Lynn Tewksbury sued private physicians Frank Dowling and Thomas Aronson after her involuntary psychiatric commitment at St. John's Episcopal Hospital under New York Mental Hygiene Law § 9.37, claiming violations of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights along with state-law claims of medical malpractice, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. The defendants moved for summary judgment, while Tewksbury cross-moved to strike their qualified immunity defense. The court denied the defendants' motions and granted Tewksbury's cross-motion, ruling that the private physicians were not entitled to qualified immunity even if they qualified as state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The decision rested on Supreme Court precedent in Richardson v. McKnight holding that private actors do not automatically receive qualified immunity, and on the finding that a cited state case addressed privilege rather than immunity from suit.
This case involves an action by the State of New York under CERCLA to recover cleanup costs at the Blydenburgh Landfill from National Service Industries, Inc. (NSI), based on NSI's alleged status as the corporate successor to Serv-All Uniform Rental Corporation, which had arranged for illegal disposal of hazardous PCE waste at the site in 1978. NSI moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims, arguing it was not Serv-All's legal successor, while the State cross-moved for partial summary judgment to strike NSI's successor-liability defense and for a declaratory judgment of successor status. The court denied NSI's motion and granted the State's, applying the Second Circuit's "substantial continuity" test for CERCLA successor liability and finding that NSI (via its acquisition of Initial Service Investments) had purchased substantially all of Serv-All's assets, continued its business operations, retained key personnel and customer contracts, and assumed the same liabilities in a manner that made it a substantial continuation of the predecessor entity.
Plaintiff Gerald Rafferty, a commodities floor broker and member of the New York Mercantile Exchange, sued the NYMEX Long-Term Disability Income Plan and its insurer under ERISA after his claim for benefits due to a lumbar spine condition was denied. The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plan was not an ERISA "employee benefit plan" as Rafferty was not an employee of NYMEX. The court granted the motion, holding that Rafferty was not an employee because he paid his own premiums, performed no work for NYMEX during the 1990s when the policy was in effect, and his membership in the exchange did not establish an employment relationship under ERISA's definitions or common-law tests. The court further ruled the plan was not governed by ERISA and denied any remand to state court since the action had been originally filed in federal court rather than removed.
This case involves a dispute among members of Kathleen's Bake Shop, LLC, a limited liability company formed to expand a famous Southampton bake shop business. Plaintiffs Robert and Kevin Weber, who own two-thirds of the LLC, sued defendant Kathleen King (the one-third owner) and others for breach of contract, interference with business relations, and related claims arising from alleged efforts to disrupt the company's operations and force a default on promissory notes used to purchase their interests. The court addressed whether the LLC itself was an indispensable party under procedural rules requiring its joinder. The court determined that the LLC was indispensable because the claims concerned harms to the company and its assets, in which members hold no direct ownership interest under New York LLC law, and the action could not proceed without it as the real party in interest. Accordingly, the action was subject to dismissal for failure to join the LLC.
The case involved a town employee suing his supervisor and the town for sexual harassment under Title VII and state law, defamation from a false police report, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and various federal civil rights violations, based on allegations that the supervisor threatened his job to continue an intimate relationship after he ended it and engaged in hostile conduct including an altercation at a work site. The court granted the supervisor's motion to dismiss the Title VII claim, the emotional distress claim, and certain federal civil rights claims under §§ 1981a, 1983, 1985(3), and 1988, but denied dismissal of the state sexual harassment claim under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 and the defamation claim. The rulings rested on review of the amended complaint and incorporated fact-finder's report, determining that some claims failed to state a viable cause of action while others sufficiently alleged actionable conduct.
The case involved Santana Products, Inc. suing Sylvester & Associates, Ltd. and Frederick E. Sylvester for alleged violations of the Sherman Act, Lanham Act, and New York Donnelly Antitrust Act. Santana claimed the defendants conspired with others to exclude its high-density polyethylene toilet partitions from the market by spreading false information about fire hazards and by distributing misleading advertising materials comparing products. The court granted the defendants' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings while denying the rest of the motions, including requests for a more definite statement. The core reasoning addressed the statute of limitations for antitrust claims based on acts outside the statutory period and the insufficiency of allegations regarding conspiracy to monopolize or shared monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.