This case involves a coverage dispute under a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by Continental Western to Shay Construction. Shay sought coverage for defense and damages arising from cross-claims by general contractor Milender White alleging breaches of subcontracts on a Colorado construction project, including defective work, delays, and failure to pay subcontractors. Continental Western filed suit for a declaratory judgment that the policy provided no coverage and moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, holding that the claims fell within policy exclusions (j)(5) and (j)(6) for property damage arising from the insured's faulty or defective work while ongoing, applying Colorado contract law to interpret the policy terms. On reconsideration, the court found its prior conclusions reasonable and not clearly erroneous.
This case concerned whether Xcel Energy was required to obtain a Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) determination for mercury emissions under Clean Air Act section 112(g) before constructing its Comanche 3 coal-fired power plant, particularly after the D.C. Circuit invalidated EPA's delisting rule in New Jersey v. EPA. The court dismissed WildEarth Guardians' claims with prejudice, including requests for penalties and fees, after finding that Xcel had obtained MACT determinations prior to and during construction and that no continuing violation occurred. The core reasoning was that retroactive application of section 112(g) was inappropriate under the facts, including Xcel's compliance efforts and a settlement extending MACT standards to existing facilities, and that other cases cited by the plaintiff were distinguishable because those defendants had never sought MACT approvals.
This case involves a copyright infringement claim by a residential design firm against a construction company and its owners, alleging that a home built by the defendants copied the firm's protected house plans for designs HDS-2089 and its derivative HDS-1758. The court addressed the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and a related motion to strike evidence. It granted summary judgment in part, holding the individual defendants vicariously liable for the company's actions and rejecting affirmative defenses based on a third-party draftsman's role, but denied summary judgment on other issues including copyright validity, infringement, and statute of limitations due to factual disputes over discovery of the alleged copying and other elements. The motion to strike was denied without prejudice.
The case concerned plaintiff Nathan Laidley's challenge to Denver's municipal Impoundment Ordinance and Costs Ordinance, which authorize police to seize a vehicle when the driver lacks a valid license and require posting a $2,500 bond plus fees for release or risk forfeiture. Laidley, who had his car impounded after a traffic stop and later pleaded guilty to driving without a license, alleged that the ordinances were invalid and that the seizure violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court denied Denver's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the claims arose under federal law, but granted summary judgment to Denver. It reasoned that the impoundment was supported by probable cause from the traffic violation and that the ordinances were consistent with state law and did not effect an unconstitutional seizure or deprivation of property.
This case is a personal injury lawsuit in which plaintiff Wayne Watson alleges that his bronchiolitis obliterans and related lung conditions resulted from daily inhalation of butter flavoring chemicals in microwave popcorn he consumed over seven years. The defendants, including manufacturers Gilster-Mary Lee and Birds Eye and retailers Dillon Companies and Kroger, moved for summary judgment and to exclude portions of the plaintiffs' expert testimony on causation. The court denied summary judgment, concluding that factual disputes remain on general and specific causation, the adequacy of warnings, and whether the manufacturers' conduct was reckless in light of worker health studies from NIOSH and others. It also granted in part and denied in part the Daubert-style motions to exclude experts, admitting most testimony while limiting one expert's opinions on minimum exposure thresholds.
This case involved environmental groups challenging the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's withdrawal of a proposed rule to list Graham’s penstemon as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act, citing threats from oil and gas development, livestock grazing, and off-road vehicles. The court reviewed the agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act to assess whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court granted the petition, vacated the 2006 Final Rule withdrawing the listing, and remanded the matter to the agency for further consideration. The core reasoning was that the agency failed to evaluate the combined impacts of identified threats, disregarded the best available scientific information on those threats, and relied on conservation measures that were neither implemented nor shown to be effective.