In Noland v. Dixon, a federal district court considered a habeas corpus petition filed by John Thomas Noland Jr., who had been convicted in North Carolina state court of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The court granted relief on several claims, including that jury instructions improperly required unanimity for mitigating factors at sentencing, that the petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, that the prosecution improperly commented on the defendant's silence, and that there were errors in guilt-phase jury instructions. It also ordered an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's mental competence to stand trial. As a result, the court set aside the conviction and sentence, allowing the state to retry the petitioner only after determining his competence and providing a fair trial consistent with constitutional standards, while declining to reach several other claims.
This case involves the United States government's civil forfeiture action against a strip shopping center in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, known as Leola’s Plaza, valued at around $300,000. The government alleged the property was purchased with proceeds from Leroy Ragin's drug-related crimes, including money laundering and operating a continuing criminal enterprise, for which he was convicted. Claimant Leola Marsh, Ragin's aunt, asserted an interest in the property, but the court found the government's evidence established probable cause for forfeiture and that Marsh's response failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations in full, granting the government's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Marsh's claim and counterclaims, defaulting all other potential claimants, and ordering forfeiture of the property to the United States (subject to a consent order protecting the interest of secured creditor First Citizens Bank).
This case involved two black women employees suing their white former employer, an insurance agency, for racial discrimination in hiring, promotion, demotion, and termination decisions, along with related common-law claims. The jury rejected the plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and North Carolina common law, but the court separately considered Mayse's Title VII claim. The court ruled for Mayse on Title VII, finding that she was demoted and discharged due to her race and resistance to the employer's racially discriminatory hiring practices, as shown by internal documents and communications expressing preferences against black applicants. The court granted the plaintiffs a new trial on the claims submitted to the jury.
The case involved a plaintiff who prepared federal income tax returns for individuals in exchange for purchasing their refund checks at a discount, leading the IRS to assess penalties under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6695(c) and (f) for failing to include his Social Security number on returns and for negotiating the checks, on the theory that he was a paid income tax return preparer. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on stipulated facts, including that the plaintiff charged no explicit fees for preparation and that the IRS found no errors in the returns. It held that the plaintiff qualified as a paid preparer under 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(36) because a portion of the profits from the discounting activities constituted compensation for return preparation. However, the court ruled that this holding would apply only prospectively, allowing the plaintiff to recover representative penalties already paid and barring the government from collecting the remaining assessments, because retroactive application would be unduly harsh given the lack of prior notice, absence of any demonstrated harm to the IRS, and the plaintiff's non-fraudulent conduct.
This case concerns the Secretary of Health and Human Services' compliance with a Fourth Circuit decision in Hyatt v. Sullivan regarding Social Security Ruling SSR 88-13 on evaluating pain in disability claims. The district court found that the Secretary's new ruling, SSR 90-1p, inaccurately described the appellate court's holding and failed to properly amend the prior policy as required. The court ordered the Secretary to amend SSR 90-1p within 30 days to accurately reflect compliance with Fourth Circuit law and to immediately cease any policy of disregarding that law in denying benefits to eligible claimants.
The case concerned a challenge by the North Carolina Civil Liberties Union and individual attorneys to the practice of a state district court judge who opened each morning court session by directing attendees to pause for a prayer that he recited aloud, invoking divine guidance for the proceedings. The court held that this practice violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states. It applied the three-part Lemon test and found that the prayer lacked a secular purpose, had the primary effect of advancing religion, and created excessive government entanglement with religion; it distinguished the case from legislative prayer precedents like Marsh v. Chambers due to the lack of historical tradition and the captive nature of the courtroom audience. The judge was enjoined from continuing the practice.