The case involved a wrongful death claim by the plaintiff, as administratrix of her decedent's estate, against Trans World Airlines arising from injuries sustained during an April 1956 international flight from Chicago to Athens that allegedly caused the decedent's death in September 1958. The suit was filed in September 1959 and later amended to allege willful and wanton misconduct. The court dismissed the action, holding that it was governed by the Warsaw Convention and was untimely under Article 29, which extinguishes the right to damages if an action is not brought within two years from the date of arrival or when the aircraft ought to have arrived. The court concluded that Article 25's provision lifting liability limits for willful misconduct does not affect or extend the strict two-year limitations period in Article 29, which applies regardless of whether the claim is based on negligence or more culpable conduct.
This case involved a Canadian steamship company filing a libel against the City of Chicago for damage to its vessel Torondoc, with the city filing a cross-libel for damage to the Dearborn Street Bridge, arising from an incident where the ship passed through the bridge in the Chicago River. The court made findings of fact regarding the navigation of the ship, the operation of the bridge, compliance with regulations on signals and lights, and the involvement of a tug. It concluded by examining admiralty principles on the division of damages when both parties are at fault, considering rules such as equal division versus allocation based on degrees of fault. The court reasoned that traditional admiralty doctrine requires mutual wrongdoers to share damages equally, while discussing potential alternatives and their implications.
This case involved a civil antitrust action in which plaintiff A.C. Becken Co. alleged that defendant Gemex Corporation's illegal refusal to deal caused plaintiff lost profits on sales of Gemex watchbands. Following a remand from the Seventh Circuit, the district court reviewed the existing record and additional evidence to calculate damages. The court determined that plaintiff's prima facie loss estimate of $56,475.95 required reductions for salesmen's commissions and other non-defendant factors, but not for general expenses, cash discounts, or certain inventory costs, resulting in a final damages figure of $24,764.68. It concluded that plaintiff was entitled to recover treble damages of $74,294.04 under the antitrust laws, with damages not limited to the period before the complaint was filed.
The case involved Edward A. Hintz, who was indicted under 2 U.S.C. § 192 for willfully defaulting on a Senate Banking and Currency Committee summons by appearing but refusing to be sworn or testify at a 1956 hearing on matters under inquiry pursuant to Senate rules and resolutions. Hintz moved to dismiss, contending the indictment was fatally inconsistent because it alleged both that he had appeared and that he made default, and that the statute's willful default and refusal-to-answer branches created distinct offenses that his conduct could not violate simultaneously. The court rejected these arguments and upheld the indictment, reasoning that the statute punishes any willful failure to give testimony in response to a valid congressional summons, that refusal to be sworn qualifies as such a default, and that the charging language sufficiently covered both statutory branches as interpreted in United States v. Bryan.
This case involved Parmelee Transportation Company suing defendants including competitor John L. Keeshin, his company, railroads, and others for alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in the 1955 award of a contract for interstation passenger and baggage transfer services among Chicago's railroad terminals. The court entered judgment for the defendants. The core reasoning was that the transfer service created a lawful monopoly under Supreme Court precedent, and alleged improper inducements such as promises of regulatory favors did not convert the competitive bidding process or contract award into an antitrust violation, since the Sherman Act does not cover all torts or unrelated misconduct but only conduct that restricts or monopolizes trade.
This case involved a personal injury lawsuit arising from a car accident, in which the plaintiff sought $150,000 in damages and the defendants denied negligence, contributory negligence, and the extent of injuries. The court had previously ordered separate trials on liability and damages under local Rule 21, which permits bifurcation to promote efficiency. After a jury found the defendants liable, the court discharged that jury and scheduled the damages trial for a later date before a new jury, rather than proceeding immediately with the same jury. The decision rested on the need to allow time for settlement negotiations, additional medical examinations, and preparation, consistent with Rule 21's goals of expediting justice without imposing hardship or undue delay, while noting that a liability verdict is not immediately appealable.