Ronald Edward Meredith

This case involves a dispute over two promissory notes issued by Onyx Arabians for the purchase of a share in an Arabian stallion and several mares under agreements governed by Kentucky law. J.P. Morgan Delaware, which received the notes by assignment after they had passed through intermediate holders, sought summary judgment as a holder in due course entitled to payment free of defenses, while Onyx raised affirmative defenses and counterclaims based on alleged breaches such as unavailability of the stallion and failure to repurchase one mare. The court held that Morgan was not a holder in due course because the notes, payable to order, lacked a required endorsement from the original payee, making Morgan a mere transferee subject to Onyx's claims and defenses under KRS 355.3-201 and 3-202. It further found that an oral agreement to repurchase one mare was enforceable as a consistent additional term not barred by the parol evidence rule, constituting a breach, while other alleged breaches regarding breeding rights were not supported. Accordingly, the court denied Morgan's motion for summary judgment and partially granted Onyx's motion.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether Jefferson County, Kentucky, qualifies as a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which would permit it to be sued in federal court for alleged civil rights violations. The court held that counties are "persons" for § 1983 purposes and allowed the plaintiff's claim to proceed. Its reasoning began with inconclusive legislative history and ambiguous analogies under Kentucky law treating counties sometimes as arms of the state and sometimes as quasi-municipal corporations; it then followed Supreme Court guidance from Monell and Will that focuses on Eleventh Amendment status, under which federal precedents uniformly treat counties as separate from the state.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involved defendants charged in a criminal matter who moved to suppress wiretap evidence obtained under a court-authorized intercept order, arguing that an FBI agent had listened to conversations without activating the recording device in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(8)(a) and 2518(5), and seeking suppression under § 2518(10)(a). The court denied both the motion to suppress the unrecorded interceptions offered by the agent and the alternative request to suppress all derived evidence. It reasoned that precedents such as United States v. Daly and United States v. Clerkley establish that a failure to record does not constitute an "unlawfully intercepted" communication warranting suppression, as the recording requirement serves an evidentiary purpose rather than protecting privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment, and the agents' conduct satisfied the minimization requirement without deliberate or repeated violations.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, a former Jefferson County employee sued the county government, fiscal court, and judge executive, alleging sex discrimination and wrongful discharge under statutes including Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, Section 1983, Section 1985, and Civil RICO, claiming the defendants used an enterprise to engage in racketeering to suppress information about the discrimination. The court first consolidated all defendants into a single entity, Jefferson County, and then granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the Civil RICO claim. The core reasoning was that a county, as a quasi-municipal corporation, does not qualify as a 'person' under 18 U.S.C. Section 1961(3) because it lacks the capacity to form the mens rea required for the predicate criminal acts, making a RICO action impossible, while other remedies remain available. The decision applied the summary judgment standards from the 1986 Celotex trilogy and declined to expand the statutory definition of 'person.'

civil rightscriminal lawprocedurelabor & employment

This case involves a products liability, breach of warranty, and negligence lawsuit brought by the family of Kenneth Ashe against boat manufacturers Sea Nymph, Inc., Outboard Marine Corporation, and Midas International Corporation following Ashe's death in a 1987 boating accident on Lake Cumberland, Kentucky. The defendants sought summary judgment, arguing that Ashe's contributory negligence barred recovery. The court granted the motion, holding that Ashe was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because he operated the boat at high speed in darkness using only a handheld spotlight on a debris-filled lake without wearing a life preserver, despite knowing the conditions and being unable to swim. The decision relied on Kentucky law, including precedent that failing to use a life preserver in obvious danger constitutes contributory negligence, and found no genuine issue of material fact for trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a hearing to determine whether defendant Pulley, who had been convicted by a jury on multiple counts of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, should be released on bond while appealing his conviction to the Sixth Circuit. The district court had already found that the defendant posed no flight risk or danger to the community and that the appeal was not for delay. The court denied the motion for bond, holding that none of the five issues raised for appeal—challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions on a missing witness, the denial of a continuance for an unavailable witness, the presence of police officers in the courtroom, and the denial of a severance motion—presented a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or a new trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b). The court reasoned that a substantial question must be a close or debatable one that would likely lead to reversal if successful, and none of the defendant's claims met that standard or were uncontrolled by precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge by Envy Ltd., operator of a cabaret featuring nude dancing, to City of Louisville Ordinance No. 320, which regulates adult entertainment establishments by restricting their operating hours from midnight to 6 a.m. and requiring detailed disclosures about owners, directors, employees, and premises ownership as a condition for licensing. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief and summary judgment, arguing that the ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments due to insufficient evidence supporting the restrictions. The court denied the motion, holding that the ordinance is a valid content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation designed to address secondary effects such as increased crime, noise, and organized crime involvement, consistent with Supreme Court precedents like Young v. American Mini Theatres and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, as it serves a substantial government interest while allowing reasonable alternative avenues of expression.

free speechbusiness & regulatory

This case involved Kentucky Agricultural Energy Corporation suing the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and Bowling Green Municipal Utilities for negligence after a power outage on December 25, 1983, caused damage to its alcohol plant equipment. The court granted summary judgment in favor of TVA. The reasoning was that TVA, as a wholesaler of electricity through distributors, owed no legal duty to the plaintiff for uninterrupted service under Kentucky law, and imposing liability would conflict with TVA's rate structure and public policy considerations regarding utility service reliability.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved claims arising from parcel inspections conducted by Jefferson County Police at the infield gates of Churchill Downs during the Kentucky Derby, as well as a separate claim that Officer Heavrin negligently prosecuted Tony Jeffers after arresting him for pills that lab results later showed were allergy medication. The court entered judgment for the defendants. It found that Churchill Downs had agreed to the searches for safety reasons after police raised concerns about injuries and prohibited items, that the procedures were reasonable and limited, and that although the officer failed to follow up on the lab report or notify prosecutors of the exonerating evidence, causing Jeffers unnecessary travel and court appearances, damages had not been established with the required specificity.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs alleging RICO violations based on a conspiracy among defendants to defraud them of interests in certain oil and gas leases known as the Sullivan lease. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the claims with prejudice, while granting the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint but without requiring service on new defendants or further answers. The core reasoning was that res judicata barred the federal RICO action because a prior state court judgment had found no fraud by the central figure in the alleged scheme, and RICO jurisdiction is concurrent with state courts so the claim could have been raised there; other pending motions were denied as moot.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In United States v. Webb, defendants Morris Wayne Webb and Debby Buchanan faced a superseding indictment under the federal mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1341) for allegedly participating in a scheme to submit fraudulent absentee ballots in a Kentucky sheriff's election to help secure the salary and benefits of a favored candidate. Following the Supreme Court's decision in McNally v. United States, which limited mail fraud prosecutions to schemes involving money or property, the defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing it failed to allege such a loss. The district court overruled the motion, holding that the indictment properly alleged a scheme to deprive the Commonwealth of Kentucky of its money through the payment of salary to an official elected via tainted ballots, and that the jury could be instructed accordingly to satisfy McNally's requirements.

criminal lawelections

This case involved two high school seniors suspended for five days and barred from extracurricular activities, including baseball, after admitting to possessing and consuming alcohol at a Beta Club convention in violation of the Glasgow Independent Schools Discipline Code and Handbook. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction under Rule 65 to reverse the suspensions, claiming inadequate notice, procedural unfairness, and harm to their grades and college prospects, while the defendants moved to dismiss. The court denied the injunction and granted summary judgment to the school district and principal, concluding that the students had received proper notice of the rules through the handbook and principal's announcements, were afforded due process via individual hearings with the principal, and that the policy was correctly enforced. The core reasoning focused on the clear prohibition in the code, the students' admissions, and the lack of likelihood of success on the merits for any constitutional or procedural claims.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involved a former plant manager, Walter Harvey, who was terminated at age 46 from his position at a manufacturing facility owned by I.T.W., Inc. and sued his employer alleging age discrimination under Kentucky Revised Statute 344.040 along with claims of outrageous conduct, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, tortious interference with employment, and gross negligence. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims with prejudice. It reasoned that Harvey failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because the termination was based on legitimate non-discriminatory factors such as inventory control problems, a personal conflict with a subordinate, and efforts to reduce overhead, and that as an at-will employee the remaining tort claims lacked any supporting contractual duty or outrageous conduct.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

The case concerned Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. appealing a bankruptcy court order in the Chapter 11 reorganization of debtors Kenneth Ray George and Alberta Whitt George that denied the bank post-petition interest on its secured claims and limited its contractual attorney's fees to the excess value of the collateral. The district court affirmed the denial of post-petition interest beyond the collateral value, applying 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) which generally bars unmatured interest after filing and § 506(b) which permits such interest only to the extent a creditor is oversecured. The court reversed on attorney's fees, however, ruling that while § 506(b) caps the secured portion at the excess collateral value, the remainder could be allowed as an unsecured claim under § 502(b)(1) if valid under state law, consistent with the treatment of other unsecured claims in the solvent estate. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved Thomas Webster suing Allstate Insurance Company after his 1984 termination from a claims representative position, alleging breach of an implied employment contract with a covenant of good faith, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (including retaliation for refusing to participate in a criminal act related to an odometer statement on a vehicle title), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The action, removed to federal court on diversity grounds and governed by Kentucky law, centered on the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint, the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and a motion to compel documents. The court denied the motion to amend as futile, granted summary judgment to Allstate, and dismissed the remaining motion as moot, reasoning that Kentucky follows the employment-at-will doctrine with only narrow public policy exceptions that did not apply, there was no express contract limiting termination to for-cause reasons, and the alleged conduct did not meet the threshold for outrageous conduct or a fundamental public policy violation.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved debtor Sharon Brooks, who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and sought to avoid a judicial lien held by Commercial Credit Corporation on her residence under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), claiming a $5,000 homestead exemption under Kentucky law. The Bankruptcy Court granted the motion to avoid the lien, but the District Court reversed that order on appeal and remanded the case. The court held that Kentucky has opted out of the federal exemption scheme, so exemptions are governed by state law under K.R.S. 427.060, which explicitly bars the homestead exemption for debts that predate the purchase of the property. Because the debt here was reduced to judgment in 1974 and the property was acquired in 1979, no exemption applied, meaning the lien did not impair an allowable exemption and could not be avoided under federal bankruptcy law.

propertyprocedure

This case involved a seaman, Richard Burden, and his wife suing his employer, Evansville Materials, Inc., for damages from a lower back injury allegedly sustained while moving heavy coiled cables on a tugboat on the Ohio River. The claims were brought under the Jones Act for negligence and under general maritime law for unseaworthiness, seeking compensation for lost wages, pain and suffering, medical expenses, maintenance and cure, and loss of society. After a bench trial, the court found the defendant negligent but determined that Burden was 80% contributorily negligent for using an improper lifting method instead of the known shouldering technique, leading to an award of $104,268.34 to Burden (after reduction) and $4,000 to his wife, with credits for prior payments. The ruling treated certain post-maximum medical recovery expenses as compensatory damages subject to the comparative fault reduction rather than as cure.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case was a diversity action in which a manufacturer, after settling a products liability suit brought by an injured employee, sought indemnity from the employer for the settlement amount and expenses. The central issue was whether Kentucky Revised Statute 342.690(1) limits an employer's potential indemnity liability to a third-party tortfeasor to the amount of workers' compensation benefits the employer owes the employee. The court analyzed Kentucky precedents including Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co. and Burrell v. Electric Plant Board, noting that the statute's exclusive remedy provision applies and that comparative fault or full indemnity claims beyond workers' compensation payments are not permitted. It concluded that the employer's liability to indemnify is capped at the workers' compensation benefits, while observing the difficulty of proving secondary negligence by the manufacturer in such settings.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved the U.S. Secretary of Labor alleging that Kentucky Ridge Mining Co., Inc., its owner Letcher White, and Norton Minerals, Inc. violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay minimum wages and overtime to 31 employees who mined coal in Kentucky from July to August 1985. After an evidentiary hearing, the court granted a preliminary injunction that bars further FLSA violations and requires the coal produced in violation of the Act, stored at three sites, to be sold under court supervision with proceeds deposited in the court registry and advance notice to the Department of Labor. The ruling rests on findings that the employees were underpaid, the coal was mined in interstate commerce, and the injunction was needed to maintain the status quo and prevent irreparable harm from asset dissipation or unfair competition.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory