The case concerned whether the parents of a 12-year-old boy were denied due process when the INS issued a departure control order blocking the child's return to the Soviet Union after the family had visited the United States and the child had sought and received asylum. The parents, who had returned to Ukraine, moved for summary judgment to lift the order so they could regain custody of their son. The court granted the motion, holding that the order violated the parents' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because they received no notice or opportunity to be heard before the INS acted. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the court found the parents' fundamental interest in the care and custody of their minor child outweighed the government's interest, and that adding procedures for parental participation would impose minimal burden. The court noted that existing regulations provided a hearing only to the minor alien and contained no mechanism for notifying or involving absent parents.
This case involves objections by debenture holders and their indenture trustee to the treatment of their Class B claims under a 1985 plan of reorganization for the bankrupt Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co. The objectors sought fixed rather than contingent interest payments at rates higher than the 5% coupon rate in their 1955 Indenture, including legal or equitable rates from 1976 or 1978 onward, while the debtor and shareholders proposed maintaining the debentures' original contingent status. The court sustained the objections in part by enforcing the Indenture's acceleration clause triggered by the bankruptcy filing, ruling that principal and unpaid interest became due immediately upon the trustee's 1978 demand, with 5% interest accruing annually from January 1, 1976 regardless of available net income, plus interest on the claims at a fair rate but without compounding or higher equitable adjustments. The core reasoning rested on the plain language of the Indenture's default and acceleration provisions, which contained no requirement tying interest to net income, and the need for fair and equitable treatment consistent with the contract terms rather than granting windfall rates above those for other creditors.
The case involved a defendant convicted by jury on seven counts of failing to file income tax returns and providing false information on W-4 forms. The court denied the defendant's post-trial motions, including claims of Speedy Trial Act violations, challenges to the Sixteenth Amendment's validity, and a motion for acquittal. The court reasoned that delays were mostly excludable under the Speedy Trial Act due to pretrial motions and extensions, the amendment's ratification validity was not justiciable per Supreme Court precedent, and evidence of the defendant's prior compliance and notices supported the jury's finding of willfulness.
The case involved a former inmate at Sheridan Correctional Center who sued Illinois prison officials, claiming that his eight-day solitary confinement without running water in his cell violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, resulting in health issues, and seeking $500,000 in damages. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the claim. The reasoning was that the undisputed facts showed the plaintiff had daily access to showers, a gymnasium, and other sources of water, along with food and medical care, so the conditions did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment or intentional disregard of his well-being, and any issue might amount to negligence rather than a constitutional violation.
In Sullivan v. Stefanik, the plaintiff brought pendent state-law claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution against a defendant following a criminal proceeding in which a preliminary hearing resulted in a finding of probable cause. The defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that the probable cause determination collaterally estopped the plaintiff from pursuing those claims. The court denied the motion, holding that the incomplete record of the preliminary hearing—lacking details on testimony, representation, and the precise charges—failed to satisfy the requirements for collateral estoppel under Illinois law. The decision drew on precedents such as Whitley v. Seibel and Brown v. Green, which similarly treated ambiguous state-court records as non-preclusive in later civil actions, and permitted further discovery, including the deposition of the assistant state's attorney, to attempt reconstruction of the hearing record.
The case involved the University of Chicago Hospitals challenging the Secretary of Health and Human Services' decision affirming the Provider Reimbursement Review Board's refusal to hear the hospital's appeal of its 1980 Medicare reimbursement determination. The Board declined jurisdiction because the hospital's hearing request was filed 37 days after the 180-day statutory deadline under 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3), and it found no good cause for an extension under its regulations. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the Board's discretionary denial of a time extension was committed to agency discretion by law under the Administrative Procedure Act and thus not subject to judicial review absent an abuse of discretion, which was not shown here, consistent with precedents like Califano v. Sanders.