In this case, former employees sued their union, Local 542, alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, seeking compensatory and punitive damages along with a jury trial. The suit arose under a long-standing 1979 Judgment and Decree from an earlier class-action case against the union, which appointed a Special Master to adjudicate individual discrimination claims and provide remedies. Plaintiffs moved to remove the Special Master, arguing bias due to his ongoing relationship with the union and that his involvement would improperly burden their right to a jury trial. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, finding no basis to remove the Special Master but clarifying that plaintiffs retained the right to a full jury trial afterward and were not limited to evidence presented to the Special Master. The decision rested on the absence of any legal or factual showing of bias and the effect of the 1991 Title VII amendments granting jury trial rights for damages claims.
In Colbert v. Angstadt, an African-American plaintiff sued the City of Reading and its police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related statutes, claiming that officers filed criminal charges against him for assault and disorderly conduct without probable cause following an altercation at a Rite Aid store. The plaintiff also alleged conspiracy, failure to train police officers, and state law violations related to his arrest and detention. The court granted the municipal defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of probable cause for the charges, no evidence of a conspiracy or inadequate training, and that the state claims failed for similar reasons. The court denied other pending motions as moot or granted them as procedural matters.
This case involves plaintiff Ronald D. Ricci's challenge to the Social Security Administration's denial of Adult Child’s Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, based on his claim of disability due to schizophrenia prior to his twenty-second birthday in 1977. The court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment following an ALJ's determination, after a hearing, that Ricci lacked a medically determinable impairment meeting the Act's requirements before that date. The court granted the Commissioner's motion and denied Ricci's, holding that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the rejection of certain witness testimony and no requirement to consult a medical advisor under SSR 83-20. The ruling emphasized that findings of fact by the ALJ are conclusive if backed by substantial evidence and that the plaintiff must show continuous disability from before age 22.
This case involves a dispute between Local 234 and its parent international union TWU over the latter's imposition of a trusteeship on the local following charges of financial malpractice, subversion of union democracy, and internal board discord. After an 18-day hearing process that included testimony from over 25 witnesses, the international union's executive council found 15 charges proven and imposed the trusteeship. Local 234 filed suit seeking to block enforcement while TWU counterclaimed for a preliminary injunction to enforce it. The court granted TWU's motion, reasoning that under the LMRDA a trusteeship is presumptively valid if imposed in accordance with the union constitution after a fair hearing and for a permissible purpose, and Local 234 had not rebutted that presumption.
This case involves a bankruptcy appeal arising from a construction subcontract dispute on a SEPTA railroad rehabilitation project. Debtor Cornell subcontracted painting work to Seaway, which assigned its rights to D.L. Smith; after delays, payment issues, and D.L. Smith's eventual departure, Cornell hired Seaway to complete the work and both filed unsecured claims in Cornell's Chapter 11 proceeding, leading to a trial on breach, retainage, and damages claims among the parties after partial settlements. The Bankruptcy Court disallowed D.L. Smith's claim for retainage, found final acceptance of most work performed, denied most damages and back-charges, and awarded Cornell only $1,160 on its breach claim. On appeal, the District Court remanded for further proceedings, identifying errors in the calculation of work completed (including failure to account for an outstanding balance) and the determination of retainage due, while upholding the need to reassess damages attributable to completing the subcontract.
This case is a judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of supplemental security income benefits to plaintiff Donna L. Colavito under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The plaintiff, born in 1948 with a tenth-grade education and no recent work history, alleged disability from depression, heart palpitations, arthritis, and degenerative disc disease beginning in 1989. The ALJ found she was not disabled, determining she retained the capacity for simple, low-stress jobs like janitor or packer at light or medium levels, and the Magistrate Judge recommended upholding this based on substantial evidence in the record. The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation, holding that its review was limited to whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence without reweighing the evidence or substituting its judgment.