the perils of the sea. Because Lara lacked seaman status, the court concluded he could not pursue his claims and entered judgment for the defendant.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case is a civil forfeiture action brought by the United States against the property at 1215 Kelly Road in Bellingham, Washington, based on its alleged use in criminal activity. Claimants contested the forfeiture on Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment double jeopardy, and Eighth Amendment excessive fines grounds. The court had already ruled that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that double jeopardy claims were moot or premature, and it now schedules an evidentiary hearing to assess whether forfeiture of the entire fifteen-acre property would be an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. Drawing on Austin v. United States, the court adopts a multifactor approach that weighs the harshness of the penalty against the gravity of the offense, the property's relationship to the offense, and the extent of criminal activity on the property, while noting that the government has established a prima facie case and shifting the burden to claimants to demonstrate excessiveness and propose divisions of the property.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

This case involves challenges by environmental groups to the operations of the Federal Columbia River Power System dams and power marketing decisions by the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and other federal agencies, alleging violations of the Endangered Species Act in relation to endangered salmon species. The court granted BPA's motion to dismiss the claims against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The core reasoning is that Section 9(e)(5) of the Northwest Power Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for reviewing final actions of the BPA Administrator taken under that Act, and the plaintiffs' claims target such actions embodied in BPA's Record of Decision, irrespective of the legal theory asserted.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

The case involved the EEOC suing on behalf of Jacqueline Brooks, a Muslim receptionist at Exeter House, a Christian retirement home run by Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. (PMI), who resigned after being told she could not wear her required headcovering at work as it conflicted with the facility's dress code and Christian environment. The court granted summary judgment to PMI, finding that Section 702 of Title VII exempts religious organizations from claims of religious discrimination in employment connected to their activities. The core reasoning was that the exemption protects PMI's ability to define and maintain its religious mission and environment without government interference, and that accommodating Brooks' religious symbol would compromise that environment and amount to more than a de minimis burden.

labor & employmentreligious libertycivil rights

The case Garnett v. Renton School District concerned whether a public high school that permitted various non-curriculum-related student groups to meet on its premises was required under the federal Equal Access Act to also allow a religious student group to meet, despite provisions in the Washington state constitution prohibiting the use of public school facilities for religious purposes. The court determined that a limited open forum had been created by the presence of noncurriculum-related groups such as the Bowling Club and International Club, triggering the Act's requirements, but the Washington constitution prevented the school from permitting the religious club. The core reasoning was that the Equal Access Act does not preempt or override state constitutional protections, as the Act itself includes provisions preserving other constitutional rights and does not intend to displace state laws on the separation of church and state.

free speechreligious libertyfederal power

This case involved a civil rights action filed by prisoner James Cello-Whitney against prison staff, alleging physical abuse. The court adopted a magistrate judge's report and dismissed the action with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), citing the plaintiff's long-standing pattern since 1983 of filing abusive claims that he failed to prosecute while instead submitting irrelevant motions. It also certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that the plaintiff's appeal of a prior order was not taken in good faith. To address the abuse, the court issued an injunction restricting Cello-Whitney's future filings by limiting him to three in forma pauperis applications per year, requiring evidence of actual or threatened physical harm for such applications, mandating payment of filing fees otherwise, and imposing conditions that claims be new, fact-based, and supported by evidence of intent to produce proof.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involved counterclaims by RSR Corporation against the United States seeking contribution under CERCLA for cleanup costs at the Western Processing hazardous waste site, based on allegations that the EPA's regulatory and remedial actions prior to 1983 constituted negligence or misfeasance. The court granted the United States' second motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed the relevant portions of RSR's First and Seventh Counterclaims. It reasoned that there was no waiver of sovereign immunity allowing such claims against the government and that the EPA's activities were exclusively regulatory and remedial, not rendering it liable as an owner, operator, transporter, or generator under CERCLA Section 107. The court further noted that CERCLA channels disputes over remedial efforts through cost recovery actions and comparisons to the National Contingency Plan rather than direct contribution suits based on agency conduct.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involves liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) for waste deposited at the Western Processing site. GATX sought summary judgment dismissing claims against it, arguing that its tank-bottom sludge was petroleum waste covered by CERCLA's petroleum exclusion and thus not a hazardous substance. Boeing cross-moved for partial summary judgment, contending that the sludge was contaminated waste containing hazardous substances like PAHs and lead rather than usable petroleum. The court denied GATX's motion and granted Boeing's, ruling that the sludge was not exempt under the petroleum exclusion because it consisted of non-usable waste contaminated with hazardous materials, as supported by EPA interpretations and distinctions in case law between petroleum products and contaminated wastes. As a result, GATX was held liable as a party under CERCLA Section 107(a)(3).

environment

This case involved a U.S. Postal Service employee and her family suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment arising from an incident on January 7, 1989, in which she was allegedly detained and pressured at work after a head injury. The employee had previously settled a related discrimination complaint and received ongoing workers' compensation benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) for the same events. The court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that FECA provides the exclusive remedy for injuries arising from federal employment, including emotional harms as determined by the Department of Labor. As additional grounds, the court found that the false imprisonment claim was barred under the FTCA's exception for claims arising from assault, battery, or false imprisonment by non-investigative personnel, and granted summary judgment in favor of the postal inspector involved.

labor & employmentfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

This case involved third-party claims by Boeing and others against several transporter companies under CERCLA and Washington's Model Toxics Control Act for allegedly delivering hazardous wastes to the contaminated Western Processing site. The transporter defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they could not be liable unless they had selected the site as the destination and raising additional defenses regarding the legality of the site and their status as common carriers. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing claims based on deliveries where the transporters did not select the site, consistent with the statutory language of CERCLA § 107(a)(4), legislative history, and EPA policy; it denied the motion as to certain deliveries where genuine issues of material fact existed regarding site selection. Partial judgment under Rule 54(b) was entered for two defendants whose claims were fully dismissed.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

In this CERCLA contribution action concerning cleanup costs at a hazardous waste site, Bayside Waste Hauling & Transfer moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that it could not be held liable as a successor after purchasing assets from another company. The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether Bayside qualified as a successor under either traditional exceptions or the continuing business enterprise exception. Evidence indicated factors such as retention of the same location, overlapping employees, use of similar logos, and continuity of operations, which could support liability. The court reasoned that federal common law under CERCLA permits an expansive view of successor liability to ensure equitable allocation of remediation costs among responsible parties, consistent with Ninth Circuit guidance emphasizing national uniformity over narrow state rules.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved the federal government's enforcement action under CERCLA against several defendants, including Unocal, for liability at the Western Processing hazardous waste site in Washington. The government moved for partial summary judgment on liability, asserting that the defendants were responsible parties under Section 107(a) due to releases of hazardous substances like arsenic from the facility that caused response costs. The court granted the motion, finding all four statutory elements satisfied: a release or threatened release of hazardous substances from a facility causing response costs, with each defendant falling into a liable class such as generator or owner/operator. It rejected Unocal's third-party defense because the arsenic contamination was not shown to be caused solely by others, held that the environmental harm was indivisible supporting joint and several liability, and ruled that equitable defenses and apportionment arguments were inapplicable at the liability phase and reserved for later contribution proceedings.

environmenttorts & liability

This case concerns third-party contribution claims under CERCLA for cleanup costs at the Western Processing Site, where Boeing and other plaintiffs moved for approval of settlement agreements with 25 third-party defendants. The plaintiffs sought both approval of the agreements, which were based on volumetric waste shares and estimated cleanup costs, and a judicial finding that the payments equaled the settling defendants' equitable shares of liability. Defense Liaison Counsel opposed the requested equitable-share findings, arguing they would prejudge allocation issues and advocating instead for application of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. The court approved and entered the settlements, dismissed related claims against the settling defendants with prejudice, but declined to make any equitable-share determinations and ruled that remaining claims would be reduced by the settling parties' shares as later determined at trial under UCFA principles.

environmentprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Veeder's claims against NC Machinery for a replacement marine engine that allegedly arrived damaged and later failed at sea; Veeder asserted negligence, strict liability, misrepresentation, punitive damages, and Washington Consumer Protection Act violations after purchasing the engine through boat builder Modutech, but raised no contract or warranty claims. The court granted NC's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. It held that an agency relationship existed between Veeder and Modutech based on Veeder's deposition testimony, that admiralty law barred tort claims for pure economic loss under the Supreme Court's East River decision, and that the misrepresentation and Consumer Protection Act claims lacked factual support because any alleged nondisclosure was disclosed before reliance and the transaction was a one-off private deal without public impact or pattern. The court also denied Veeder's cross-motion for summary judgment.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved United Van Lines suing Hertz Penske Truck Leasing after x-ray equipment was damaged during transport in a rented truck, alleging breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose under the UCC as well as a violation of Washington's Consumer Protection Act. The court granted Hertz Penske's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claims. It reasoned that the rental agreement's disclaimer of warranties was valid because it was conspicuous, in writing, and expressly mentioned the warranties as required by RCW 62A.2-316, that the customer had inspected the truck, and that the liability limitations were not unconscionable. The court further found no deceptive act or pattern of conduct to support the CPA claim.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In Lash v. Ballard Construction Co., plaintiff Thomas Lash, an employee of defendant Ballard Construction Co., sought damages under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act for injuries sustained while working on a floating work platform used for dredging near a pier. The court considered whether the platform qualified as a "vessel" under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), which would allow a negligence claim against the employer. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the structure was not a vessel because its primary purpose was to serve as a stationary work platform for the dredging equipment, with any movement being incidental and not involving navigation. The decision relied on undisputed facts about the platform's design and use, concluding that no reasonable trier of fact could find it to be a vessel.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether the Washington Insurance Guaranty Association (WIGA) or an umbrella insurer (GNIC) bore responsibility for defending and covering claims after the insured's primary carrier became insolvent and withdrew from defense. WIGA, which had stepped in to defend the insured up to its statutory limits, sought reimbursement from GNIC, arguing that the umbrella policy's language required it to drop down and provide primary coverage due to the insolvency. The court granted GNIC's motion for summary judgment and denied WIGA's, holding that the policy was unambiguous in requiring GNIC to cover only losses in excess of the scheduled underlying limits and that neither the policy nor the WIGA Act imposed a duty on the excess carrier to drop down. The reasoning centered on the policy's limits clause distinguishing scheduled underlying insurance from other collectible insurance, the statutory role of WIGA as a substitute for the insolvent primary insurer, and rejection of public policy arguments for shifting insolvency risk to the excess carrier.

business & regulatory

This case concerned personal injury claims arising from a 1981 maritime accident involving the fishing vessel MIDNIGHT EXPRESS, brought against defendant Hudson Shipbuilders after the company had entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The plaintiffs filed suit in September 1986, more than three years after the incident, following the lifting of the automatic bankruptcy stay in June 1986. The court addressed whether the bankruptcy stay tolled the three-year statute of limitations under 46 U.S.C. App. § 763a or whether 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) merely extended the deadline by 30 days after the stay ended. The court granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed the relevant claims, ruling that § 108(c) does not suspend the running of the limitations period during bankruptcy but instead provides only a 30-day extension if the period would otherwise expire while the stay is in effect. The decision rested on the statutory text, legislative history distinguishing the current provision from its predecessor, and the policy favoring certainty in the administration of bankruptcy estates.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a University of Washington student-athlete's challenge to the NCAA's drug-testing program, which requires annual consent to urine testing for banned substances like steroids and stimulants as a condition of participating in intercollegiate athletics; her separate claim against the University's own testing program had already been settled. Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to allow her to compete without testing or sanctions during the litigation. The court denied the motion, holding that the balance of hardships favored the defendants, that plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits because the NCAA program did not involve state action and no constitutionally protected right had been violated, and that any privacy intrusion from monitored urine collection was outweighed by the program's goals of protecting athlete health, ensuring competitive fairness, and deterring drug abuse.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved high school students seeking to hold meetings of a student-initiated religious fellowship group on school premises during noninstructional time, after the school district refused permission. The plaintiffs claimed violations of the Equal Access Act, the First Amendment rights to free speech, free exercise of religion, and establishment clause protections, as well as equal protection and due process under the U.S. and Washington State Constitutions. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the school had not created a limited open forum under the Act because its existing clubs were curriculum-related and school-sponsored rather than student-initiated noncurriculum activities. Even assuming a limited open forum existed, the court held that the Equal Access Act does not require schools to violate the Washington Constitution's prohibitions on appropriating public property for religious purposes or allowing sectarian influence in public schools. The court further concluded that the denial did not infringe the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, as Establishment Clause concerns and state constitutional restrictions justified differential treatment of religious groups, and the students could meet at a nearby church.

free speechreligious libertycivil rights