Donald W. Molloy

Timothy Blixseth sued his former attorney Steven Brown, Brown's law firm, and other defendants alleging misconduct by Brown as chair of the Unsecured Creditors Committee in Blixseth's bankruptcy proceedings, including claims of legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and related tort and contract theories. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the Barton Doctrine required Blixseth to obtain leave from the bankruptcy court before suing bankruptcy-appointed or approved officers for acts taken in their official capacity. The court reasoned that the doctrine centralizes bankruptcy-related litigation in the forum most familiar with the proceedings to avoid inconsistent rulings and collateral attacks on the bankruptcy court's decisions.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved environmental groups challenging a 2008 Fish and Wildlife Service rule that revised management of nonessential experimental gray wolves in the northern Rockies under the Endangered Species Act, easing the standard for states and tribes to remove wolves that impact ungulate populations. After Congress enacted Section 1713 of the 2011 Appropriations Act directing reissuance of a delisting rule, the court dismissed the ESA claims for lack of jurisdiction because they were moot as to wolf populations in Montana and Idaho. On the NEPA claims, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the Service's environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact adequately explained why the rule change would not have significant environmental effects and was not arbitrary or capricious.

environment

The case concerned a challenge to Section 1713 of the Department of Defense and Full Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011, which directed the Fish and Wildlife Service to reissue a 2009 rule delisting the Northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf population (except in Wyoming) under the Endangered Species Act, despite a prior court order vacating that rule for violating the ESA's requirement to protect species throughout their range. Plaintiffs argued the provision was unconstitutional on separation-of-powers and other grounds. The court upheld the provision, holding that Congress validly exercised its legislative authority to change policy through the rider and that courts are bound to apply enacted statutes regardless of the legislative process used. It further concluded that the provision did not unconstitutionally bar judicial review of constitutional claims.

environmentfederal power

In Jackson v. Johnson, plaintiff Adam Jackson sued Missoula County Deputy Sheriff Jason Johnson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Johnson violated his Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully seizing him and using excessive force when Johnson tasered him during an encounter on a residential street following a car accident in June 2009; Jackson also brought pendent state-law claims. The court granted Deputy Johnson's motion for summary judgment on the unlawful seizure claim, finding that Johnson had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop and was entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied summary judgment on the excessive force claim, however, because disputed issues of material fact existed regarding whether Jackson was compliant, whether Johnson provided adequate warnings, and whether the use of the taser was reasonable under the circumstances. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims after resolving the federal claims.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involves a dispute between two insurance companies, Great American Assurance Company and Discover Property and Casualty Insurance Company, over which policy provides primary coverage for liability arising from a fatal truck accident in Texas involving a driver for Sammons Trucking. Great American sought a declaratory judgment that its non-trucking policy did not apply or was excess to Discover's policies, along with indemnity for settlement payments, while Discover counterclaimed that Great American's policy was primary and sought reimbursement for defense costs. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act and abstained from hearing the case. The core reasoning was that a parallel state case was pending, Montana law on the issues was unsettled, and abstention was appropriate to discourage forum shopping in this state-law governed coverage dispute.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involves plaintiffs challenging the U.S. Forest Service's Amended Record of Decision approving the Moose Post-Fire Project in the Flathead National Forest, alleging violations of the Endangered Species Act, National Forest Management Act, and National Environmental Policy Act under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment and reconsidered its prior order on a motion to dismiss, concluding that the Forest Service had not amended the Forest Plan as part of the project approval and that the Ninth Circuit's remand required only clarification of the agency's reasoning rather than a plan amendment. The court vacated the part of its earlier order that had interpreted the action as creating a forest-wide standard and found that the plaintiffs' arguments relying on that interpretation were no longer viable. It allowed the plaintiffs seven days to notify the court if they wished to file new summary judgment motions based on the clarified ruling.

environment

The case was a putative class action brought by plaintiff Stefanie Cramer under ERISA against her health plan insurer and subrogation administrator, alleging wrongful denial of benefits, breach of fiduciary duty, and seeking declaratory relief based on the defendants' assertion of a subrogation claim related to medical expenses paid after her car accident. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motions to dismiss, concluding that the plan's subrogation provision only barred enforcement of such a right before the insured was made whole, and that the defendants' actions—sending notices and engaging in correspondence—amounted only to assertion of the claim rather than enforcement. The court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations after de novo review of the objections.

healthcarelabor & employment

The case involved the Jacksons seeking underinsured motorist benefits under their Trinity Universal Insurance policy after their son died in a single-vehicle rollover accident while riding as a passenger in a family-owned truck driven by another person. Trinity had already paid the policy's liability limits but denied the underinsured motorist claim, asserting that the family-owned vehicle did not qualify as an underinsured motor vehicle under the policy's explicit exclusion for vehicles owned by or available for regular use of a family member. The court denied the Jacksons' motion for partial summary judgment and granted Trinity's motion for summary judgment, holding that the policy language was unambiguous and that the exclusion was valid. The decision relied on the Montana Supreme Court's ruling in Monroe v. Cogswell Agency, which upheld identical exclusions as enforceable and consistent with public policy because they do not render coverage illusory and prevent substitution of cheaper underinsured coverage for liability coverage. Arguments attempting to distinguish or cloud the precedent were rejected as inapplicable.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned a challenge by environmental groups to a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service rule that identified the northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf as a distinct population segment under the Endangered Species Act and then partially delisted it by removing federal protections in Idaho, Montana, and parts of surrounding states while retaining them elsewhere. The court held that the partial delisting rule was invalid and must be set aside. It reasoned that the ESA does not authorize listing or protecting only a portion of a species or distinct population segment as endangered, and that the Service's interpretation of the phrase "significant portion of its range" to allow such subdivision conflicted with the statute's text and legislative history, which treat a species or DPS as a single unit for protection purposes.

environment

The case concerned a challenge by four environmental organizations to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's February 2009 revised designation of approximately 39,000 square miles of critical habitat for the Canada lynx across six states under the Endangered Species Act. The plaintiffs contended that the Service arbitrarily omitted both occupied and unoccupied areas required by the ESA and failed to base the designation on the best scientific data available. The court determined that the challenge succeeded in part, finding that the Service's approach to identifying essential habitat and applying statutory standards was flawed in certain respects. The core reasoning examined the ESA's definitions of critical habitat, the obligation to use the best available science, and whether the Service's exclusion of specific areas like Colorado met those requirements.

environment

The case concerns a lawsuit by Alliance for the Wild Rockies challenging U.S. Forest Service and U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service approvals of three projects (Grizzly Vegetation and Transportation Management, Miller West Fisher, and Little Beaver Hazardous Fuels Reduction) in the Cabinet-Yaak Ecosystem grizzly bear habitat, alleging violations of the Endangered Species Act, National Forest Management Act, and National Environmental Policy Act through inadequate analysis of road densities, habitat impacts, and cumulative effects on the threatened bear population. The district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court granted the motions in part and denied them in part, concluding that the agencies' decisions on certain road-density calculations and analysis areas lacked sufficient support in the record while upholding other compliance determinations.

environmentprocedure

This case involves environmental advocacy groups challenging federal agency approvals for the proposed Rock Creek Mine, an underground copper and silver mining project on national forest lands in Montana's Cabinet Mountain Wilderness. Plaintiffs sued the U.S. Forest Service and Fish and Wildlife Service under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging violations of the Endangered Species Act, NEPA, the Clean Water Act, the Organic Act, and NFMA related to impacts on grizzly bears and bull trout. The companion case specifically contests the Fish and Wildlife Service's "no jeopardy" biological opinions for those species. The court reviewed the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment concerning the 2001 FEIS, 2003 Record of Decision, 2006/2007 biological opinions, and related documents. It applied precedents such as Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to evaluate whether the agencies properly assessed effects on critical habitat and complied with statutory requirements before authorizing mine activities.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

In this case, Ames Construction sued Intermountain Industrial for failing to secure required insurance coverage under their supply contract for a wastewater treatment plant project and sought a defense from Maxum Indemnity in an underlying state lawsuit; Intermountain and Western States Insurance Agency filed third-party claims against Maxum, which in turn sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend Ames. The district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on the insurance coverage issues. The court granted summary judgment to Ames, Intermountain, and Western States, holding that Maxum had a duty to defend Ames because the policy's endorsement for additional insureds was ambiguous regarding the certificate requirement and the intended-use exclusion did not unequivocally bar coverage. The court reasoned that ambiguities must be construed in favor of the insured under Montana law and that Maxum improperly ignored facts that could trigger coverage rather than defending under a reservation of rights.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved H&R Block seeking a preliminary injunction to enforce non-competition and non-solicitation clauses in a franchise agreement with defendant Kathryn Kutzman, who had operated tax preparation franchises in Montana until the agreement expired in 2009 and then indicated plans to continue preparing taxes in the same area. The court granted the injunction in part, barring Kutzman from competing within 45 miles for up to one year and from soliciting former clients, while denying other requested relief. It applied Montana law to find the provisions enforceable because they were reasonable in time and geographic scope, supported by consideration such as training and branding provided by H&R Block, and did not unduly harm the public interest or the defendant's ability to work. The decision rested on the likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm from loss of goodwill, and the balance of equities favoring enforcement of the contractual terms.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case stems from a 2007 multi-truck collision on Interstate 90 in Montana in which plaintiff Marcel Florea, a passenger in a Schneider truck, was injured; after the Floreas settled their negligence claims against the involved trucking companies, the remaining defendants (including Werner Enterprises) continued litigating cross-claims for contribution and indemnification based on disputed allocation of fault. Werner moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that one of its two trucks (Werner 1) played no causal role in Florea's injuries and thus could not support liability for contribution or indemnification. The magistrate judge recommended denial, finding that Werner had not met its summary-judgment burden of negating the causation element because record evidence, including the sequence of collisions and positions of vehicles, left genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Werner 1 truck contributed to the injuries. The district judge adopted the recommendation and denied the motion.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case under the Federal Tort Claims Act involved claims by the surviving spouse, children, parents, and siblings of Jay Thomas Allen, who alleged that negligence by Indian Health Services employees in diagnosing and treating his stroke and subsequent seizures caused his disability and death. The United States moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the loss-of-consortium claims of the parents and siblings under Montana's wrongful death statutes. The court denied the motion as to the parents, finding they presented sufficient evidence of an extraordinarily close and interdependent relationship with the decedent, but granted the motion as to the siblings, concluding they lacked the required showing of such a relationship or financial dependence and that Montana law does not recognize sibling consortium claims in these circumstances. Montana law governed liability and damages because the acts occurred in the state.

torts & liabilityhealthcarefamily law

This case involves Wayne Crismore's appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) challenging the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of his application for Title II disability insurance benefits, which alleged disability due to respiratory problems, leg weakness, and back pain beginning in 2003. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendation, granted Crismore's motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner's motion, reversed the ALJ's decision, and remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings. The core reasoning was that the ALJ failed to acknowledge or provide clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting the treating physician Dr. Bekemeyer's November 2006 residual functional capacity assessment, which indicated the need for unscheduled breaks and frequent absences, and that this omission was not harmless error. The court noted that treating source opinions are entitled to deference and must be properly weighed even if potentially inconsistent with other evidence.

labor & employmentfederal power

The case involved a wrongful levy action filed by Orma McPherson, a Canadian citizen, against the IRS, which had seized a vacation property in Montana to collect on her husband Robert's unpaid Canadian taxes from 1995-1998 under the U.S.-Canada tax treaty. Orma claimed sole ownership of the property based on a 1978 Declaration of Trust executed by Robert, under which he held title in trust for her after she fulfilled payment obligations using funds from her nursing income and joint accounts. The court granted summary judgment to Orma, ruling that the trust vested beneficial ownership entirely in her upon completion of payments in 1988, so the property was not subject to levy for Robert's tax debts. The decision rested on Montana trust and property law principles, finding that the trust terms were satisfied and Orma's contributions established her exclusive interest, with no subsequent events altering ownership.

taxesproperty

The case involves consolidated challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977, and NEPA to the U.S. Forest Service's Travel Management Plan and associated environmental impact statement for the Hyalite-Porcupine-Buffalo Horn Wilderness Study Area. Environmental plaintiffs contended that the plan unlawfully permitted increased motorized and mechanized vehicle use, while multiple-use plaintiffs argued that it overly restricted such activities. The court granted summary judgment to the environmental plaintiffs and denied the remaining motions, holding that the plan, despite balancing competing recreational interests, failed to maintain the wilderness character of the study area as it existed in 1977 because motorized use had increased since then and the agency did not adequately explain how its reconfiguration of use areas preserved that baseline character.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

The case concerns environmental groups' challenge to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's 2009 decision under the Endangered Species Act to delist the northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf distinct population segment in Idaho and Montana (but not Wyoming), which permitted scheduled wolf hunts. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to stop the hunts, arguing that partial delisting of a DPS violates the ESA, that the agency's assessment of unoccupied habitat was arbitrary, and that its findings on genetic exchange risks were arbitrary. The court denied the injunction, holding that plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of irreparable harm to the wolf population as a whole, even though individual wolves might be killed and even assuming a likelihood of success on the merits of the delisting claim. The ruling applied the Winter preliminary injunction factors, noting that harm to individuals does not establish population-level injury and that equitable balancing under precedents like TVA v. Hill does not overcome the absence of irreparable harm.

environmentfederal power