Wendell Alverson Miles

In Mitchell v. Jones, petitioner Robert Cleveland Mitchell III sought federal habeas corpus relief from his state criminal conviction, primarily challenging the prosecution's use of a 911 tape recording as violating due process because it allegedly constituted false or fabricated evidence. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denying the petition in full. The court reasoned that the magistrate correctly analyzed the claim under Napue v. Illinois standards for false evidence, as the petitioner provided no proof the tape was inauthentic and trial counsel had not objected to its admission. Additional objections, including the denial of an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel, were rejected because AEDPA strictly limits such hearings when factual bases were not developed in state court and no qualifying exceptions applied.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves plaintiff Cherri Lawson-Brewster's claims against her former employer, River Valley School District, and supervisor Jose Vera, alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act, Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (including sexual harassment and retaliation), Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act, and Worker's Disability Compensation Act. The defendants filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of Vera's alleged prior misconduct, including terminations from previous employers for sexual harassment and alcohol use, as well as an off-duty incident with another employee. The court granted the motion, finding the evidence irrelevant to the plaintiff's claims because she was unaware of it during her employment, it did not logically establish motive or credibility regarding the alleged harassment or termination, and any probative value was substantially outweighed by risks of prejudice, confusion, and the need for mini-trials on collateral issues under Federal Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and 404(b).

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involves plaintiff D'Angelo's appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's final decision denying his claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income based on conditions including a heart murmur, back issues, and osteoarthritis. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, reversing the Commissioner's decision and remanding the matter for further proceedings. The core reasoning was that the administrative law judge's reliance on vocational expert testimony was unclear as to whether it supported a step-four finding that the plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a machine operator or a step-five finding regarding other available jobs, and additional medical records needed to be obtained for proper evaluation.

healthcareprocedure

In this case, prisoner Gregory Poindexter sued prison warden Kenneth McKee and factory supervisor Kenneth Moore under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights along with state-law assault and battery claims stemming from Moore kicking his ankle and striking him with time cards while he worked in a prison furniture factory. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, granting Moore's motion for summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The core reasoning was that Moore did not act with malicious or sadistic intent to cause harm, as his actions were intended to enforce rules and protect equipment, and Poindexter suffered only de minimis injury with no serious harm. The court had previously granted McKee's motion for summary judgment on a separate retaliation claim.

civil rightscriminal law

In this diversity case, plaintiff Teresa Hendricks sued DSW Shoe Warehouse on behalf of herself and a putative class of Michigan customers, alleging that DSW breached contracts and violated the Michigan Consumer Protection Act by failing to adequately safeguard personal financial data that was later stolen by an unauthorized third party; she sought damages for the cost of credit monitoring services purchased to protect against identity theft. The court granted DSW's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to allege any actual injury, such as fraudulent charges on her accounts or damage to her credit, and instead based her claim solely on the cost of preventive monitoring, which was insufficient to establish damages or standing as a class representative; the court also found no legal duty under the MCPA and that the contract claims did not support the requested relief.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Hagen v. VPA, Inc., a former Pepsi employee sued the provider of his long-term disability insurance policy under ERISA section 502(a) after benefits were discontinued, also asserting state-law claims for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and bad faith. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). It held that ERISA section 514 preempts the state-law claims because they relate to an employee benefit plan. The ERISA claim was dismissed because the complaint failed to allege exhaustion of administrative remedies, the plaintiff was properly notified of appeal procedures, the exhibits did not support equitable tolling or a futility exception, and the time for administrative review had expired.

labor & employmenthealthcareprocedure

This case involved two Michigan hospitals challenging the denial of Medicare reimbursement for bad debts arising from unpaid beneficiary deductibles and coinsurance on their 1999 cost reports. After the fiscal intermediary disallowed the claims, the Provider Reimbursement Review Board ruled in the hospitals' favor, but the Deputy Administrator of CMS reversed that decision, holding that the debts did not qualify as uncollectible because collection efforts had not fully ceased. Applying the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the court upheld the Secretary's interpretation of the Medicare regulations as reasonable and consistent with program rules requiring providers to either continue pursuing debts or stop collection efforts after 120 days. The court therefore denied the hospitals' motion for summary judgment and granted the Secretary's cross-motion, affirming the denial of reimbursement.

healthcarefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This diversity product liability case arose after plaintiff Sonya Napier suffered injury from a splinter allegedly from arsenic-treated wood on her deck, with plaintiffs unable to identify which manufacturer produced the specific product and seeking to hold three defendant companies liable under alternative liability and concert-of-action theories. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), denied plaintiffs' request for additional discovery, and dismissed the action with prejudice. Michigan law requires plaintiffs to identify the injury-causing product and its manufacturer as a threshold element of any products liability claim. Although Abel v. Eli Lilly had recognized an alternative-liability exception, subsequent amendments to Michigan tort statutes, including M.C.L. § 600.2957, eliminated that exception by mandating proof of fault attributable to named parties or properly noticed nonparties.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved plaintiff Herbert Armitage, an IT Support Specialist at Indiana Michigan Power Company (AEP), who sued his employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for unpaid overtime wages. After granting summary judgment on liability in the plaintiff's favor, the court held a bench trial on damages and found that AEP had improperly reclassified Armitage as an exempt employee without a substantial change in his primarily manual duties of maintaining and repairing security equipment at a nuclear plant. The court determined that the reclassification was based on a flawed company-wide IT restructuring process that did not accurately assess the employee's actual job functions or FLSA exemption criteria. As a result, the court awarded the plaintiff $9,759.16 in damages for overtime hours worked.

labor & employment

The case involved employees at a nuclear power plant, classified as 'planners' by their employer Indiana Michigan Power Co., who sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act alleging they were improperly denied overtime pay for workweeks exceeding 40 hours because they were wrongly classified as exempt from the FLSA's overtime requirements. The court granted the employer's motion for partial summary judgment and denied the employees' cross-motion, ruling that the planners qualified for the administrative exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a). The core reasoning was that the planners' duties in preparing maintenance work orders, conducting field walk-downs, and exercising discretion in determining job requirements were directly related to the employer's management policies and general business operations, and involved the exercise of discretion and independent judgment, rather than routine manual or clerical tasks. The court found no genuine issue of material fact on this exemption and noted the professional exemption did not apply.

labor & employment

The case involved a state court in Michigan sanctioning Medicare for failing to send a representative to a settlement conference in a personal injury lawsuit stemming from a skiing accident. The Secretary of Health and Human Services removed the matter to federal court and sought to vacate the sanctions order. The federal court granted the motion, reasoning that the state court lacked jurisdiction to compel the appearance of federal officials or impose sanctions on Medicare due to principles of sovereign immunity and the absence of any federal claim or party status in the underlying action.

federal powerprocedurehealthcaretorts & liability

This case involves a 1993 state court personal injury lawsuit by plaintiff Lawrence Hoste against Shanty Creek Management arising from a 1990 skiing accident, during which the parties sought to settle amid various lien claims including one by Medicare. After the state court ordered Medicare to send a representative to a settlement conference and later sanctioned Medicare (upon its nonappearance) by barring it from asserting its lien on any judgment or settlement proceeds, the Secretary of Health and Human Services removed the action to federal court and moved to vacate the sanctions order. The federal district court denied the plaintiff's motion for a full remand, instead retaining jurisdiction solely over the Medicare sanctions issues while partially remanding the underlying personal injury claims against Shanty Creek. The court reasoned that federal removal jurisdiction existed because the state sanctions order directly affected federal statutory rights and the United States' claimed interest in personal property under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and 1444, and that supplemental jurisdiction principles supported keeping only the federal aspects of the case.

procedurefederal powerhealthcaretorts & liability

This case involves a diversity action by homeowners (the McRoys) and their insurer Citizens against Sears and parts maker MHP seeking recovery for property damage and injuries from a 1996 house fire that originated in an outdoor gas grill serviced by Sears. Plaintiffs alleged that Sears' installation of a replacement burner assembly under a maintenance agreement and other servicing caused a venturi to disconnect, leading to the fire, while defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motions, holding that Sears neither manufactured nor sold the grill, fulfilled any contractual repair obligations since the appliance worked for over three years afterward, and had no duty to warn or replace beyond what was provided; evidence showed the disconnection likely stemmed from users bumping the grill or manually reconnecting the propane tank without using the bracket. The opinion noted the original manufacturer's warnings about clearances, movement, and leaks, and addressed potential evidence issues but found no triable claim against the defendants.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Schultz v. Ary, plaintiff Randall Schultz, a Michigan resident employed by Roche as a pharmaceutical sales representative, sued Roche and Kenneth Ary (a Texas resident) after Ary reported that Schultz had made a racial slur during an after-hours pool game at a New Jersey hotel while both were attending a work training session; the report led to Schultz's termination, and he asserted claims including reverse discrimination under Title VII, defamation, and tortious interference. Defendant Ary moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Ary, as his uncontroverted affidavit showed no contacts with Michigan and the events occurred elsewhere. Instead of immediate dismissal, the court raised the possibility of transferring the entire case to the District of New Jersey or Southern District of Texas and directed the parties to confer or brief the venue issue.

procedurecivil rightstorts & liability

This diversity case involved a dispute over insurance coverage for tort claims arising from a 1997 car accident in Ohio, where a driver rented a vehicle from Save-A-Buck and injured passengers. Church Mutual, which insured the driver's employer, sought a declaratory judgment that Save-A-Buck as the vehicle owner was primarily responsible for defense and coverage, had unlimited liability, and that Church's policy was excess. The court held that under Michigan's financial responsibility law and the rental agreement, Save-A-Buck's duty was limited to providing the statutory minimum coverage of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per accident, with no obligation to extend its excess policy to the driver. Any additional coverage from Save-A-Buck was not considered valid and collectible insurance available to the driver under Church's policy terms, so Church's obligations were not triggered as excess beyond those minimums.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

Charlevoix Country Club, Inc. (CCC), a Subchapter S corporation, developed a golf course, country club, and residential lots, selling the lots and club memberships while retaining ownership of the recreational facilities. CCC sought to allocate a portion of its development costs for the golf course and country club to the tax basis of the lots sold and memberships in order to reduce reported taxable gain on its 1993-1995 returns. The IRS disallowed the allocation, determining that the basis for each lot should reflect only costs directly allocable to it, which increased CCC's taxable gain, and CCC paid additional tax before suing for a refund. The court granted summary judgment to the IRS, holding that because CCC retained complete ownership and control over the facilities without transferring any ownership interest to lot buyers or members, the development costs could not be allocated away from those assets under tax law principles that assign each asset its own basis.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryproperty

In this case, plaintiff Gene A. Rutherford Jr., a deckhand employed by defendant Lake Michigan Contractors, Inc., alleged that he suffered back injuries on August 20, 1997, while handing heavy steel cables between a tugboat and barge during dredging operations on the Genesee River. He brought claims for negligence under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness under general admiralty and maritime law. On the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the adequacy of the vessel's equipment or crew size but finding factual disputes remained on other elements such as maintenance and cure obligations. The core reasoning applied the summary judgment standard under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), requiring the plaintiff to produce evidence beyond mere allegations to show a triable issue under the applicable maritime standards.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

In this employment discrimination case, plaintiff Barbara Green alleged that her employer, General Motors, violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act by disciplining her more harshly than male employees for her involvement in two physical altercations at work on April 15, 1996. Green, who admitted striking the first blow in the initial fight and participating actively in the second, received a total of 44 days of disciplinary layoff (later reduced via grievance settlement), and she pointed to several male coworkers who received lesser penalties for fights as evidence of gender bias. The court granted GM’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court determined that Green had not identified sufficiently similar male comparables or otherwise raised a genuine issue of material fact showing that the discipline was motivated by her gender rather than the specific circumstances of the incidents.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this case, plaintiff Anthony Workman sued his former employer, United Fixtures Company, for wrongful termination in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, and sued his union, Local 7 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, for failing to fairly represent him during the grievance process over his discharge. The action, originally filed in state court, was removed to federal court under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants' motions, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The core reasoning was that the union and company had validly settled the grievance through a last chance agreement after the third disciplinary offense within a short period, earlier disciplines had not been grieved, and the plaintiff failed to establish any breach of the duty of fair representation or violation of the agreement as a matter of law.

labor & employment

This case involved a dispute over insurance coverage for tort claims arising from a 1997 car accident in Ohio, where Carol Goodwin, driving a rental vehicle from Save-A-Buck, injured passengers while working for Zion Lutheran Church. Church Mutual, Zion's insurer, sought a declaratory judgment that Save-A-Buck was primarily responsible for defending and indemnifying Goodwin, with unlimited liability under Michigan law, and that Church's excess coverage would apply only after Save-A-Buck's obligations were exhausted. The court denied Church's motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that the liability limitation provision in Save-A-Buck's standard rental agreement, which capped coverage at statutory minimum financial responsibility limits, was not unenforceable as a matter of law, leaving open the possibility that Save-A-Buck's obligations were limited after meeting minimum requirements.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory