This case involves plaintiffs seeking compensation for injuries allegedly caused by a Dalkon Shield IUD inserted in 1971 and removed in 1975. The defendant Trust moved for summary judgment on the ground that the claims were barred by Pennsylvania's statute of limitations. The court granted the motion, ruling that the cause of action accrued no later than October 14, 1981, when the plaintiff underwent surgery for complications that she knew or should have known might be linked to the IUD, more than two years before the suit was filed in 1984. Equitable tolling under the discovery rule did not apply because the necessary information was available to the plaintiffs well before the limitations period expired. The court also held that the warranty claims were separately barred under the four-year UCC statute of limitations running from the date of delivery.
This case involves claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from the death of David Johnson during a 1991 confrontation with Erie police officers, including allegations that Officer Bowers used a fatal choke-hold and that the city maintained a custom of inadequate training or oversight regarding treatment of Black individuals in custody. The court ruled on defendants' motion to dismiss or strike the second amended complaint by striking an overly lengthy initial paragraph, dismissing the City of Erie Police Department as an improper defendant, dismissing an indemnity claim under state law, and striking punitive damages claims against the city and official-capacity defendants, while denying dismissal of the core § 1983 claims, family members' interference-with-family-relationship claims, and certain other requests. The court reasoned that the complaint's factual allegations of prior incidents involving the officer and city discussions about training satisfied pleading requirements under Monell and recent Supreme Court precedent like Leatherman, that family members adequately alleged their own constitutional deprivations, and that a police department is merely a subunit of the municipality rather than a separate suable entity.
The case involved an appeal by attorney Gene Locks from the bankruptcy court's dismissal of his motion to appoint a representative for future asbestos disease claimants in the liquidating Chapter 11 bankruptcy of H.K. Porter Company. The bankruptcy court had dismissed the motion, finding that Locks, as a member of the Committee representing prepetition claimants, had a conflict of interest in advocating for future claimants and thus lacked standing. The district court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Locks violated his fiduciary duties and distinguishing the case from In re Amatex, noting that in this liquidating bankruptcy, appointing a futures representative was not required.
In this case, plaintiff Palmer-Lucas sued defendant Martin’s Herend Imports for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and violation of the Pennsylvania Commissioned Sales Representatives Act after the defendant terminated their long-standing sales representative agreement covering much of the United States. The defendant moved to dismiss the statutory claim, arguing that the Act is facially discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause because it applies only to out-of-state principals that lack a permanent place of business in Pennsylvania. The court applied heightened scrutiny to the statute, noting that it imposes burdens on interstate commerce by requiring written contracts, prompt payment of commissions, and potential exemplary damages exclusively from non-Pennsylvania businesses. Finding that Pennsylvania had not demonstrated a legitimate local purpose that could not be achieved through nondiscriminatory means, the court held the Act unconstitutional and granted the motion to dismiss Count II.
This case involved a former sales representative's claim against his employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging that his termination was due to age bias rather than the stated reasons of poor performance and attitude, and that he was replaced by a younger employee. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff failed to show the employer's reasons were pretextual. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of age discrimination and that conflicting evidence—such as positive performance reviews, sales awards, and customer success shortly before termination—created genuine issues of material fact about whether the articulated reasons were unworthy of credence. Applying precedents from the Supreme Court and Third Circuit, the court reasoned that credibility determinations and inferences from the facts must be left to a jury when the evidence is not so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.
The case concerned whether two excess umbrella liability insurance policies issued by Twin City Fire Insurance to Pittsburgh Corning covered claims for property damage arising from the company's asbestos-containing products. Although the policies as written excluded only asbestos-related bodily injury claims, the court found that the parties had mutually intended to exclude all asbestos-related risks, consistent with the primary policies and the prior excess policy they replaced. Evidence from the underwriting process, including the insurer's selection of exclusions and the broker's expectations, established that the omission of a property damage exclusion was a mutual mistake. The court therefore reformed the policies to exclude coverage for all asbestos claims and declared that Twin City had no obligation to cover the property damage claims at issue.
