This case was a patent infringement suit in which Black & Decker alleged that Disston infringed U.S. Patent No. 3,757,194 on a cordless electric hedge trimmer by selling several models with a removable battery pack design. Disston defended on the ground that the patent was invalid for obviousness in light of prior art including the earlier Riley patent, various battery-powered tools, and consumer electronics. The court reviewed the patent claims, the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the claimed invention and that art, and the circumstances of the invention's development. It incorporated its findings of fact and conclusions of law into the opinion and denied an ancillary request concerning attorney's fees.
In this bankruptcy case, the IRS levied on the debtor's property for unpaid taxes prior to the filing of the petition but later entered a court-approved stipulation surrendering the assets to the receiver-trustee for sale in exchange for payment of the tax liens from the proceeds. The Bankruptcy Court denied the government's petition seeking penalties and post-petition interest on those liens, but the District Court reversed. The court held that the property did not become part of the bankrupt estate upon the surrender, so the Bankruptcy Act's bar on penalties under Section 57(j) did not apply and the government could collect the additional amounts. The reasoning centered on the stipulation's limited scope, which did not transfer the property into the estate or subject the claims to bankruptcy distribution rules, and on precedent indicating that lienholders retain priority rights outside the Act when they surrender possession.
This case involved the Secretary of Labor seeking enforcement of an administrative compensation order under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, requiring Barnes & Tucker Company to pay Black Lung benefits to a miner determined to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, including reimbursement for prior payments by the Department of Labor. The company had not appealed the order to the Benefits Review Board and had failed to comply with its payment and reimbursement obligations. In granting the Secretary's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the company could not raise defenses regarding its status as an operator or the timeliness of the claim in this enforcement action, as those issues had already been decided administratively and the district court's authority under 33 U.S.C. § 921(d) is limited to checking for procedural defects rather than reviewing the merits. The statutory scheme channels substantive review exclusively to the Benefits Review Board and courts of appeals.
In Jackson v. Armstrong School District, two female teachers sued their school district employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, claiming sex discrimination in pay and working conditions because they coached women's basketball and received lower compensation than coaches of men's basketball. The court dismissed the PHRA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On the Title VII claim, the court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim because any disparity was not based on the plaintiffs' own sex, as male and female coaches of women's basketball were paid identically, and Title VII requires discrimination against an individual because of that individual's sex.
In this case, United States Steel sought a preliminary injunction under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act to halt a work stoppage by members of the United Mine Workers at its Robena Mine Complex in Pennsylvania. The stoppage began after roving pickets from West Virginia created fear among the local miners through threats and harassment, leading the union local to vote to cease work until safety could be assured; the action was unrelated to any dispute with USS management or the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The court denied the injunction, holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act generally bars federal courts from enjoining work stoppages and that the narrow Boys Markets exception did not apply because the underlying dispute was not subject to the agreement's mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures. The court further found that the stoppage was a sympathy action rooted in tradition and fear of external pickets rather than support for the West Virginia dispute or any arbitrable issue with the employer.
This case under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act concerned whether Dunlo Construction Company, engaged in salvaging coal from mine refuse piles under the 1971 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, was required to pay royalties into the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund for the coal it produced and sold. The court determined that Dunlo was obligated to make the contributions for the recoverable coal tonnage at the rates specified in the agreement, awarding the trustees $9,960.25 plus interest. The reasoning centered on the agreement's broad language requiring payments for each ton of coal produced for use or sale, the fact that the processed refuse yielded marketable coal, Dunlo's partial prior payments and contractual responsibility for royalties in its supply deals, and the absence of any exclusion for coal derived from refuse.
