This case involves a nonprofit organization and individuals seeking a preliminary injunction to halt the Bureau of Land Management's planned roundup of over 1,700 excess wild horses from the Triple B Complex in Nevada, alleging violations of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act and NEPA. The court evaluated the motion under the Winter factors, focusing on the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits and whether serious questions existed regarding the BLM's determination of appropriate management levels (AMLs), the accuracy of horse population data, and the adequacy of the environmental assessment. The court found that the AMLs had been properly established through prior planning processes without objection, that the BLM had statutory authority to remove excess horses to maintain ecological balance under a multiple-use mandate, and that the plaintiffs failed to show the data or analysis was deficient. It also rejected claims that livestock grazing impacts or alternatives like increasing AMLs needed further consideration in this context. The opinion concludes the analysis by addressing related evidentiary and procedural points without granting the injunction.
This case is a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which petitioner Samuel Griffin challenges his 2002 Nevada conviction for armed robbery following a guilty plea, raising claims including ineffective assistance of counsel, due process, and equal protection violations related to his plea and appeal rights. The court first addressed procedural issues, finding that the equal protection claim in Ground 1-6 was unexhausted because it had not been fairly presented to the state supreme court with the same federal legal theory, and it dismissed that claim on the merits as plainly meritless since ineffective assistance allegations do not implicate equal protection. Regarding other grounds, the court assumed arguendo that some lacked specificity but determined it was more efficient to review the exhausted claims on the merits under the deferential AEDPA standard, which permits relief only if the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable factual determination.
This case concerns environmental organizations' challenge to the Bureau of Land Management's approval of a large-scale wind energy facility in Spring Valley, Nevada, via a Finding of No Significant Impact and Environmental Assessment rather than a full environmental impact statement. Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to prevent the BLM from authorizing construction and site clearing scheduled to begin in March 2011, citing potential harm to greater sage-grouse habitat and bat populations near Rose Guano Cave. The court reviewed the project's details, including its renewable energy benefits, economic impacts, mitigation commitments such as habitat enhancement funding, and the BLM's fast-track process under NEPA, along with public comments and tiering to prior programmatic EIS documents. The opinion analyzed the factual and procedural background to assess the motion's merits without completing an EIS.
This case is a qui tam action brought by Nevada under the Nevada False Claims Act alleging that Merck failed to report certain discounted and free Zocor and Vioxx products provided to hospitals under incentive programs in its Best Price submissions to the federal government under the Medicaid Rebate Statute. Merck moved to dismiss on grounds that the complaint misread the rebate statute, did not show knowing falsity, was barred by conflict preemption, and failed to plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b). The court denied the motion, holding that the statute's text requires inclusion of the contingent discounts and free goods in best price calculations, that the reports could be knowingly false, that state enforcement is not preempted by federal law, and that the allegations satisfied the pleading requirements.
In Morin v. United States, plaintiff Vicky Morin sued the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that her exposure to jet fuel dumped by Navy aircraft near her workplace and homes caused her to develop a malignant plasmacytoma brain tumor. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, with the United States arguing the claim was untimely and lacked proof of causation, while the plaintiff sought judgment on causation issues. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the plaintiff failed to present admissible expert evidence establishing either general causation (that jet fuel can cause this type of cancer) or specific causation (that it did so in her case). The core reasoning focused on the inadequacy of the plaintiff's sole expert report, which offered only a conclusory statement without proper methodology such as differential diagnosis to rule out other causes, and thus could not support the required element of causation in a negligence claim.
The case concerns a claim of unjust enrichment brought by the plaintiff against Aristocrat Leisure Limited, a parent corporation, based on revenues allegedly derived from the actions of its two subsidiaries. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), arguing that the parent could not be held liable. The court granted the motion and dismissed the claim. It reasoned that under established principles of corporate law, a parent is not liable for its subsidiaries' acts absent allegations showing the subsidiaries were sham entities used to perpetrate injustice or a substantial and continuing connection between the parent and the wrongful conduct, neither of which was pleaded here.
