This case was a patent infringement action under 35 U.S.C. §§ 271 and 281 in which Louis A. Grant, Inc. alleged that Keibler Industries, Inc. infringed two patents (the ’888 and ’396 patents) covering machines for removing slag from steel-industry soaking pits. The court held both patents invalid and ordered that the plaintiff recover nothing. It concluded that the asserted claims of the ’888 patent were obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in light of prior-art references including the Thomas, White, Kinney, and Antos patents, and that the ’396 patent claims were invalid under both § 102(b) (public use more than one year before filing) and § 103 because its features, such as extendible outriggers and hydraulic clamping, would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill at the relevant time, including in view of the earlier ’888 disclosure.
United States Steel Corporation sued the EPA Administrator for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking judicial review of an order issued under the Clean Air Act that found violations of Indiana's approved implementation plan at the company's Gary facilities and required emission controls, planning, maintenance, and reporting for particulate matter. The complaint alleged that the order was arbitrary, failed to specify violations with reasonable particularity, imposed unreasonable compliance schedules without considering good faith efforts, and was otherwise vague or unlawful. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss except as to claims challenging the order's compliance with statutory requirements under 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(4), holding that the order did not constitute final agency action ripe for review under the APA and that enforcement would occur through civil actions. The plaintiff's motion for a stay was denied, and a hearing was set on requests for preliminary injunctions.
This case involves a proposed class action by students in the Gary Public Schools alleging that they were suspended or excluded from school for more than five days without adequate notice, hearing, or other procedures required by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and state law. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim because the plaintiffs were required to exhaust available administrative remedies under Indiana's statutory scheme for school discipline before pursuing federal claims. The court reasoned that precedents support requiring an authoritative institutional decision for finality before federal intervention in school matters, that the state statute provides sufficient preexisting standards, and that school officials enjoy only qualified immunity dependent on good faith.
This case involved a dispute among three unions—Iron Workers, Carpenters, and Laborers—over a work assignment by employer Telander at a construction project. The Iron Workers sued under federal labor and arbitration statutes to enforce a Joint Board arbitration award granting them the work and to recover damages for alleged breach of contract by Telander and the other unions for failing to comply with that award. After the NLRB conducted its own §10(k) proceeding and awarded the work to the Carpenters and Laborers, Telander moved to dismiss on the ground that the NLRB decision resolved the matter. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the NLRB’s determination in the §10(k) proceedings was final and precluded a separate judicial action for contract damages arising from the same work-assignment dispute.
This case involves creditors seeking to hold shareholders of a bankrupt shoe business personally liable as partners for debts incurred after the company's articles of incorporation were revoked by the Indiana secretary of state for failure to file annual reports. The plaintiffs argued that the revocation rendered the entity a partnership under common law, while defendants contended that a specific statute requiring knowing, willful, and fraudulent conduct applied and was not met here, as they lacked actual knowledge of the revocation. The court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, determined that the statute governs liability and that undisputed facts showed no such intent or knowledge by the shareholders. It further reasoned that even under common-law doctrines, estoppel principles would bar creditors who dealt with the entity as a corporation from pursuing individual liability absent fraud. The court granted summary judgment for the defendants on this basis.
This case arose from a lawsuit by First National Bank of Crown Point challenging the Comptroller of the Currency's approval of Mercantile National Bank's application to open a branch in Ross Township, Indiana, under the National Banking Act and Indiana branch banking laws. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunction to block the branch. The court denied the Comptroller's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction but granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. It held that review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, was limited to the administrative record and that the Comptroller's action was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to Indiana law, which affirmatively authorized branches in qualifying locations without existing banks. The court further ruled that plaintiffs had not shown grounds for a trial de novo.
